Narrative:

Ocean west and offshore west/central were combined. There were two cpc's on position; 1 on the radar and 1 on d-side. We were told that our 132.65 site was out; but were not given a time of when to expect it back. In turn; any aircraft inbound from merida center either from kehli intersection or marte; was unable to communicate with us. Merida was in turn putting them on ocean east frequency unbeknownst to us. In turn; we were unable to get progress times or estimates for the next fix without being able to communicate with the aircraft. We had an aircraft X southwest bound on A649 and aircraft Y northwest bound on B753. Aircraft Y never checked on so a coast track was never started for the aircraft. Aircraft X was on frequency. I had just sat down about 10 minutes prior and was trying to understand why we weren't speaking to several of the northbound aircraft. The radar target for aircraft Y appeared about 20 miles northwest of maeko intersection and aircraft X was about 25 northeast of maeko (still in radar). I; in turn; looked over at the strips and found that we only had 7 minutes between the two when we are required to have 10. The situation in and of itself was very unsafe. The supervisors were somewhat unsure how to react when I told them that having that particular frequency outage was not a good situation. Meanwhile; the controllers in merida were not taking estimates from the d-side. We have to pass them 25 minutes prior to the aircraft entering into their airspace. They were finally passed about 15 minutes prior; as they could not get the controller on the landline. Our supervisor did call merida to inform them of the controllers actions. Overall; the ocean was extremely busy. Under normal operational circumstances this would have been a normal saturday morning activity; but the frequency outage and the business of the merida controller made it more complex. Also; merida gave us a traffic at FL380 and higher performance traffic at FL360. In turn when they had their 15 minutes they tried to pass us B737 and B757 traffic at the same altitude not understanding that we would lose our required separation by kelpp intersection. Therefore; many commercial aircraft were left low at FL320 and FL300. This caused fuel concerns for many of our commercial jets. We were unable to climb them until we had them in radar. We really need a backup frequency that allows us to communicate with aircraft if that site fails. That site is the most important one. Otherwise; it may have been in our best interest to combine the east and west; so we could at least speak to the aircraft. However; the numbers for the sectors wouldn't allow us to combine as it would have placed them both in the 'red.' although we cannot penalize the slower flying jets; merida could have route separated them from the iah inbounds and dfw overflights by using B753 instead of putting them all on A766 causing the fuel problems.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZHU Controllers reported that poorly coordinated communications outages and a lack of cooperation from an adjacent facility create several operational obstacles to overcome; resulting in a loss of separation.

Narrative: Ocean West and Offshore West/Central were combined. There were two CPC's on position; 1 on the Radar and 1 on D-side. We were told that our 132.65 site was out; but were not given a time of when to expect it back. In turn; any aircraft inbound from Merida Center either from KEHLI intersection or MARTE; was unable to communicate with us. Merida was in turn putting them on Ocean East frequency unbeknownst to us. In turn; we were unable to get progress times or estimates for the next fix without being able to communicate with the aircraft. We had an Aircraft X southwest bound on A649 and Aircraft Y northwest bound on B753. Aircraft Y never checked on so a coast track was never started for the aircraft. Aircraft X was on frequency. I had just sat down about 10 minutes prior and was trying to understand why we weren't speaking to several of the Northbound aircraft. The radar target for Aircraft Y appeared about 20 miles Northwest of MAEKO intersection and Aircraft X was about 25 NE of MAEKO (still in radar). I; in turn; looked over at the strips and found that we only had 7 minutes between the two when we are required to have 10. The situation in and of itself was very unsafe. The supervisors were somewhat unsure how to react when I told them that having that particular frequency outage was not a good situation. Meanwhile; the controllers in Merida were not taking estimates from the D-side. We have to pass them 25 minutes prior to the aircraft entering into their airspace. They were finally passed about 15 minutes prior; as they could not get the controller on the landline. Our supervisor did call Merida to inform them of the controllers actions. Overall; the Ocean was extremely busy. Under normal operational circumstances this would have been a normal Saturday morning activity; but the frequency outage and the business of the Merida controller made it more complex. Also; Merida gave us a traffic at FL380 and higher performance traffic at FL360. In turn when they had their 15 minutes they tried to pass us B737 and B757 traffic at the same altitude not understanding that we would lose our required separation by KELPP intersection. Therefore; many commercial aircraft were left low at FL320 and FL300. This caused fuel concerns for many of our commercial jets. We were unable to climb them until we had them in radar. We really need a backup frequency that allows us to communicate with aircraft if that site fails. That site is the most important one. Otherwise; it may have been in our best interest to combine the East and West; so we could at least speak to the aircraft. However; the numbers for the sectors wouldn't allow us to combine as it would have placed them both in the 'red.' Although we cannot penalize the slower flying jets; Merida could have route separated them from the IAH inbounds and DFW overflights by using B753 instead of putting them all on A766 causing the fuel problems.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.