Narrative:

The aircraft identified in this report; and the session itself; were all a combination of events which occurred when I was assigned the dfw radar position in dfw's west tower. This bi-annual decombining of the position was due to a special event nearby and the large volume of helicopter operations associated with the event. Upon assuming the position; I was requested to conduct ojti on the position; but asked that I be excused from such duties; as this was the first time I had ever worked dfw radar in a decombined state and was uncomfortable and unfamiliar with the aspects of the helicopter procedures. Within the first 15 minutes of the session; one of the helicopters was proceeding eastbound along a pre-assigned route which would take the helicopter approximately 1200-1400 feet beneath the dfw ILS RY18R final approach course/glide slope. While the helicopter was clearly going to be legally separated from a heavy B752 executing the ILS approach (by altitude); a supervisor present insisted that I issue instructions to the helicopter which would preclude it passing less than 5 miles behind the B752. I was confused by this instruction; but complied. Throughout the entire session; I was inundated by requests and instructions from supervisors. Later in the session; another helicopter initiated contact with the local west 1 controller and was switched to my frequency for radar advisories. At or near the time of the frequency change; this helicopter was approximately one mile south; and paralleling; the dfw RY13R final approach course; and an air carrier was approximately 4 miles behind and to the left of the helicopter executing that ILS approach. Rather than turn the helicopter southbound away from the final approach course; I attempted to acquire visual separation between the two aircraft; but could not do so until separation appeared to be parallel and possibly less than 1 1/2 miles as stipulated. All helicopters on my frequency required extensive coordination and attention; and once again; this was my very first experience working dfw radar as a stand-alone position. This entire session on dfw radar was basically a uninformed; uneducated 'comedy of errors' due to the following reasons: 1. I had not received a face-to-face briefing on the intricacies of the dfw radar position during this event; and had no choice except to read the printed briefing guide as I attempted to work the position. Basically; I was training myself on the unfamiliar position as I was working it and asked questions of the supervisor when time permitted. Certification as a cpc at dfw is typically done 'without' the controller ever working dfw radar as a stand-alone position. 2. One supervisor; while possibly well-meaning; was adding considerable confusion to the situation based upon his/her own misunderstanding and misapplication of wake turbulence rules and requirements as well as other suggestions regarding helicopter handling during this event. 3. In the case of the second helicopter; the LW1 controller transferred communications with the helicopter to me at a time which made it difficult; if not impossible; in my judgment; to obtain the required 1 1/2 mile lateral separation from the arriving air carrier; an aircraft which weighs more than 19;000 lbs. 4. Weather had originally been forecast to be good VFR conditions; but the day started off with IFR weather and remained marginal VFR throughout the majority of my session. The lower cloud cover inhibited my ability to assist helicopters in obtaining visual contact with relevant traffic until some other types of separation had been required. The best solution to prevent this situation from occurring again would be a greater responsibility on the part of dfw ATCT management to ensure that any controllers not familiar with these procedures be allowed to monitor; and be given thorough and adequate briefings on the requirements of this very specific operation. Until those two thingsoccur; we are creating a highly uncertain and definitely unsafe situation by allowing non-experienced cpc's to work the position without background and/or adequate training.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DFW controller described complex traffic event when numerous helicopter operations were operating in close proximity to the DFW final. The reporter listed that the lack of training/briefings and supervisor commentary added to the complexity.

Narrative: The aircraft identified in this report; and the session itself; were all a combination of events which occurred when I was assigned the DFW Radar position in DFW's West Tower. This bi-annual decombining of the position was due to a special event nearby and the large volume of helicopter operations associated with the event. Upon assuming the position; I was requested to conduct OJTI on the position; but asked that I be excused from such duties; as this was the first time I had ever worked DFW Radar in a decombined state and was uncomfortable and unfamiliar with the aspects of the helicopter procedures. Within the first 15 minutes of the session; one of the helicopters was proceeding eastbound along a pre-assigned route which would take the helicopter approximately 1200-1400 feet beneath the DFW ILS RY18R final approach course/glide slope. While the helicopter was clearly going to be legally separated from a Heavy B752 executing the ILS approach (by altitude); a supervisor present insisted that I issue instructions to the helicopter which would preclude it passing less than 5 miles behind the B752. I was confused by this instruction; but complied. Throughout the entire session; I was inundated by requests and instructions from supervisors. Later in the session; another helicopter initiated contact with the Local West 1 controller and was switched to my frequency for radar advisories. At or near the time of the frequency change; this helicopter was approximately one mile south; and paralleling; the DFW RY13R final approach course; and an air carrier was approximately 4 miles behind and to the left of the helicopter executing that ILS approach. Rather than turn the helicopter southbound away from the final approach course; I attempted to acquire visual separation between the two aircraft; but could not do so until separation appeared to be parallel and possibly less than 1 1/2 miles as stipulated. All helicopters on my frequency required extensive coordination and attention; and once again; this was my very first experience working DFW Radar as a stand-alone position. This entire session on DFW Radar was basically a uninformed; uneducated 'comedy of errors' due to the following reasons: 1. I had not received a face-to-face briefing on the intricacies of the DFW Radar position during this event; and had no choice except to read the printed briefing guide as I attempted to work the position. Basically; I was training MYSELF on the unfamiliar position as I was working it and asked questions of the supervisor when time permitted. Certification as a CPC at DFW is typically done 'without' the controller ever working DFW Radar as a stand-alone position. 2. One supervisor; while possibly well-meaning; was adding considerable confusion to the situation based upon his/her own misunderstanding and misapplication of wake turbulence rules and requirements as well as other suggestions regarding helicopter handling during this event. 3. In the case of the second helicopter; the LW1 controller transferred communications with the helicopter to me at a time which made it difficult; if not impossible; in my judgment; to obtain the required 1 1/2 mile lateral separation from the arriving air carrier; an aircraft which weighs more than 19;000 lbs. 4. Weather had originally been forecast to be good VFR conditions; but the day started off with IFR weather and remained Marginal VFR throughout the majority of my session. The lower cloud cover inhibited my ability to assist helicopters in obtaining visual contact with relevant traffic until some other types of separation had been required. The best solution to prevent this situation from occurring again would be a greater responsibility on the part of DFW ATCT management to ensure that any controllers NOT familiar with these procedures be allowed to monitor; and be given thorough and adequate briefings on the requirements of this very specific operation. Until those two thingsoccur; we are creating a highly uncertain and definitely unsafe situation by allowing non-experienced CPC's to work the position without background and/or adequate training.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.