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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 854415 |
Time | |
Date | 200910 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B737-700 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Nose Gear Tire |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 169 |
Person 2 | |
Function | First Officer |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300 Flight Crew Total 65 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Other / Unknown |
Narrative:
After arriving at the gate on a routine flight; the ramp agent informed me that the right front nose wheel tire pressure looked low. I went down to inspect it and found that it was low; almost flat. I contacted dispatch to coordinate with maintenance to have the tire changed. When I spoke to the dispatcher; he said they were already aware of it and had already informed ops. I asked how dispatch found out about it and they said they had been informed by ground ops. Apparently; ramp personnel noticed the low tire pressure after they disconnected the tug and we were taxiing for takeoff; at our departure station. Ground ops said they tried to contact us 3 times but must have tried contacting us when my first officer was monitoring the ATIS freq on the #2 radio for the latest ATIS update (non d-atis airfield). We did not know about the low tire pressure prior to takeoff and proceeded to depart. While we were enroute; dispatch was notified. Dispatch; however; failed to notify us of the situation via ACARS. The flight and landing were uneventful. The first we learned of the low tire pressure was after we were parked at the gate. Both nose wheel tires were subsequently changed. While talking to both dispatch and ground ops; I informed both parties how important it was to notify us. If ground ops was unable to contact us on the company frequency; they could have called the tower and had them tell us to contact company. Once dispatch found out; they immediately should have passed the information via ACARS. Had we known about the situation prior to takeoff; we would have returned to the gate. Had we learned about it in flight; we would have taken precautions during landing to be ready for a tire failure. In my conversation with ground ops; it appears the condition of the tire got worse during the flight. They said that on taxi the pressure was only a little low. By the time we got to the gate; the tire pressure was significantly low; almost flat. This may have led everyone to feel a little less concerned about notifying us. In any case; we needed to have been informed to take the appropriate action. This is another example of how d-atis and ACARS are great tools; allowing us to be monitoring company or guard on the #2 radio.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737 Captain informed upon gate arrival that one nose tire appears under inflated. Further investigation reveals the tire is low and was discovered during the previous pushback but not relayed to the crew for a variety of reasons.
Narrative: After arriving at the gate on a routine flight; the Ramp Agent informed me that the right front nose wheel tire pressure looked low. I went down to inspect it and found that it was low; almost flat. I contacted dispatch to coordinate with Maintenance to have the tire changed. When I spoke to the Dispatcher; he said they were already aware of it and had already informed Ops. I asked how Dispatch found out about it and they said they had been informed by Ground Ops. Apparently; ramp personnel noticed the low tire pressure after they disconnected the tug and we were taxiing for takeoff; at our departure station. Ground Ops said they tried to contact us 3 times but must have tried contacting us when my First Officer was monitoring the ATIS freq on the #2 radio for the latest ATIS update (non D-ATIS airfield). We did not know about the low tire pressure prior to takeoff and proceeded to depart. While we were enroute; Dispatch was notified. Dispatch; however; failed to notify us of the situation via ACARS. The flight and landing were uneventful. The first we learned of the low tire pressure was after we were parked at the gate. Both nose wheel tires were subsequently changed. While talking to both dispatch and Ground Ops; I informed both parties how important it was to notify us. If Ground Ops was unable to contact us on the company frequency; they could have called the Tower and had them tell us to contact company. Once Dispatch found out; they immediately should have passed the information via ACARS. Had we known about the situation prior to takeoff; we would have returned to the gate. Had we learned about it in flight; we would have taken precautions during landing to be ready for a tire failure. In my conversation with Ground Ops; it appears the condition of the tire got worse during the flight. They said that on taxi the pressure was only a little low. By the time we got to the gate; the tire pressure was significantly low; almost flat. This may have led everyone to feel a little less concerned about notifying us. In any case; we needed to have been informed to take the appropriate action. This is another example of how D-ATIS and ACARS are great tools; allowing us to be monitoring company or guard on the #2 radio.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.