Narrative:

Approximately 5 mi from touchdown, 'gear down' was selected by the captain (at my request, as I was the flying pilot). The right main gear light failed to illuminate upon extension and the warning horn went on. The handle lights also remained on. Since we were still nearly 3 mi out, the captain instructed me to continue the approach while he 'troubleshot' the problem. He also advised me to reduce to final approach speed. While I was slowing, the captain attempted to raise and recycle the gear, but said he was unable to lift the gear selector. At about this time, the gear motor circuit breaker popped and was reset by the captain. In an effort to slow as much as safely practical, I selected 'full flaps' at an airspeed of approximately 140 KTS. At this time, the warning horn again sounded. As this was occurring, the captain had begun a manual extension of the gear. At approximately 1-1/2 mi from the runway we agreed it was not wise to continue and I commenced a go around. As we flew by, the tower asked us if we were experiencing any difficulty and the captain responded that we had an unsafe gear indications. The tower stated that all three gears appeared to be down, but said they would roll the emergency equipment. A circle for runway 4R was initiated, and we were placed ahead of jet traffic on a 12 mi final. The captain continued his efforts to manually extend the gear on downwind. By continuous pumping, he was able to extinguish the handle lights, although the right main still did not show 'green'. The captain requested I make a visual inspection out my window, and I did so. It appeared to me that the gear was fully extended. The captain instructed me to continue my approach and make a normal landing, stating that he suspected an indicator malfunction and that all was probably normal. Full flap was selected on final and the aircraft slowed to V reference across the threshold. When the flaps were fully extended, the gear warning horn did not sound. I touched down nose high, and on the left main gear, then applied increasing amounts of left aileron until full travel was reached. The right main contacted the ground substantially after the left. So as not to place undue stress on the undercarriage, I did not select reverse on the rollout, nor did I apply heavy braking. The runway was cleared at slow speed on taxiway 'K'. Throughout the procedure, the captain was pumping the gear handle, which never seemed (he said) to reach full pressure. As we cleared, the captain again indicated his belief in a faulty indicator and instructed me to taxi to our gate. I continued to taxi at a normal pace, power steering in 'taxi' mode, while the captain called times to company and briefed the passengers for arrival at the gate. Since the emergency extension lever is on the captain's side of the panel, he instructed me to continue my taxi. I assumed he intended to maintain his pressure on the system as we taxiied in. Since I was busy steering and watching for other traffic on the ground, I did not see whether or not the captain continued to apply manual pressure to the system. At a point midway between txwys 'rc' and 'rb', the aircraft staggered. The handle light illuminated, the hydraulic fluid annunciator illuminated, and the warning horn sounded. I immediately pulled both condition levers back and feathered the propellers immediately after as the aircraft sank and skidded. As I did this, the captain pulled the 'T' handles and 'gangbarred' the master. As soon as the aircraft stopped, the captain instructed me to evacuate through the forward door. One man did leave via the right front emergency exit before I could get unstrapped, out of my seat and open the door. The other 18 passengers were evacuated forward and were escorted by the crew to the brockway bus. As they entered, we asked each of them if they thought they were injured in any way. All of them responded in the negative.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LTT RIGHT MAIN GEAR COLLAPSED DURING TAXI IN.

