Narrative:

I found that I could not clear the 'no land 3' on the autoland panel; and thus looked at the overhead to find the reason. I found the 'right gen drive disc' light on; and the left one out. I then wrote up the following: 'no autoland 3 displayed' reason: right gen disc light on. As I realized it was actually the left side that had a problem I immediately followed up with a radio call to maintenance control explaining this. They asked if I would defer the generator; to which I said no. Then they told me they had to run a procedure involving an engine run; and asked if I would handle that. I said no. I then got a constant procession of folks from all departments; both in person; and via phone calls pressuring me to perform this maintenance action or to accept deferrals. Management even went so far as to call a deadheading crew on the aircraft to solicit their services for the same purposes. I did speak to a flight operations manager; who wanted an explanation as to why I would not perform this maintenance. He also offered me pay to do this. I refused to offer an explanation. After approximately five hours on the aircraft; local contract maintenance found mechanics that were authorized to perform engine runs. They came to the airplane and ran two complete tests to verify that a) the generator would in fact disconnect; B) there was no obvious indication of a short; and C) that I would be able to tell via the EICAS system if I had a problem with the drive. These were my conditions for a deferral of the indicator. All checked out as desired; and we were ready to go. But when the mechanics called maintenance control to coordinate the sign-off; they were reprimanded for having done any work. The company mechanics that had been on the way in a vehicle from another airport were to take care of this issue. So we waited for yet another hour. When the mechanics showed up; they were refused access to our aircraft because by now one of our flight attendants was timing out. Suddenly the contract mechanics were asked to sign off what they had tried to an hour earlier. While all this occurred; the first officer's flight director had also failed. This was deferred by the contract maintenance crew. Immediately after take-off; the first officer's speed command bug was lost; and upon arrival we smelled a burning smell that seemed like an electrical overheat. No other indications. During these six hours on the aircraft that we endured without compensation I felt a constant pressure to perform maintenance functions or to accept deferrals without knowing the root causes of these issues. Once I had refused to do this that should have ended this nonsense. But I must have been pressured at least a dozen times by various people. This creates a quite hostile work environment; and serves no real purpose other than what is known as 'pilot pushing;' which to my knowledge is illegal activity. There were all sorts of good reasons to have a proper maintenance check of a problem that existed in an important aircraft system. My judgment was constantly questioned and I was repeatedly pressured into doing what I knew was not a proper way to handle this issue almost always by people that had no business whatsoever or had the proper knowledge or background to do so.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757-200 Captain refused to depart with a generator drive anomaly and also refused to perform maintenance functions requested by maintenance managers.

Narrative: I found that I could not clear the 'No Land 3' on the Autoland panel; and thus looked at the overhead to find the reason. I found the 'R GEN DRIVE DISC' light on; and the left one out. I then wrote up the following: 'No Autoland 3 displayed' reason: R GEN DISC light on. As I realized it was actually the left side that had a problem I immediately followed up with a radio call to Maintenance Control explaining this. They asked if I would defer the generator; to which I said no. Then they told me they had to run a procedure involving an engine run; and asked if I would handle that. I said no. I then got a constant procession of folks from all departments; both in person; and via phone calls pressuring me to perform this maintenance action or to accept deferrals. Management even went so far as to call a deadheading crew on the aircraft to solicit their services for the same purposes. I did speak to a Flight Operations Manager; who wanted an explanation as to why I would not perform this maintenance. He also offered me pay to do this. I refused to offer an explanation. After approximately five hours on the aircraft; local contract maintenance found mechanics that were authorized to perform engine runs. They came to the airplane and ran two complete tests to verify that A) the generator would in fact disconnect; B) there was no obvious indication of a short; and C) that I would be able to tell via the EICAS system if I had a problem with the drive. These were my conditions for a deferral of the indicator. All checked out as desired; and we were ready to go. But when the mechanics called maintenance control to coordinate the sign-off; they were reprimanded for having done any work. The company mechanics that had been on the way in a vehicle from another airport were to take care of this issue. So we waited for yet another hour. When the mechanics showed up; they were refused access to our aircraft because by now one of our flight attendants was timing out. Suddenly the contract mechanics were asked to sign off what they had tried to an hour earlier. While all this occurred; the First Officer's flight director had also failed. This was deferred by the contract maintenance crew. Immediately after take-off; the First Officer's speed command bug was lost; and upon arrival we smelled a burning smell that seemed like an electrical overheat. No other indications. During these six hours on the aircraft that we endured without compensation I felt a constant pressure to perform maintenance functions or to accept deferrals without knowing the root causes of these issues. Once I had refused to do this that should have ended this nonsense. But I must have been pressured at least a dozen times by various people. This creates a quite hostile work environment; and serves no real purpose other than what is known as 'pilot pushing;' which to my knowledge is illegal activity. There were all sorts of good reasons to have a proper maintenance check of a problem that existed in an important aircraft system. My judgment was constantly questioned and I was repeatedly pressured into doing what I knew was not a proper way to handle this issue almost always by people that had no business whatsoever or had the proper knowledge or background to do so.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.