Narrative:

During takeoff as the aircraft began acceleration (approximately 75 knots) a warning chime sounded with a brief ECAM warning appearing on the left ECAM screen. The captain elected to reject the takeoff. We cleared the runway and executed all appropriate checklists. While still executing the reject the ECAM warning disappeared. After clearing the runway; we discussed the warning yet neither one of us could specifically identify what the warning was. It appeared to be a 'yellow hydraulic' issue. The warning was so brief that we didn't have an opportunity to read and digest the complete ECAM warning. We reviewed all hydraulic system(s) indications from quantity; fluid etc. No abnormal indications existed. We then reviewed other systems and no abnormal conditions existed. We then contacted local maintenance. The mechanic indicated as we had suspected that it may have been a spurious warning and that if no abnormal indications were present than we should be fine. Since we had no indication of a problem we elected to taxi to the runway and takeoff. During climb out we decided that it would be in the best interest of safety that we make a comment to maintenance and future pilots operating this aircraft of the occurrence we had in the event the spurious warning re-occurred. During the approach phase of this same flight; the warning triggered again. This time the warning came on and went off approximately 4 times over a two minute period and then was gone again. No system malfunctions were indicated. Flight landed with no additional problems or warnings. After this second warning of the flight we decided that it should be entered into the logbook as a maintenance required item. After review of our handling of this situation; it occurred to us that we should have made two different choices in handling the situation. 1. After the rejected takeoff; even with no remaining indication we should have made an entry into the logbook and contacted maintenance control for guidance prior to a second takeoff attempt. Contacting local maintenance is not sufficient. 2. Also; per a change in the fom that the crew was unaware of; a spurious warning that causes a rejected takeoff must be entered into the logbook as an action item and not a comment item. Bottom line; we acted professionally and with direct adherence to safety to ensure the flight could be successfully completed and in no way purposely attempted to depart from company procedures or with what was considered an open write up.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A300 flight crew reports rejecting a takeoff for a Yellow Hyd ECAM message that disappears before the aircraft can be slowed. After a through systems check; and with local maintenance approval the crew departs uneventfully. The anomaly reoccurs during approach and the crew is informed after landing that the rejected takeoff required a log entry and maintenance action prior to departure.

Narrative: During takeoff as the aircraft began acceleration (approximately 75 knots) a warning chime sounded with a brief ECAM warning appearing on the left ECAM screen. The Captain elected to reject the takeoff. We cleared the runway and executed all appropriate checklists. While still executing the reject the ECAM warning disappeared. After clearing the runway; we discussed the warning yet neither one of us could specifically identify what the warning was. It appeared to be a 'Yellow hydraulic' issue. The warning was so brief that we didn't have an opportunity to read and digest the complete ECAM warning. We reviewed all hydraulic system(s) indications from quantity; fluid etc. No abnormal indications existed. We then reviewed other systems and no abnormal conditions existed. We then contacted local maintenance. The Mechanic indicated as we had suspected that it may have been a spurious warning and that if no abnormal indications were present than we should be fine. Since we had no indication of a problem we elected to taxi to the runway and takeoff. During climb out we decided that it would be in the best interest of safety that we make a comment to maintenance and future pilots operating this aircraft of the occurrence we had in the event the spurious warning re-occurred. During the approach phase of this same flight; the warning triggered again. This time the warning came on and went off approximately 4 times over a two minute period and then was gone again. No system malfunctions were indicated. Flight landed with no additional problems or warnings. After this second warning of the flight we decided that it should be entered into the logbook as a maintenance required item. After review of our handling of this situation; it occurred to us that we should have made two different choices in handling the situation. 1. After the rejected takeoff; even with no remaining indication we should have made an entry into the logbook and contacted Maintenance Control for guidance prior to a second takeoff attempt. Contacting local maintenance is not sufficient. 2. Also; per a change in the FOM that the crew was unaware of; a spurious warning that causes a rejected takeoff must be entered into the logbook as an action item and not a comment item. Bottom line; we acted professionally and with direct adherence to safety to ensure the flight could be successfully completed and in no way purposely attempted to depart from company procedures or with what was considered an open write up.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.