Narrative:

Medium large transport X, 'te' gate departure to ZKC sector - 56, acquired on ARTS III, northwest of runway 30L. Increase in the verified altitude readout and airspeed both seemed slower than normal, but with the strong winds, I was not alarmed. Medium large transport X showed altitude of 1800' MSL; speed 200 KTS. I issued a climb to 6000' still on runway heading, (because turbojet aircraft are required to leave 2500' MSL before we can turn them, due to noise abatement). At this point, I noticed a primary target one mile behind medium large transport X, also on runway heading. This is not unusual, as visual separation is often utilized between successive departures having different departure routings/gates. Medium large transport Y, 'right' gate departure to ZKC sector - 53, acquired one mile behind medium large transport X; 210 KTS ground speed, at 2100' MSL (medium large transport X was now at 2000' and 200 KTS). The flight progress strip for medium large transport Y arrived in the drop tube from a 230 KT speed restriction, but no markings to indicate that visual separation was being used. I turned medium large transport X to 180 degree, even though he had not yet met the 2500' criteria, and asked medium large transport Y if he had the preceding company aircraft in sight. Medium large transport Y replied that he did not have medium large transport X in sight and immediately added that he was slowing from 230 KTS to 210 KTS. I told medium large transport Y to continue runway heading at 230 KTS, as his company was turning sbound, away from him. Next, I called the local control - south controller, and told her that medium large transport Y had not been maintaining visual separation with the preceding traffic. Her response was frightening - 'so what, he left right behind the other guy...I'm getting them all out of town.' at the closest point, the aircraft were one mile apart, slowly decreasing, and separated by 100' altitude. IFR departure separation was never established by the local controller, and even the visual separation, (which would be questionable in this weather) was not attempted. It greatly concerns me that the inexperienced tower fpl knew there was no existing separation and did not care. Backgnd information: 'te' departure gate is southeast of lambert, while 'right' gate is southwest. - Stl standard instrument departure specifies climb to 5000' MSL. - Strip marking for visual separation, 'va aircraft I.D.' written in boxes 13 through 15 indicate visual applied from aircraft I.D.' with a ceiling of 1800' the aircraft would enter the clouds at 2400' MSL. - Even with a close proximity to medium large transport X, medium large transport Y could not see the aircraft due to climb confign and an altitude above the first aircraft. Callback conversation revealed the following information: reporter stated that the stl ATC facility was in the process of operationally splitting the tower cabin attendant function from the TRACON function, meaning that controller would no longer work in both the tower cabin attendant and TRACON radar room. The tower local control during this incident was one of the personnel who would remain in the tower and not qualify in the radar function. Reporter's main concern in this system error was the local controller's lack of concern or or understanding of just how dangerous and difficult this type of operation is. He feels that with the cabin attendant and radar room split permanently, they will lose the feel for each, separate function and incidents of this type will become more frequent. Analyst suggested that he make a formal suggestion to facility management that a system of cross-facility familiarization be established for the purpose of keeping each workforce aware of the other's problems and desires.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION BETWEEN TWO SUCCESSIVE IFR DEP WITH THE SECOND FASTER THAN THE FIRST.

