Narrative:

Captain was the flying pilot. At 6;000 ft got [a] hydraulic green system low pressure [fault]. Transferred control of aircraft and radios to the first officer. Captain performed initial part of ECAM by turning off the pump. Then received a hydraulic ptu fault and performed ECAM. Then hydraulic yellow electric pump overheat with fault lights in both yellow hydraulic pump switches; performed ECAM. This immediately brought on autoflight/autopilot off ECAM followed by hydraulic green and yellow low pressure ECAM. Captain performed all ECAM procedures and checklists. He made a PA to the flight attendant's and passengers while the first officer declared an emergency and coordinated with ATC to return to field. Captain sent ACARS message to dispatch; called operations; and gave flight attendants the test information. At this point we had the following inoperative systems: flaps (slats only); stabilizer; brakes; thrust rev 1-2; anti-skid; autobrakes; autopilot; nose wheel steering; yaw damper and other less important ones. We had to manually lower the gear (no retraction capability on go-around). On final; captain and first officer agreed to transfer control back to captain for landing and discussed tail strike considerations and possible go-around. While captain was flying; he recalled one note from the numerous ecams and checklists that directed the crew to restore hydraulic yellow system once the temperature came down. The first officer selected the yellow pump back on. We now had an airplane that was very controllable. Many systems were recovered including flaps; stabilizer; yaw damper; some spoilers; one reverser; and brakes. We landed normally. We were airborne a total of 32 minutes. Maintenance found green hydraulic reservoir empty. The new training procedures worked great; but I probably should have written down the one important note to restore any systems if able. We were just fortunate that we had enough time left to consider what little we had and how to get back what we could. The first officer was great at communicating with ATC and then me while aircraft pitch and altitude were critical along with speeds. Also; we turned autothrust off. It did not help with pitch control during dual hydraulic system failure and turbulence. Another factor was the flight attendants. Before we could call them or make a PA because our hands were full; two of them called from different locations on the long A321 to mention loud noises from the cargo compartment. It's important to notify them as quickly as you can to avoid interruptions in the checklists.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A321 flight crew experiences loss of Green hydraulic system pressure during initial climbout; followed by a PTU fault and a Yellow hydraulic system overheat. Yellow system pump is turned off resulting in loss of flaps (slats only); stabilizer trim; brakes; thrust Rev 1-2; anti-skid; autobrakes; autopilot; nose wheel steering; yaw damper among other other less important items. The Yellow system is restored when the system cools resulting in restoration of most flight controls.

Narrative: Captain was the flying pilot. At 6;000 FT got [a] Hydraulic Green System Low Pressure [fault]. Transferred control of aircraft and radios to the First Officer. Captain performed initial part of ECAM by turning off the pump. Then received a Hydraulic PTU Fault and performed ECAM. Then Hydraulic Yellow Electric Pump Overheat with fault lights in both yellow hydraulic pump switches; performed ECAM. This immediately brought on autoflight/autopilot off ECAM followed by Hydraulic Green and Yellow Low Pressure ECAM. Captain performed all ECAM procedures and checklists. He made a PA to the flight attendant's and passengers while the First Officer declared an emergency and coordinated with ATC to return to field. Captain sent ACARS message to Dispatch; called Operations; and gave flight attendants the TEST information. At this point we had the following inoperative systems: flaps (slats only); stabilizer; brakes; thrust Rev 1-2; anti-skid; autobrakes; autopilot; nose wheel steering; yaw damper and other less important ones. We had to manually lower the gear (no retraction capability on go-around). On final; Captain and First Officer agreed to transfer control back to Captain for landing and discussed tail strike considerations and possible go-around. While Captain was flying; he recalled one note from the numerous ECAMs and checklists that directed the crew to restore Hydraulic Yellow System once the temperature came down. The First Officer selected the yellow pump back on. We now had an airplane that was very controllable. Many systems were recovered including flaps; stabilizer; yaw damper; some spoilers; one reverser; and brakes. We landed normally. We were airborne a total of 32 minutes. Maintenance found Green hydraulic reservoir empty. The new training procedures worked great; but I probably should have written down the one important note to restore any systems if able. We were just fortunate that we had enough time left to consider what little we had and how to get back what we could. The First Officer was great at communicating with ATC and then me while aircraft pitch and altitude were critical along with speeds. Also; we turned autothrust off. It did not help with pitch control during dual hydraulic system failure and turbulence. Another factor was the flight attendants. Before we could call them or make a PA because our hands were full; two of them called from different locations on the long A321 to mention loud noises from the cargo compartment. It's important to notify them as quickly as you can to avoid interruptions in the checklists.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.