Narrative:

Proceeded through the normal external and internal checklists. The first officer did the external preflight. I proceeded to complete the internal checklist and ready all the necessary weight and balance forms. I finished the pre-departure checklist. At the point of setting the parking brake in the checklists. I set it, then it released itself. Instead of resetting it, I elected to leave it off after noting the pneumatic pressure in the main and brake system. At this point, we had approximately 1900 psi in the system--just enough to taxi to the runway and takeoff with the minimum required 1500 psi. Earlier in the day, the first officer noted the lefthand our board antiskid was slow to respond during the test, indicating there was a slow release of air from the pneumatic system anytime the brakes were applied. On our departure from bradley in the morning, we had charged the system with one engine running with no results for 20 mins. Then we did the same with 2 engines running for approximately 25 additional mins, after which we finally obtained the takeoff minimum of 1500 psi. While charging with 2 engines, the first officer and I took turns holding the right brake only. I did not use the parking brake because of the possible leak. While doing one of the checklists, I noticed a ramp agent removing the chocks west/O any prior permission or signal from myself. I yelled at him to put the chocks back since the brakes may not be set. The ramp agent acknowledged the command to replace them. I started the engine in the usual order--#2 then #1. After pushing the start button for #1, I looked out my window there was a ramp agent (#2) walking under the lh wing. I observed this #2 ramp agent gesturing to the ramp agent who had cleared us for start. The only part I understood was that the aft door was not shut. The F/a closed the door right as the lh engine was starting. After both engines were started, I called for the after starting checklist. After switching to internal power, I signaled for APU disconnect using appropriate signals. I returned to the cockpit overhead to turn on the rest of the systems. As I was turning on the alternators, there was yelling that the aircraft was moving. I immediately stomped on the brakes. Simultaneously, I heard the sound of crunching metal from the right side of the aircraft. Immediately I feathered both engines and pulled the right engine t-handle (firewall shut off for the fuel system). The first officer called for an evacuate/evacuation as I shut the engines down. At no time during the sequence of events did I give the agreed upon and accepted signal for the removal of the chocks. In my opinion, if the chocks had remained properly in place, the aircraft never would have moved.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR-MDT ROLLED FORWARD AND HIT POWER CART AS THE EXTERNAL CONNECTIONS WERE BEING REMOVED IN PREPARATION FOR FOR DEP.

Narrative: PROCEEDED THROUGH THE NORMAL EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL CHKLISTS. THE F/O DID THE EXTERNAL PREFLT. I PROCEEDED TO COMPLETE THE INTERNAL CHKLIST AND READY ALL THE NECESSARY WT AND BALANCE FORMS. I FINISHED THE PRE-DEP CHKLIST. AT THE POINT OF SETTING THE PARKING BRAKE IN THE CHKLISTS. I SET IT, THEN IT RELEASED ITSELF. INSTEAD OF RESETTING IT, I ELECTED TO LEAVE IT OFF AFTER NOTING THE PNEUMATIC PRESSURE IN THE MAIN AND BRAKE SYS. AT THIS POINT, WE HAD APPROX 1900 PSI IN THE SYS--JUST ENOUGH TO TAXI TO THE RWY AND TKOF WITH THE MINIMUM REQUIRED 1500 PSI. EARLIER IN THE DAY, THE F/O NOTED THE LEFTHAND OUR BOARD ANTISKID WAS SLOW TO RESPOND DURING THE TEST, INDICATING THERE WAS A SLOW RELEASE OF AIR FROM THE PNEUMATIC SYS ANYTIME THE BRAKES WERE APPLIED. ON OUR DEP FROM BRADLEY IN THE MORNING, WE HAD CHARGED THE SYS WITH ONE ENGINE RUNNING WITH NO RESULTS FOR 20 MINS. THEN WE DID THE SAME WITH 2 ENGS RUNNING FOR APPROX 25 ADDITIONAL MINS, AFTER WHICH WE FINALLY OBTAINED THE TKOF MINIMUM OF 1500 PSI. WHILE CHARGING WITH 2 ENGS, THE F/O AND I TOOK TURNS HOLDING THE RIGHT BRAKE ONLY. I DID NOT USE THE PARKING BRAKE BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBLE LEAK. WHILE DOING ONE OF THE CHKLISTS, I NOTICED A RAMP AGENT REMOVING THE CHOCKS W/O ANY PRIOR PERMISSION OR SIGNAL FROM MYSELF. I YELLED AT HIM TO PUT THE CHOCKS BACK SINCE THE BRAKES MAY NOT BE SET. THE RAMP AGENT ACKNOWLEDGED THE COMMAND TO REPLACE THEM. I STARTED THE ENG IN THE USUAL ORDER--#2 THEN #1. AFTER PUSHING THE START BUTTON FOR #1, I LOOKED OUT MY WINDOW THERE WAS A RAMP AGENT (#2) WALKING UNDER THE LH WING. I OBSERVED THIS #2 RAMP AGENT GESTURING TO THE RAMP AGENT WHO HAD CLRED US FOR START. THE ONLY PART I UNDERSTOOD WAS THAT THE AFT DOOR WAS NOT SHUT. THE F/A CLOSED THE DOOR RIGHT AS THE LH ENG WAS STARTING. AFTER BOTH ENGS WERE STARTED, I CALLED FOR THE AFTER STARTING CHKLIST. AFTER SWITCHING TO INTERNAL PWR, I SIGNALED FOR APU DISCONNECT USING APPROPRIATE SIGNALS. I RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT OVERHEAD TO TURN ON THE REST OF THE SYSTEMS. AS I WAS TURNING ON THE ALTERNATORS, THERE WAS YELLING THAT THE ACFT WAS MOVING. I IMMEDIATELY STOMPED ON THE BRAKES. SIMULTANEOUSLY, I HEARD THE SOUND OF CRUNCHING METAL FROM THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE ACFT. IMMEDIATELY I FEATHERED BOTH ENGS AND PULLED THE RIGHT ENG T-HANDLE (FIREWALL SHUT OFF FOR THE FUEL SYS). THE F/O CALLED FOR AN EVAC AS I SHUT THE ENGS DOWN. AT NO TIME DURING THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS DID I GIVE THE AGREED UPON AND ACCEPTED SIGNAL FOR THE REMOVAL OF THE CHOCKS. IN MY OPINION, IF THE CHOCKS HAD REMAINED PROPERLY IN PLACE, THE ACFT NEVER WOULD HAVE MOVED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.