Narrative:

Our airplane had previously been written up for a #2 hydraulic quantity loss four times in the past two days. Upon receiving the release; we noticed that the #2 AC gen caution light was deferred. This struck us as odd since the #2 AC gen had been written up. We started engines and monitored the load meter per the MEL. We noticed that no load was showing on the load meter indicating that the AC gen was indeed not working. There is no MEL for the AC gen; only the warning system. I then contacted maintenance control to inform them that the AC gen was broke and the MEL was not valid. They then suggested we ferry the aircraft if we were comfortable with that. Not knowing what provisions were in the cfm or QRH for an inoperative AC gen; I informed dispatch we would call them back. We consulted the cfm and QRH and did not find any guidance for a dual AC gen failure. We were concerned that with the additional load on the #1 AC gen it too may fail. We did not feel it prudent to ferry the aircraft with a questionable hydraulic system and one AC gen. We informed dispatch of our decision who then conferenced me in with mr X. Mr X did not know enough about the dash 8 so he sent us to captain Y. Captain Y did not see what our problem was and said we should take it. I explained the above and how with previous gen failures; the other has failed soon after in my experience. This would leave us without aux fuel pumps; ice protection; both spus; and no trus. In case of a #1 engine failure; we would have no way to transfer fuel; possibly no hydraulics; and only one operating dc gen. Captain Y explained that I was dealing with situations that were highly unlikely and that ferry permits were not issued lightly. (The local mechanic was not required to perform any additional inspections.) he said that he would ferry the plane. I again emphasized our unwillingness to ferry the plane in its current condition. He asked if I had ever done a dual AC gen failure in the simulator; and I said I could not recall. He then asked how long I had been in the plane and that they 'would have to make sure that was on my next sim.' I may have done one; but I honestly don't remember. Captain Y placed me on hold and when he came back said he had spoken with mr Z and that it was my decision whether or not to take the plane; but a meeting may be necessary to 'review my decision making abilities.' captain Y's attitude suggested that my decision was not sufficient and was in effect wrong. If I did not ferry the aircraft; I faced a meeting with the chief pilot to determine whether I should be a captain or not. Mr west then contacted me about the situation and was surprised when I told him it was an AC gen; not a dc gen. I inquired about additional guidance in case of dual AC gen failure as there was none in our QRH; and mr west said there was none that he knew of. We were then all conferenced with captain Y and it was again made clear that the plane should be ferried. If we received a dual AC gen failure; captain Y suggested that is why we were pilots and we would figure it out. I discussed the situation with my first officer and we covered all the scenarios we could come up with. We were highly concerned with the condition of the #2 hydraulic system and only having one AC gen; but in light of the pressure being placed upon us; decided to attempt to ferry the plane. We appeared to be the only two people who didn't think it was a good idea. After starting the engines; we began our taxi out and noticed the #2 hydraulic system quantity was decreasing. We returned to the gate and about the time we returned the quantity reached 0. One of the exact situations that we were told was highly unlikely. Thankfully; it occurred before we were airborne. Preventative actions: 1. Pilots should not be forced to ferry an aircraft with two highly important systems questionable or inoperative. 2. Mx should ensure they are meling the appropriate item. 3. The captain should not face an hour of pressure to complete a flight if he has reasonable cause not to take it. 4. Procedures should be established for situations which may occur during ferry flights (i.e. Dual AC gen failure).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DHC-8 Captain reported repeated efforts to coerce him into ferrying an aircraft he felt was not airworthy.

Narrative: Our airplane had previously been written up for a #2 hydraulic quantity loss four times in the past two days. Upon receiving the release; we noticed that the #2 AC GEN Caution Light was deferred. This struck us as odd since the #2 AC GEN had been written up. We started engines and monitored the load meter per the MEL. We noticed that no load was showing on the load meter indicating that the AC GEN was indeed not working. There is no MEL for the AC GEN; only the warning system. I then contacted Maintenance Control to inform them that the AC GEN was broke and the MEL was not valid. They then suggested we ferry the aircraft if we were comfortable with that. Not knowing what provisions were in the CFM or QRH for an inoperative AC GEN; I informed Dispatch we would call them back. We consulted the CFM and QRH and did not find any guidance for a dual AC GEN failure. We were concerned that with the additional load on the #1 AC GEN it too may fail. We did not feel it prudent to ferry the aircraft with a questionable Hydraulic system and one AC GEN. We informed Dispatch of our decision who then conferenced me in with Mr X. Mr X did not know enough about the Dash 8 so he sent us to Captain Y. Captain Y did not see what our problem was and said we should take it. I explained the above and how with previous GEN failures; the other has failed soon after in my experience. This would leave us without Aux Fuel Pumps; Ice Protection; Both SPUs; and no TRUs. In case of a #1 Engine Failure; we would have no way to transfer fuel; possibly no hydraulics; and only one operating DC GEN. Captain Y explained that I was dealing with situations that were highly unlikely and that ferry permits were not issued lightly. (The Local Mechanic was not required to perform any additional inspections.) He said that he would ferry the plane. I again emphasized our unwillingness to ferry the plane in its current condition. He asked if I had ever done a dual AC GEN failure in the simulator; and I said I could not recall. He then asked how long I had been in the plane and that they 'would have to make sure that was on my next sim.' I may have done one; but I honestly don't remember. Captain Y placed me on hold and when he came back said he had spoken with Mr Z and that it was my decision whether or not to take the plane; but a meeting may be necessary to 'review my decision making abilities.' Captain Y's attitude suggested that my decision was not sufficient and was in effect wrong. If I did not ferry the aircraft; I faced a meeting with the Chief Pilot to determine whether I should be a captain or not. Mr W then contacted me about the situation and was surprised when I told him it was an AC GEN; not a DC GEN. I inquired about additional guidance in case of dual AC GEN failure as there was none in our QRH; and Mr W said there was none that he knew of. We were then all conferenced with Captain Y and it was again made clear that the plane should be ferried. If we received a dual AC GEN failure; Captain Y suggested that is why we were pilots and we would figure it out. I discussed the situation with my First Officer and we covered all the scenarios we could come up with. We were highly concerned with the condition of the #2 hydraulic system and only having one AC GEN; but in light of the pressure being placed upon us; decided to attempt to ferry the plane. We appeared to be the only two people who didn't think it was a good idea. After starting the engines; we began our taxi out and noticed the #2 hydraulic system quantity was decreasing. We returned to the gate and about the time we returned the quantity reached 0. One of the exact situations that we were told was highly unlikely. Thankfully; it occurred before we were airborne. Preventative Actions: 1. Pilots should not be forced to ferry an aircraft with two highly important systems questionable or inoperative. 2. MX should ensure they are MELing the appropriate item. 3. The Captain should not face an hour of pressure to complete a flight if he has reasonable cause not to take it. 4. Procedures should be established for situations which may occur during ferry flights (i.e. dual AC GEN failure).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.