Narrative:

After landing lax on runway 25R found gate was occupied. Ground controller in an almost abusive manner issued clearance to air carrier hangar via juliet (outer) taxiway for holding. Cockpit crew was completely unfamiliar with that area of the airport. Flight was ordered to vacate txwys by taxiing into uncontrolled air carrier ramp area. Captain first attempted to park on outer edge of ramp next to a parked air carrier large transport. Entry is thought to have been made via taxiway 23K as depicted on lax 10-9 chart, crossing of a veh traffic lan was noted and captain thinks an inner taxiway (kilo) was crossed entering the ramp. After parking on outer edge of ramp, west/O ground personnel clearance, the flight was ordered further into the uncontrolled ramp area by the ground controller to allow other aircraft in behind. Flight taxied deep into area and turned around to face an first officer air carrier that had parked in vacated space and was deplaning passenger. After gate became available, flight was cleared out of ramp area by the ground controller (who was still abrasive and uncooperative) to the gate via juliet taxiway. Because of deplaning process in the vicinity of K23 captain elected to exit ramp through unoccupied air cargo ramp. This caused flight to enter juliet taxiway from behind a blast fence that blocked the view of the inner if one actually exists at that point. As flight progressed wbound on juliet cautiously and unsure as to whether they were on the inner or outer (no signs were visible) captain noted aircraft in the distance eastbound on the same taxiway and asked crew if we might be on the inner. First officer referred to 10-9 and stated 'we should be on the outer.' captain took that to be confirmation we were on the inner and needed to transition to the outer. At the next cross taxiway (24J) captain turned left on a blue lighted taxiway and right following blue lights that turned into white runway edge lights. Crew immediately realized location on active runway and expedited taxi to first exit taxiway. After established on juliet taxiway crew observed an aircraft fly past at 200-300'. First officer and second officer believe that 10-9 chart is in error and inner taxiway has been replaced by veh lanes. Summary of incident is that a highly competent, alert and motivated 3-M crew in an unfamiliar area, goaded by a hurried, coercive controller didn't have enough chartage or ground visual cues to determine location on the airport and avoid active runway. Supplemental information from acn 84119: as we taxied on the outer taxiway an aircraft passed over on a go around at about 200-300'.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TAXIING LGT TAXIED ONTO ACTIVE RWY WITHOUT CLRNC.

Narrative: AFTER LNDG LAX ON RWY 25R FOUND GATE WAS OCCUPIED. GND CTLR IN AN ALMOST ABUSIVE MANNER ISSUED CLRNC TO ACR HANGAR VIA JULIET (OUTER) TXWY FOR HOLDING. COCKPIT CREW WAS COMPLETELY UNFAMILIAR WITH THAT AREA OF THE ARPT. FLT WAS ORDERED TO VACATE TXWYS BY TAXIING INTO UNCTLED ACR RAMP AREA. CAPT FIRST ATTEMPTED TO PARK ON OUTER EDGE OF RAMP NEXT TO A PARKED ACR LGT. ENTRY IS THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN MADE VIA TXWY 23K AS DEPICTED ON LAX 10-9 CHART, XING OF A VEH TFC LAN WAS NOTED AND CAPT THINKS AN INNER TXWY (KILO) WAS CROSSED ENTERING THE RAMP. AFTER PARKING ON OUTER EDGE OF RAMP, W/O GND PERSONNEL CLRNC, THE FLT WAS ORDERED FURTHER INTO THE UNCTLED RAMP AREA BY THE GND CTLR TO ALLOW OTHER ACFT IN BEHIND. FLT TAXIED DEEP INTO AREA AND TURNED AROUND TO FACE AN F/O ACR THAT HAD PARKED IN VACATED SPACE AND WAS DEPLANING PAX. AFTER GATE BECAME AVAILABLE, FLT WAS CLRED OUT OF RAMP AREA BY THE GND CTLR (WHO WAS STILL ABRASIVE AND UNCOOPERATIVE) TO THE GATE VIA JULIET TXWY. BECAUSE OF DEPLANING PROCESS IN THE VICINITY OF K23 CAPT ELECTED TO EXIT RAMP THROUGH UNOCCUPIED AIR CARGO RAMP. THIS CAUSED FLT TO ENTER JULIET TXWY FROM BEHIND A BLAST FENCE THAT BLOCKED THE VIEW OF THE INNER IF ONE ACTUALLY EXISTS AT THAT POINT. AS FLT PROGRESSED WBOUND ON JULIET CAUTIOUSLY AND UNSURE AS TO WHETHER THEY WERE ON THE INNER OR OUTER (NO SIGNS WERE VISIBLE) CAPT NOTED ACFT IN THE DISTANCE EBND ON THE SAME TXWY AND ASKED CREW IF WE MIGHT BE ON THE INNER. F/O REFERRED TO 10-9 AND STATED 'WE SHOULD BE ON THE OUTER.' CAPT TOOK THAT TO BE CONFIRMATION WE WERE ON THE INNER AND NEEDED TO TRANSITION TO THE OUTER. AT THE NEXT CROSS TXWY (24J) CAPT TURNED LEFT ON A BLUE LIGHTED TXWY AND RIGHT FOLLOWING BLUE LIGHTS THAT TURNED INTO WHITE RWY EDGE LIGHTS. CREW IMMEDIATELY REALIZED LOCATION ON ACTIVE RWY AND EXPEDITED TAXI TO FIRST EXIT TXWY. AFTER ESTABLISHED ON JULIET TXWY CREW OBSERVED AN ACFT FLY PAST AT 200-300'. F/O AND S/O BELIEVE THAT 10-9 CHART IS IN ERROR AND INNER TXWY HAS BEEN REPLACED BY VEH LANES. SUMMARY OF INCIDENT IS THAT A HIGHLY COMPETENT, ALERT AND MOTIVATED 3-M CREW IN AN UNFAMILIAR AREA, GOADED BY A HURRIED, COERCIVE CTLR DIDN'T HAVE ENOUGH CHARTAGE OR GND VISUAL CUES TO DETERMINE LOCATION ON THE ARPT AND AVOID ACTIVE RWY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 84119: AS WE TAXIED ON THE OUTER TXWY AN ACFT PASSED OVER ON A GO AROUND AT ABOUT 200-300'.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.