Narrative:

After normal thru flight checks and ACARS weight & balance calculations all data was (auto) loaded into the FMC. Stab trim for takeoff was checked and the stab trim setting from the previous taxi-in was the same as the new takeoff trim for this flight and no stab trim changes were made. Taxi-out briefing was conducted and proper trim settings noted during the before takeoff checklist challenge & response. When cleared for takeoff the operation was normal until approximately 200-300 feet AGL when I tried to use the yoke trim switches to trim the aircraft. After two or three unsuccessful attempts to trim I noted to the captain that I had no stabilizer trim control. As the airplane was flying without excessive control forces we continued the climb and completed the normal takeoff profile; climb checklist and ATC switch to departure control. Departure control assigned a higher altitude of 14;000' and a southeasterly heading. Not long thereafter we requested to stop climb at 10;000' and let the controller know we needed a few moments to clarify an anomaly. During the next several minutes we noted that the captains yoke trim switches were also inoperative. The autopilot did not trim the stabilizer either. After I (PF) continued aircraft control and the ATC comm; the captain confirmed that there were no circuit breakers popped on any of the cb panels. The captain took the QRH and we went through the stabilizer inop checklist which leads into the stabilizer runaway checklist. After completing the checklist the captain contacted dispatch on Comm2 and conferenced with our dispatcher and maintenance. After verifying our actions the decision was made to return to ZZZ. Landing weight was not an issue as we had taken off at approximately 113;000 pounds. The captain and I transferred controls (he became PF) and he had me look through the QRH checklists to ensure we had completed them correctly and to ensure correct preparations for our return. He declared our emergency and we requested vectors for a longer than normal straight-in approach to the longest runway. Earlier in the event he had given the flight attendant team a temporary rundown on why we had leveled off for so long and why the vectors. He also had spoken with the passengers prior to taking control of the aircraft and declaring our emergency. As we continued our return to he had me (PNF/pm) provide the formal test information to the flight attendants and confirmed they had no questions for him. The vectors; approach and landing were uneventful and the emergency equipment standing by was thanked and released as we continued a normal taxi back to the gate. (A final note....the emergency equipment had a dedicated frequency to speak with our aircraft following landing. Their transmissions were very difficult to understand and sounded as if there was a large amount of wind noise blowing past their microphones. We ended up relaying most information to them through the ground controller/frequency. In more dire situations communications with the rescue trucks would have been spotty at best). Flying back today we had a brief radio conversation with maintenance to find out what they had determined regarding the trim malfunction. Maintenance radioed back that they had found the main stabilizer trim motor malfunctioned and inoperative and had replaced it with a new one. The event happened because a component failed sometime between the taxi-in and just after takeoff on the next flight (the first time the trim switches were pushed).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 crew experiences stabilizer trim motor failure shortly after takeoff. After complying with QRH procedures an emergency is declared and flight returns to departure airport.

Narrative: After normal thru flight checks and ACARS weight & balance calculations all data was (auto) loaded into the FMC. Stab Trim for takeoff was checked and the stab trim setting from the previous taxi-in was the same as the new takeoff trim for this flight and no stab trim changes were made. Taxi-out briefing was conducted and proper Trim Settings noted during the Before Takeoff Checklist challenge & response. When cleared for takeoff the operation was normal until approximately 200-300 feet AGL when I tried to use the yoke trim switches to trim the aircraft. After two or three unsuccessful attempts to trim I noted to the Captain that I had no Stabilizer Trim control. As the airplane was flying without excessive control forces we continued the climb and completed the normal takeoff profile; Climb Checklist and ATC switch to Departure Control. Departure Control assigned a higher altitude of 14;000' and a southeasterly heading. Not long thereafter we requested to stop climb at 10;000' and let the controller know we needed a few moments to clarify an anomaly. During the next several minutes we noted that the Captains yoke trim switches were also inoperative. The autopilot did not trim the stabilizer either. After I (PF) continued aircraft control and the ATC Comm; the Captain confirmed that there were no circuit breakers popped on any of the cb panels. The Captain took the QRH and we went through the Stabilizer Inop Checklist which leads into the Stabilizer Runaway Checklist. After completing the checklist the Captain contacted Dispatch on Comm2 and conferenced with our Dispatcher and Maintenance. After verifying our actions the decision was made to return to ZZZ. Landing Weight was not an issue as we had taken off at approximately 113;000 pounds. The Captain and I transferred controls (he became PF) and he had me look through the QRH checklists to ensure we had completed them correctly and to ensure correct preparations for our return. He declared our emergency and we requested vectors for a longer than normal straight-in approach to the longest runway. Earlier in the event he had given the flight attendant team a temporary rundown on why we had leveled off for so long and why the vectors. He also had spoken with the passengers prior to taking control of the aircraft and declaring our emergency. As we continued our return to he had me (PNF/PM) provide the formal TEST information to the flight attendants and confirmed they had no questions for him. The vectors; approach and landing were uneventful and the emergency equipment standing by was thanked and released as we continued a normal taxi back to the gate. (A final note....the emergency equipment had a dedicated frequency to speak with our aircraft following landing. Their transmissions were very difficult to understand and sounded as if there was a large amount of wind noise blowing past their microphones. We ended up relaying most information to them through the ground controller/frequency. In more dire situations communications with the rescue trucks would have been spotty at best). Flying back today we had a brief radio conversation with Maintenance to find out what they had determined regarding the trim malfunction. Maintenance radioed back that they had found the main stabilizer trim motor malfunctioned and inoperative and had replaced it with a new one. The event happened because a component failed sometime between the taxi-in and just after takeoff on the next flight (the first time the trim switches were pushed).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.