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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 822287 |
Time | |
Date | 200902 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | FO |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B747-400 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Cockpit Window |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Not Flying |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240 Flight Crew Total 16000 Flight Crew Type 3000 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Procedural Maintenance |
Narrative:
During preflight I noticed that the bottom left corner of cockpit window L2 was delaminated with opaque white fogging. Also; the moisture barrier seal on the outside of the window was separating from the window. We reported this to the station and entered it into maintenance database. Shortly thereafter; a mechanic came to the cockpit to see the defect; and quickly determined that it was deferrable. He returned to the cockpit in a few minutes with several pages from the maintenance manual and explained that it was 'within limits.' I asked if it would be a DF or cf item. He stated neither. This raised my level of concern as there was clearly a defect and should be either corrected; deferred; or carried forward in accordance with the fom. He pointed out to me the section in the MM stating; 'delamination extending more than 3.5 inches from the edge of the window must be replaced.' since the area did not extend more than 3.5 inches; he determined that it was within limits. I carefully read the document and found that the mechanic was referring to the wrong section; this one dealing with L1/R1 windshields; not the side windows. The proper reference was rather on page xx; which clearly stated that this window defect could not be deferred and must be replaced: '4(b) replace the windshield if a milky white film can be seen in the delaminated area. This is a sign of moisture ingress; which can cause arcing of the heating film.' I remain concerned; as I have reported numerous times in the recent past; that there is a serious lack of quality control with regard to this station's contract maintenance operations. Had the mechanic not made the maintenance manual guidance available for our review; this serious defect would have gone unaddressed. Pilots need to have complete confidence in the maintenance operation. We neither have the resources or the training to adequately second-guess guidance provided by maintenance. Such confidence is not possible when mechanics inaccurately interpret their guidance materials and operate in a culture where an on-time departure is more important than performing required maintenance and repairs. This was clearly evident in this incident; where parts availability was brought up several times in an attempt to get us to ignore the defect. Does the lack of stocked parts (this part was available at the airport from another carrier) or the difficulty in obtaining them obviate the requirement to perform the repair? In this particular incident; serious action by the local contract mechanics to address the defect with the boeing maintenance manual only began when we took it upon ourselves to initiate contact maintenance via satcom. Maintenance controller told me that this was the first he had heard about this problem even though the mechanic told us early in the process that he had consulted with maintenance to determine that the defect was 'within limits.' as I have suggested in previous reports; in my opinion; this station needs a comprehensive audit and continuous monitoring of its maintenance operation to ensure compliance with all applicable regulations and company procedures to ensure the required level of safety. Flights originating from this international station are operating in some of the harshest and most remote areas of the world; frequently very far from any suitable alternate. These conditions demand the highest level of quality from our maintenance operation.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B747 Captain reports L2 cockpit window delamination that Maintenance is reluctant to repair prior to departure; citing erroneous information concerning the L1 window.
Narrative: During preflight I noticed that the bottom left corner of cockpit window L2 was delaminated with opaque white fogging. Also; the moisture barrier seal on the outside of the window was separating from the window. We reported this to the station and entered it into Maintenance database. Shortly thereafter; a Mechanic came to the cockpit to see the defect; and quickly determined that it was deferrable. He returned to the cockpit in a few minutes with several pages from the Maintenance manual and explained that it was 'within limits.' I asked if it would be a DF or CF item. He stated neither. This raised my level of concern as there was clearly a defect and should be either corrected; deferred; or carried forward in accordance with the FOM. He pointed out to me the section in the MM stating; 'delamination extending more than 3.5 inches from the edge of the window must be replaced.' Since the area did not extend more than 3.5 inches; he determined that it was within limits. I carefully read the document and found that the Mechanic was referring to the wrong section; this one dealing with L1/R1 windshields; not the side windows. The proper reference was rather on page XX; which clearly stated that this window defect could not be deferred and must be replaced: '4(b) Replace the windshield if a milky white film can be seen in the delaminated area. This is a sign of moisture ingress; which can cause arcing of the heating film.' I remain concerned; as I have reported numerous times in the recent past; that there is a serious lack of quality control with regard to this station's contract Maintenance Operations. Had the Mechanic not made the Maintenance Manual guidance available for our review; this serious defect would have gone unaddressed. Pilots need to have complete confidence in the Maintenance operation. We neither have the resources or the training to adequately second-guess guidance provided by Maintenance. Such confidence is not possible when mechanics inaccurately interpret their guidance materials and operate in a culture where an on-time departure is more important than performing required maintenance and repairs. This was clearly evident in this incident; where parts availability was brought up several times in an attempt to get us to ignore the defect. Does the lack of stocked parts (this part was available at the airport from another carrier) or the difficulty in obtaining them obviate the requirement to perform the repair? In this particular incident; serious action by the local contract mechanics to address the defect with the Boeing Maintenance manual only began when we took it upon ourselves to initiate contact Maintenance via Satcom. Maintenance Controller told me that this was the first he had heard about this problem even though the Mechanic told us early in the process that he had consulted with Maintenance to determine that the defect was 'within limits.' As I have suggested in previous reports; in my opinion; this station needs a comprehensive audit and continuous monitoring of its Maintenance operation to ensure compliance with all applicable regulations and company procedures to ensure the required level of safety. Flights originating from this international station are operating in some of the harshest and most remote areas of the world; frequently very far from any suitable alternate. These conditions demand the highest level of quality from our Maintenance Operation.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.