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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 832012 |
Time | |
Date | 200904 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | EMB ERJ 140 ER&LR |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Takeoff |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe |
Narrative:
Upon gear retraction on takeoff; we got 'landing gear lever disagreement EICAS' warning. I cycled gear down; got 3 green with no messages. I cycled the gear up; and got 'landing gear lever disagreement.' both instances were associated with right main landing gear 'in transit' indication in red. We followed the aom checklist; put gear down; and returned for landing. During this period; the pilot flying was switched from the first officer to the captain. ATC was notified of our difficulty; and an emergency was declared. I also briefed the flight attendant and informed the passengers of our problem. I instructed the flight attendant that we would handle this as an emergency landing; but only evacuate if the aircraft was obviously damaged. To be certain gear was down; we also completed the manual gear extension procedure. We began one approach; but I realized we were overweight for landing. So I executed a go-around; then flew with gear and flaps down while we burned fuel. I estimated that a considerable period of time would be required to get the weight down to maximum structural landing weight; and given that it was night; the weather was relatively rough (light to occasional moderate turbulence; with low clouds and precipitation); the gear and flaps were creating considerable noise; and the unease that even the suggestion of a maintenance issue can cause in the minds of our passengers; I considered that for the psychological well-being of the passengers it was best that we get on the ground as quickly as possible consistent with safety. Because we had performed the manual landing gear extension procedure; I was very confident the gear was down and locked; and we had no reason to think that it was not: cockpit noises were consistent with the gear down; there was no other indication of gear asymmetry; such as abnormal handling characteristics; and the 'landing gear lever disagreement' indication went away when the gear was extended. All cockpit indications were that the gear was down. Therefore; I made the command decision that the best course of action was to land as soon as possible in ZZZ; the nearest suitable airport; as per the aom checklist. The next day; I was informed that the sensors were inoperative and replaced.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: EMB-140 flight crew received LG LEVER DISAGREE EICAS warning on departure. They run the procedures; declare an emergency and returned to an uneventful landing.
Narrative: Upon gear retraction on takeoff; we got 'Landing Gear Lever Disagreement EICAS' warning. I cycled gear down; got 3 green with no messages. I cycled the gear up; and got 'Landing Gear Lever Disagreement.' Both instances were associated with right main landing gear 'in transit' indication in red. We followed the AOM checklist; put gear down; and returned for landing. During this period; the pilot flying was switched from the First Officer to the Captain. ATC was notified of our difficulty; and an emergency was declared. I also briefed the Flight Attendant and informed the passengers of our problem. I instructed the Flight Attendant that we would handle this as an emergency landing; but only evacuate if the aircraft was obviously damaged. To be certain gear was down; we also completed the manual gear extension procedure. We began one approach; but I realized we were overweight for landing. So I executed a go-around; then flew with gear and flaps down while we burned fuel. I estimated that a considerable period of time would be required to get the weight down to maximum structural landing weight; and given that it was night; the weather was relatively rough (light to occasional moderate turbulence; with low clouds and precipitation); the gear and flaps were creating considerable noise; and the unease that even the suggestion of a maintenance issue can cause in the minds of our passengers; I considered that for the psychological well-being of the passengers it was best that we get on the ground as quickly as possible consistent with safety. Because we had performed the manual landing gear extension procedure; I was very confident the gear was down and locked; and we had no reason to think that it was not: cockpit noises were consistent with the gear down; there was no other indication of gear asymmetry; such as abnormal handling characteristics; and the 'Landing Gear Lever Disagreement' indication went away when the gear was extended. All cockpit indications were that the gear was down. Therefore; I made the command decision that the best course of action was to land as soon as possible in ZZZ; the nearest suitable airport; as per the AOM checklist. The next day; I was informed that the sensors were inoperative and replaced.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.