Narrative: APPROX 5 MI FROM TOUCHDOWN, 'GEAR DOWN' WAS SELECTED BY THE CAPT (AT MY REQUEST, AS I WAS THE FLYING PLT). THE RIGHT MAIN GEAR LIGHT FAILED TO ILLUMINATE UPON EXTENSION AND THE WARNING HORN WENT ON. THE HANDLE LIGHTS ALSO REMAINED ON. SINCE WE WERE STILL NEARLY 3 MI OUT, THE CAPT INSTRUCTED ME TO CONTINUE THE APCH WHILE HE 'TROUBLESHOT' THE PROB. HE ALSO ADVISED ME TO REDUCE TO FINAL APCH SPD. WHILE I WAS SLOWING, THE CAPT ATTEMPTED TO RAISE AND RECYCLE THE GEAR, BUT SAID HE WAS UNABLE TO LIFT THE GEAR SELECTOR. AT ABOUT THIS TIME, THE GEAR MOTOR CIRCUIT BREAKER POPPED AND WAS RESET BY THE CAPT. IN AN EFFORT TO SLOW AS MUCH AS SAFELY PRACTICAL, I SELECTED 'FULL FLAPS' AT AN AIRSPD OF APPROX 140 KTS. AT THIS TIME, THE WARNING HORN AGAIN SOUNDED. AS THIS WAS OCCURRING, THE CAPT HAD BEGUN A MANUAL EXTENSION OF THE GEAR. AT APPROX 1-1/2 MI FROM THE RWY WE AGREED IT WAS NOT WISE TO CONTINUE AND I COMMENCED A GO AROUND. AS WE FLEW BY, THE TWR ASKED US IF WE WERE EXPERIENCING ANY DIFFICULTY AND THE CAPT RESPONDED THAT WE HAD AN UNSAFE GEAR INDICATIONS. THE TWR STATED THAT ALL THREE GEARS APPEARED TO BE DOWN, BUT SAID THEY WOULD ROLL THE EMER EQUIP. A CIRCLE FOR RWY 4R WAS INITIATED, AND WE WERE PLACED AHEAD OF JET TFC ON A 12 MI FINAL. THE CAPT CONTINUED HIS EFFORTS TO MANUALLY EXTEND THE GEAR ON DOWNWIND. BY CONTINUOUS PUMPING, HE WAS ABLE TO EXTINGUISH THE HANDLE LIGHTS, ALTHOUGH THE RIGHT MAIN STILL DID NOT SHOW 'GREEN'. THE CAPT REQUESTED I MAKE A VISUAL INSPECTION OUT MY WINDOW, AND I DID SO. IT APPEARED TO ME THAT THE GEAR WAS FULLY EXTENDED. THE CAPT INSTRUCTED ME TO CONTINUE MY APCH AND MAKE A NORMAL LNDG, STATING THAT HE SUSPECTED AN INDICATOR MALFUNCTION AND THAT ALL WAS PROBABLY NORMAL. FULL FLAP WAS SELECTED ON FINAL AND THE ACFT SLOWED TO V REF ACROSS THE THRESHOLD. WHEN THE FLAPS WERE FULLY EXTENDED, THE GEAR WARNING HORN DID NOT SOUND. I TOUCHED DOWN NOSE HIGH, AND ON THE LEFT MAIN GEAR, THEN APPLIED INCREASING AMOUNTS OF LEFT AILERON UNTIL FULL TRAVEL WAS REACHED. THE RIGHT MAIN CONTACTED THE GND SUBSTANTIALLY AFTER THE LEFT. SO AS NOT TO PLACE UNDUE STRESS ON THE UNDERCARRIAGE, I DID NOT SELECT REVERSE ON THE ROLLOUT, NOR DID I APPLY HEAVY BRAKING. THE RWY WAS CLRED AT SLOW SPD ON TXWY 'K'. THROUGHOUT THE PROC, THE CAPT WAS PUMPING THE GEAR HANDLE, WHICH NEVER SEEMED (HE SAID) TO REACH FULL PRESSURE. AS WE CLRED, THE CAPT AGAIN INDICATED HIS BELIEF IN A FAULTY INDICATOR AND INSTRUCTED ME TO TAXI TO OUR GATE. I CONTINUED TO TAXI AT A NORMAL PACE, PWR STEERING IN 'TAXI' MODE, WHILE THE CAPT CALLED TIMES TO COMPANY AND BRIEFED THE PAXS FOR ARR AT THE GATE. SINCE THE EMER EXTENSION LEVER IS ON THE CAPT'S SIDE OF THE PANEL, HE INSTRUCTED ME TO CONTINUE MY TAXI. I ASSUMED HE INTENDED TO MAINTAIN HIS PRESSURE ON THE SYS AS WE TAXIIED IN. SINCE I WAS BUSY STEERING AND WATCHING FOR OTHER TFC ON THE GND, I DID NOT SEE WHETHER OR NOT THE CAPT CONTINUED TO APPLY MANUAL PRESSURE TO THE SYS. AT A POINT MIDWAY BTWN TXWYS 'RC' AND 'RB', THE ACFT STAGGERED. THE HANDLE LIGHT ILLUMINATED, THE HYDRAULIC FLUID ANNUNCIATOR ILLUMINATED, AND THE WARNING HORN SOUNDED. I IMMEDIATELY PULLED BOTH CONDITION LEVERS BACK AND FEATHERED THE PROPS IMMEDIATELY AFTER AS THE ACFT SANK AND SKIDDED. AS I DID THIS, THE CAPT PULLED THE 'T' HANDLES AND 'GANGBARRED' THE MASTER. AS SOON AS THE ACFT STOPPED, THE CAPT INSTRUCTED ME TO EVACUATE THROUGH THE FORWARD DOOR. ONE MAN DID LEAVE VIA THE RIGHT FRONT EMER EXIT BEFORE I COULD GET UNSTRAPPED, OUT OF MY SEAT AND OPEN THE DOOR. THE OTHER 18 PAXS WERE EVACUATED FORWARD AND WERE ESCORTED BY THE CREW TO THE BROCKWAY BUS. AS THEY ENTERED, WE ASKED EACH OF THEM IF THEY THOUGHT THEY WERE INJURED IN ANY WAY. ALL OF THEM RESPONDED IN THE NEGATIVE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.