Narrative:

During takeoff; upon gear retraction; we received an left/G gear not uplocked ECAM. The cockpit duties were then divided with first officer continuing to fly the aircraft and captain handling the ECAM. The ECAM directed a recycling of the gear; which was done. Shortly thereafter; we received another gear not uplocked ECAM; followed by hydraulic G engine pump lo pr. Captain selected the green pump off per the ECAM and noticed a decreasing quantity on the green hydraulic quantity indicator on the hydraulic schematic. At this time; we were talking to departure and received clearance to climb to 7000 feet. As we were climbing out of 3000 feet; we received another ECAM - hydraulic ptu fault. Per the ECAM; captain turned off the ptu. We realized that continuing to destination was not a possibility with the gear still down and the loss of green hydraulics and informed departure that we would be returning. First officer put on the autopilot at this point to accommodate the division of duties. We received a southerly vector and leveled off at 5000 feet. We did not declare an emergency at this time. The flight attendants called us to let us know they still heard the gear down. Captain then informed our flight attendant that we had hydraulic issues and issued a cabin advisory. Captain also informed the passengers about a hydraulic malfunction and the return. Then we had another ECAM - hydraulic Y elec pump ovht; followed by the autopilot disconnecting. First officer continued to hand-fly the aircraft while captain declared an emergency with approach and addressed the Y ovht ECAM. The yellow engine pump was then selected off per the ECAM. The flight attendants were then instructed to prepare the cabin for evacuation. Approach set us up with the longest runway. Emergency equipment was requested and a tug to clear us from the runway (with dispatch) due to the loss of nose wheel steering. Since we were down to one hydraulic system and overweight (by 13;000 pounds); we consulted with dispatch and maintenance about the recovery of the yellow hydraulic system (as indicated in the irregular procedure). About 15 miles form the field the yellow hydraulic system was reselected on and was successfully restored. Captain coordinated with dispatch for a tug and also requested landing performance data from dispatch with the loss of green hydraulics. Captain also reviewed the landing distance abnormal or irregular configuration; whereby it was determined that with the yellow system back and normal landing configuration; a mostly normal landing could be made (except for the overweight status and alternate brakes). The prep for evacuation was canceled; but the cabin advisory remained. Checklists were referred to and accomplished (all of the above ecams and the overweight landing checklist) as well as normal checklists. Captain took control of the aircraft at about 1500 feet and landed the aircraft. The aircraft was brought to a stop straight ahead on the runway. It was not convenient to clear the runway without any nose wheel steering. Fire vehicles met us on the runway; and airport operations communicated with us from there. We shut down the engines; and indicated to the firemen that the brakes were set. They inspected the landing gear and informed us that there was a hydraulic leak in the left gear well area. The left brakes were then heating up; and we informed the flight attendants of a possibility of evacuation due to the leak with brake temperatures increasing and to stay alert. Passengers were informed to remain seated. The firemen were also requested to chalk the aircraft so we could release the brake to increase cooling; and they also got fans. The brakes finally peaked around 580 degrees then started cooling. Eventually a tug came out to tow us to the gate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A320 flight crew experienced the failure of landing gear to retract completely after takeoff followed shortly by a HYD G Engine Pump LO PR ECAM. The flight returned safely to the departure airport and was towed to the gate due to lack of steering.

Narrative: During takeoff; upon gear retraction; we received an L/G Gear Not Uplocked ECAM. The cockpit duties were then divided with First Officer continuing to fly the aircraft and Captain handling the ECAM. The ECAM directed a recycling of the gear; which was done. Shortly thereafter; we received another gear not uplocked ECAM; followed by HYD G Engine Pump Lo PR. Captain selected the green pump off per the ECAM and noticed a decreasing quantity on the green hydraulic quantity indicator on the hydraulic schematic. At this time; we were talking to Departure and received clearance to climb to 7000 feet. As we were climbing out of 3000 feet; we received another ECAM - HYD PTU Fault. Per the ECAM; Captain turned off the PTU. We realized that continuing to destination was not a possibility with the gear still down and the loss of green hydraulics and informed Departure that we would be returning. First Officer put on the autopilot at this point to accommodate the division of duties. We received a southerly vector and leveled off at 5000 feet. We did not declare an emergency at this time. The Flight Attendants called us to let us know they still heard the gear down. Captain then informed our Flight Attendant that we had hydraulic issues and issued a cabin advisory. Captain also informed the passengers about a hydraulic malfunction and the return. Then we had another ECAM - HYD Y ELEC PUMP OVHT; followed by the autopilot disconnecting. First Officer continued to hand-fly the aircraft while Captain declared an emergency with Approach and addressed the Y OVHT ECAM. The yellow engine pump was then selected off per the ECAM. The Flight Attendants were then instructed to prepare the cabin for evacuation. Approach set us up with the longest runway. Emergency equipment was requested and a tug to clear us from the runway (with Dispatch) due to the loss of nose wheel steering. Since we were down to one hydraulic system and overweight (by 13;000 pounds); we consulted with Dispatch and Maintenance about the recovery of the yellow hydraulic system (as indicated in the irregular procedure). About 15 miles form the field the yellow hydraulic system was reselected on and was successfully restored. Captain coordinated with Dispatch for a tug and also requested landing performance data from Dispatch with the loss of green hydraulics. Captain also reviewed the landing distance abnormal or irregular configuration; whereby it was determined that with the yellow system back and normal landing configuration; a mostly normal landing could be made (except for the overweight status and alternate brakes). The prep for evacuation was canceled; but the cabin advisory remained. Checklists were referred to and accomplished (all of the above ECAMS and the overweight landing checklist) as well as normal checklists. Captain took control of the aircraft at about 1500 feet and landed the aircraft. The aircraft was brought to a stop straight ahead on the runway. It was not convenient to clear the runway without any nose wheel steering. Fire vehicles met us on the runway; and airport operations communicated with us from there. We shut down the engines; and indicated to the firemen that the brakes were set. They inspected the landing gear and informed us that there was a hydraulic leak in the left gear well area. The left brakes were then heating up; and we informed the Flight Attendants of a possibility of evacuation due to the leak with brake temperatures increasing and to stay alert. Passengers were informed to remain seated. The firemen were also requested to chalk the aircraft so we could release the brake to increase cooling; and they also got fans. The brakes finally peaked around 580 degrees then started cooling. Eventually a tug came out to tow us to the gate.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.