Narrative:

As our flight was being vectored for the final approach segment into bna, a flight attendant called from the main cabin and informed the first officer that there were fumes of unknown origin in the cabin. The first officer then kept in constant contact with the cabin crew in an effort to identify the fumes and locate the source. At approximately 6000' MSL, as we were turning to final, a deadheading large transport first officer got on the interphone and advised the first officer that the floor in mid-cabin area of the gear was hot and we ought to land immediately. When we heard 'gear area,' we elected to extend the gear immediately and eliminate this item from the developing situation. We obtained good gear indication. Now our only perceived problem was the continuing fumes. It was not deemed necessary to declare an emergency because we were number one on approach final. Landing would be immediate. Also affecting the decision not to declare an emergency was a log book entry from earlier that same day stating that the aircraft had had fumes in the cabin. The problem had been a loose clamp in the pneumatic ducting. In any case, the first officer remained in constant contact with the cabin, and I (captain) landed the aircraft and taxied off the runway. My main concern, with fumes present and increasing in intensity, was to get to the gate as soon as possible. Once again the deadhead crew member got on the interphone and informed us that the floor was hot and mushy and he thought there 'might be smoke.' I stopped the aircraft and told the ground controller we had a problem, probably in the cargo compartment. He sent the crash crews and we initiated a ground evacuate/evacuation. The crew performed admirably well, and the deadhead crew member was available source of information. The only breakdown in coordination was when the deadhead crew got on the interphone. He expressed a few of his own thoughts to the cabin crew who interpreted them as coming from the cockpit. This caused only a small amount of confusion and in no way inhibited the crew from performing all tasks at hand. In retrospect, the only thing I, as captain, would have done differently would be to have had the crash crews activated while we were on final approach and had them standing by. In a 2 person cockpit, one needs all the help one can get. With no F/east, we in the cockpit, had no opportunity at first hand information. As 'the flying pilot' I had to fly the aircraft, coordinate with ATC and do checklist items. The copilot was 'out of the loop' in trying to obtain information on our problem. There was no opportunity to speak to the passengers. This is in no way a criticism of the copilot. It demonstrates the fallacy of allowing mba's and politicians to dictate air safety. One last note;I do believe that carrying hazardous material on commercial aircraft should be limited only to life saving, life or death, critical items. Deregulation has transposed the air carrier into the 'truckers of the sky!' supplemental information on acn 81693: about five minutes after completion of the evacuate/evacuation, the middle cargo bay was opened by a company employee. The sight of smoke coming out of the bay (the cargo bays in the medium large transport do not have smoke or fire detectors) proved that our decision to evacuate immediately had been prudent. When the employee shot a liquid fire extinguisher into the bay, the smoke intensified. Since I had a halon extinguisher, I approached and released it into the bay as well with no success at stopping the smoke. It turned out that illegally shipped sodium hydroxide, in chemical reaction with something, caused the smoke and heat and probably the fumes as well. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: the cargo was marked laundry equipment so no special loading procedure were used. Temperature in the cargo compartment reached between 600-800 degrees from 10-15 mins and at this time the aircraft is still declared a total loss because of possible keel beam damage. Company and FAA investigations are still in progress.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FUMES OF UNKNOWN ORIGIN WERE DETECTED IN THE CABIN OF AN ACR MLG WHILE IT WAS ON VECTORS FOR LNDG AT BNA. EMERGENCY NOT DECLARED BUT ACFT WAS EVACUATED AFTER LNDG AND CLEARING THE RWY.

