Narrative:

On a routine multi-engine IFR training flight; a student and I departed and climbed to 6;000 ft MSL cruising altitude and 20 NM north of the field; I failed the student's right engine. The student struggled with the aircraft and did not secure the engine quickly. The student was attempting to run a before securing inoperative engine checklist in an effort to get the engine running again before committing to single engine operations. A multi-engine aircraft loses roughly 80% of its climb performance with a failed engine. It may not be able to hold altitude in a situation like this; especially if the student is slow to feather the dead engine. We started a driftdown and were not able to hold altitude. This is a CFI's problem; not an ATC issue -- I messed up. Still; this was a chance for the student to handle a situation they were not expecting to encounter. I waited quietly and observed the student's actions and decisions. I looked at our altitude and noticed it was descending slightly. I hoped the student might inform ATC of an inability to hold altitude and request assistance. He did not. I noted opposite direction traffic what seemed like a good distance in front of us and at a lower altitude. There was adequate space to our left or right of course and time to react. Not wanting the situation to become dangerous; but more importantly to show the student how to address an issue like this with ATC; I made a radio call: departure; 'seminole is practicing a single engine emergency and not able to maintain altitude. Any chance we can get 5;000 ft?' seminole; 'negative; you need to maintain 6;000 ft; traffic is 10 miles opposite direction; you need to start your engine and climb.' 'roger; we are climbing.' (the simulated situation is now over.) seminole; 'we can't have that altitude change even in single engine training.' by the time we started a recovery; we were probably around 400 ft low. I take responsibility for what occurred and recognized I allowed the aircraft to do something it was not supposed to do. I understand ATC's separation requirements; and should have handled the situation differently. This is an issue of safety and demands priority over training. However; this got me thinking and I want to share a little instructor logic with those ATC controllers who might read this report. There is a push in the industry for more scenario based training. In short; a CFI will put a student into a tough situation and make a real attempt to allow the student to handle the situation until it's entirely resolved. Of course; this is no excuse to break regulation or compromise safety. I do find one of the weaker areas in this scenario based training is working with ATC. We teach to fly the plane first and communicate last but; unfortunately; the student rarely actually keys the mike. We can talk and simulate all we want; but when it comes to actually handling a realistic situation; this is often the result. It was amazing to the decisions the student (and CFI) made in an effort to handle this situation it turned out. Being able to practice with ATC and work a situation out until the end is great practice for the student. I understand what happened this evening and why they were not able to accommodate our request. I know how I could have restructured the scenario to allow realistic ATC interaction without breaking policy. I guess my hope is when a situation allows; ATC would work with a simulated emergency to benefit the student's education. Had spacing not been an issue; if ATC were able to give a 'turn to heading 090 degrees to avoid traffic;' the student might have learned how to handle this particular situation more effectively. The next time this happens; it may be for real; the student might not be able to hold altitude; and there will not be an instructor on board. How will the student react? If ATC is able to play these situations out with the CFI when safety allows; it will most certainly be a service to the overall safety of

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PA44 instructor reports deviating from assigned altitude when student is given a simulated engine failure. Deviation is allowed by instructor but not communicated to ATC in a timely manor.

Narrative: On a routine multi-engine IFR training flight; a student and I departed and climbed to 6;000 FT MSL cruising altitude and 20 NM north of the field; I failed the student's right engine. The student struggled with the aircraft and did not secure the engine quickly. The student was attempting to run a Before Securing Inoperative Engine checklist in an effort to get the engine running again before committing to single engine operations. A multi-engine aircraft loses roughly 80% of its climb performance with a failed engine. It may not be able to hold altitude in a situation like this; especially if the student is slow to feather the dead engine. We started a driftdown and were not able to hold altitude. This is a CFI's problem; not an ATC issue -- I messed up. Still; this was a chance for the student to handle a situation they were not expecting to encounter. I waited quietly and observed the student's actions and decisions. I looked at our altitude and noticed it was descending slightly. I hoped the student might inform ATC of an inability to hold altitude and request assistance. He did not. I noted opposite direction traffic what seemed like a good distance in front of us and at a lower altitude. There was adequate space to our left or right of course and time to react. Not wanting the situation to become dangerous; but more importantly to show the student how to address an issue like this with ATC; I made a radio call: Departure; 'Seminole is practicing a single engine emergency and not able to maintain altitude. Any chance we can get 5;000 FT?' Seminole; 'Negative; you need to maintain 6;000 FT; traffic is 10 miles opposite direction; you need to start your engine and climb.' 'Roger; we are climbing.' (the simulated situation is now over.) Seminole; 'We can't have that altitude change even in single engine training.' By the time we started a recovery; we were probably around 400 FT low. I take responsibility for what occurred and recognized I allowed the aircraft to do something it was not supposed to do. I understand ATC's separation requirements; and should have handled the situation differently. This is an issue of safety and demands priority over training. However; this got me thinking and I want to share a little instructor logic with those ATC controllers who might read this report. There is a push in the industry for more Scenario Based Training. In short; a CFI will put a student into a tough situation and make a real attempt to allow the student to handle the situation until it's entirely resolved. Of course; this is no excuse to break regulation or compromise safety. I do find one of the weaker areas in this scenario based training is working with ATC. We teach to fly the plane first and communicate last but; unfortunately; the student rarely actually keys the mike. We can talk and simulate all we want; but when it comes to actually handling a realistic situation; this is often the result. It was amazing to the decisions the student (and CFI) made in an effort to handle this situation it turned out. Being able to practice with ATC and work a situation out until the end is great practice for the student. I understand what happened this evening and why they were not able to accommodate our request. I know how I could have restructured the scenario to allow realistic ATC interaction without breaking policy. I guess my hope is when a situation allows; ATC would work with a simulated emergency to benefit the student's education. Had spacing not been an issue; if ATC were able to give a 'turn to heading 090 degrees to avoid traffic;' the student might have learned how to handle this particular situation more effectively. The next time this happens; it may be for real; the student might not be able to hold altitude; and there will not be an instructor on board. How will the student react? If ATC is able to play these situations out with the CFI when safety allows; it will most certainly be a service to the overall safety of

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.