Narrative: MLG X, 'TE' GATE DEPARTURE TO ZKC SECTOR - 56, ACQUIRED ON ARTS III, NORTHWEST OF RUNWAY 30L. INCREASE IN THE VERIFIED ALTITUDE READOUT AND AIRSPEED BOTH SEEMED SLOWER THAN NORMAL, BUT WITH THE STRONG WINDS, I WAS NOT ALARMED. MLG X SHOWED ALTITUDE OF 1800' MSL; SPEED 200 KTS. I ISSUED A CLIMB TO 6000' STILL ON RUNWAY HEADING, (BECAUSE TURBOJET ACFT ARE REQUIRED TO LEAVE 2500' MSL BEFORE WE CAN TURN THEM, DUE TO NOISE ABATEMENT). AT THIS POINT, I NOTICED A PRIMARY TARGET ONE MILE BEHIND MLG X, ALSO ON RUNWAY HEADING. THIS IS NOT UNUSUAL, AS VISUAL SEPARATION IS OFTEN UTILIZED BETWEEN SUCCESSIVE DEPARTURES HAVING DIFFERENT DEPARTURE ROUTINGS/GATES. MLG Y, 'R' GATE DEPARTURE TO ZKC SECTOR - 53, ACQUIRED ONE MILE BEHIND MLG X; 210 KTS GND SPEED, AT 2100' MSL (MLG X WAS NOW AT 2000' AND 200 KTS). THE FLIGHT PROGRESS STRIP FOR MLG Y ARRIVED IN THE DROP TUBE FROM A 230 KT SPEED RESTRICTION, BUT NO MARKINGS TO INDICATE THAT VISUAL SEPARATION WAS BEING USED. I TURNED MLG X TO 180 DEG, EVEN THOUGH HE HAD NOT YET MET THE 2500' CRITERIA, AND ASKED MLG Y IF HE HAD THE PRECEDING COMPANY ACFT IN SIGHT. MLG Y REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE MLG X IN SIGHT AND IMMEDIATELY ADDED THAT HE WAS SLOWING FROM 230 KTS TO 210 KTS. I TOLD MLG Y TO CONTINUE RUNWAY HEADING AT 230 KTS, AS HIS COMPANY WAS TURNING SBOUND, AWAY FROM HIM. NEXT, I CALLED THE LOCAL CONTROL - SOUTH CTLR, AND TOLD HER THAT MLG Y HAD NOT BEEN MAINTAINING VISUAL SEPARATION WITH THE PRECEDING TFC. HER RESPONSE WAS FRIGHTENING - 'SO WHAT, HE LEFT RIGHT BEHIND THE OTHER GUY...I'M GETTING THEM ALL OUT OF TOWN.' AT THE CLOSEST POINT, THE ACFT WERE ONE MILE APART, SLOWLY DECREASING, AND SEPARATED BY 100' ALTITUDE. IFR DEPARTURE SEPARATION WAS NEVER ESTABLISHED BY THE LOCAL CTLR, AND EVEN THE VISUAL SEPARATION, (WHICH WOULD BE QUESTIONABLE IN THIS WEATHER) WAS NOT ATTEMPTED. IT GREATLY CONCERNS ME THAT THE INEXPERIENCED TWR FPL KNEW THERE WAS NO EXISTING SEPARATION AND DID NOT CARE. BACKGND INFORMATION: 'TE' DEPARTURE GATE IS SE OF LAMBERT, WHILE 'R' GATE IS SW. - STL STANDARD INSTRUMENT DEPARTURE SPECIFIES CLIMB TO 5000' MSL. - STRIP MARKING FOR VISUAL SEPARATION, 'VA ACFT I.D.' WRITTEN IN BOXES 13 THROUGH 15 INDICATE VISUAL APPLIED FROM ACFT I.D.' WITH A CEILING OF 1800' THE ACFT WOULD ENTER THE CLOUDS AT 2400' MSL. - EVEN WITH A CLOSE PROXIMITY TO MLG X, MLG Y COULD NOT SEE THE ACFT DUE TO CLIMB CONFIGN AND AN ALTITUDE ABOVE THE FIRST ACFT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: RPTR STATED THAT THE STL ATC FAC WAS IN THE PROCESS OF OPERATIONALLY SPLITTING THE TWR CAB FUNCTION FROM THE TRACON FUNCTION, MEANING THAT CTLR WOULD NO LONGER WORK IN BOTH THE TWR CAB AND TRACON RADAR ROOM. THE TWR LC DURING THIS INCIDENT WAS ONE OF THE PERSONNEL WHO WOULD REMAIN IN THE TWR AND NOT QUALIFY IN THE RADAR FUNCTION. RPTR'S MAIN CONCERN IN THIS SYSTEM ERROR WAS THE LOCAL CTLR'S LACK OF CONCERN OR OR UNDERSTANDING OF JUST HOW DANGEROUS AND DIFFICULT THIS TYPE OF OPERATION IS. HE FEELS THAT WITH THE CAB AND RADAR ROOM SPLIT PERMANENTLY, THEY WILL LOSE THE FEEL FOR EACH, SEPARATE FUNCTION AND INCIDENTS OF THIS TYPE WILL BECOME MORE FREQUENT. ANALYST SUGGESTED THAT HE MAKE A FORMAL SUGGESTION TO FAC MGMNT THAT A SYSTEM OF CROSS-FACILITY FAMILIARIZATION BE ESTABLISHED FOR THE PURPOSE OF KEEPING EACH WORKFORCE AWARE OF THE OTHER'S PROBLEMS AND DESIRES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.