Narrative: AS OUR FLT WAS BEING VECTORED FOR THE FINAL APPROACH SEGMENT INTO BNA, A FLT ATTENDANT CALLED FROM THE MAIN CABIN AND INFORMED THE F/O THAT THERE WERE FUMES OF UNKNOWN ORIGIN IN THE CABIN. THE F/O THEN KEPT IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH THE CABIN CREW IN AN EFFORT TO IDENTIFY THE FUMES AND LOCATE THE SOURCE. AT APPROX 6000' MSL, AS WE WERE TURNING TO FINAL, A DEADHEADING LGT F/O GOT ON THE INTERPHONE AND ADVISED THE F/O THAT THE FLOOR IN MID-CABIN AREA OF THE GEAR WAS HOT AND WE OUGHT TO LAND IMMEDIATELY. WHEN WE HEARD 'GEAR AREA,' WE ELECTED TO EXTEND THE GEAR IMMEDIATELY AND ELIMINATE THIS ITEM FROM THE DEVELOPING SITUATION. WE OBTAINED GOOD GEAR INDICATION. NOW OUR ONLY PERCEIVED PROBLEM WAS THE CONTINUING FUMES. IT WAS NOT DEEMED NECESSARY TO DECLARE AN EMER BECAUSE WE WERE NUMBER ONE ON APPROACH FINAL. LNDG WOULD BE IMMEDIATE. ALSO AFFECTING THE DECISION NOT TO DECLARE AN EMER WAS A LOG BOOK ENTRY FROM EARLIER THAT SAME DAY STATING THAT THE ACFT HAD HAD FUMES IN THE CABIN. THE PROBLEM HAD BEEN A LOOSE CLAMP IN THE PNEUMATIC DUCTING. IN ANY CASE, THE F/O REMAINED IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH THE CABIN, AND I (CAPT) LANDED THE ACFT AND TAXIED OFF THE RWY. MY MAIN CONCERN, WITH FUMES PRESENT AND INCREASING IN INTENSITY, WAS TO GET TO THE GATE ASAP. ONCE AGAIN THE DEADHEAD CREW MEMBER GOT ON THE INTERPHONE AND INFORMED US THAT THE FLOOR WAS HOT AND MUSHY AND HE THOUGHT THERE 'MIGHT BE SMOKE.' I STOPPED THE ACFT AND TOLD THE GND CTLR WE HAD A PROBLEM, PROBABLY IN THE CARGO COMPARTMENT. HE SENT THE CRASH CREWS AND WE INITIATED A GND EVAC. THE CREW PERFORMED ADMIRABLY WELL, AND THE DEADHEAD CREW MEMBER WAS AVAILABLE SOURCE OF INFO. THE ONLY BREAKDOWN IN COORD WAS WHEN THE DEADHEAD CREW GOT ON THE INTERPHONE. HE EXPRESSED A FEW OF HIS OWN THOUGHTS TO THE CABIN CREW WHO INTERPRETED THEM AS COMING FROM THE COCKPIT. THIS CAUSED ONLY A SMALL AMOUNT OF CONFUSION AND IN NO WAY INHIBITED THE CREW FROM PERFORMING ALL TASKS AT HAND. IN RETROSPECT, THE ONLY THING I, AS CAPT, WOULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY WOULD BE TO HAVE HAD THE CRASH CREWS ACTIVATED WHILE WE WERE ON FINAL APPROACH AND HAD THEM STANDING BY. IN A 2 PERSON COCKPIT, ONE NEEDS ALL THE HELP ONE CAN GET. WITH NO F/E, WE IN THE COCKPIT, HAD NO OPPORTUNITY AT FIRST HAND INFORMATION. AS 'THE FLYING PILOT' I HAD TO FLY THE ACFT, COORDINATE WITH ATC AND DO CHECKLIST ITEMS. THE COPLT WAS 'OUT OF THE LOOP' IN TRYING TO OBTAIN INFO ON OUR PROB. THERE WAS NO OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK TO THE PASSENGERS. THIS IS IN NO WAY A CRITICISM OF THE COPLT. IT DEMONSTRATES THE FALLACY OF ALLOWING MBA'S AND POLITICIANS TO DICTATE AIR SAFETY. ONE LAST NOTE;I DO BELIEVE THAT CARRYING HAZARDOUS MATERIAL ON COMMERCIAL ACFT SHOULD BE LIMITED ONLY TO LIFE SAVING, LIFE OR DEATH, CRITICAL ITEMS. DEREGULATION HAS TRANSPOSED THE AIR CARRIER INTO THE 'TRUCKERS OF THE SKY!' SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION ON ACN 81693: ABOUT FIVE MINUTES AFTER COMPLETION OF THE EVAC, THE MIDDLE CARGO BAY WAS OPENED BY A COMPANY EMPLOYEE. THE SIGHT OF SMOKE COMING OUT OF THE BAY (THE CARGO BAYS IN THE MLG DO NOT HAVE SMOKE OR FIRE DETECTORS) PROVED THAT OUR DECISION TO EVACUATE IMMEDIATELY HAD BEEN PRUDENT. WHEN THE EMPLOYEE SHOT A LIQUID FIRE EXTINGUISHER INTO THE BAY, THE SMOKE INTENSIFIED. SINCE I HAD A HALON EXTINGUISHER, I APPROACHED AND RELEASED IT INTO THE BAY AS WELL WITH NO SUCCESS AT STOPPING THE SMOKE. IT TURNED OUT THAT ILLEGALLY SHIPPED SODIUM HYDROXIDE, IN CHEMICAL REACTION WITH SOMETHING, CAUSED THE SMOKE AND HEAT AND PROBABLY THE FUMES AS WELL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: THE CARGO WAS MARKED LAUNDRY EQUIPMENT SO NO SPECIAL LOADING PROC WERE USED. TEMPERATURE IN THE CARGO COMPARTMENT REACHED BETWEEN 600-800 DEGREES FROM 10-15 MINS AND AT THIS TIME THE ACFT IS STILL DECLARED A TOTAL LOSS BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE KEEL BEAM DAMAGE. COMPANY AND FAA INVESTIGATIONS ARE STILL IN PROGRESS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.