Narrative:

There was a hydraulic system failure. Initially; both hydraulic systems indicated no; or low pressure. Quantity was normal. Later; we recovered pressure to the right system. After the indications listed above; we selected flaps up; climb power. The flaps retracted to approximately 5 degrees. Slats were left in the extended position. As the non flying pilot; I selected the 'red gear light with gear handle up' checklist. The first item on the checklist directed us to check hydraulic pressures. The pressures on both systems indicated 0 psi. The quantities were normal; approximately 15 quarts per side. The checklist also directed us to select the landing gear down. The gear came down and locked; three green lights; but the gear door open light remained illuminated. Being in class B airspace; I wanted to get away from such a traffic dense environment so we could have fewer interruptions whilst completing further checklist. The aircraft was under full control; only limited in climb performance; so I directed the first officer to join our route. We did; and first officer advised ATC of a 230 KT speed restriction. I then selected the dual hydraulic system failure checklist. The items were accomplished; and the notes in the checklist were reviewed. I then declared the emergency with ATC. I asked to level our climb; and the receive delay vectors in order to give the entire crew time to complete the various checklists; and to attempt to burn off fuel and reduce our landing gross weight. We received instructions to hold northwest of the VOR; which we did. I then told the flight attendants a brief version of what the situation was; and made a brief description of the problem to the passengers. Next; I contacted dispatch. I spoke with dispatch and maintenance; and it was agreed to attempt a no flaps landing. While in the holding pattern; I repeated the checklist to insure that nothing had been overlooked. The first officer and I discussed our situation and we decided we would be better off landing in the large airport due to the 12;000 ft runway length. We coordinated this with dispatch; then ATC. We remained in holding; and I gave flight attendants a full description of the situation and the ramifications. I told them they would have plenty of time to complete all their emergency preparations while we burned off fuel. I briefed the passengers in lay terms so they would also know the situation. When this was complete; the noise level from the nose gear got quiet; and the gear door light went out. Now we noticed the right system pressure was returned to 3;100 psi; and the left side pressure was 1;500 psi. We also noticed that the left system quantity was bleeding out; and bled out to 2 quart indicated. The right quantity remained at 15-16 quarts. We now decided that with these pressures; we could probably make a normal landing at normal configuration. We call dispatch and told them the new situation; and they agreed that we could attempt normal landing at our departure airport. I then notified ATC of our new intentions; and we were re cleared direct to our departure airport. I requested a long final so that we could verify that we could get configured normally and that our pressures would maintain. The flaps extended normally; and the pressures and quantities remained unchanged. We were cleared to land. I also noted that brake accumulator pressure was normal. Tower gave me the fire department's frequency. I called them on short final and said that we would be making a normal landing; and that they could stand down unless I called for them. They stood down; and monitored the landing visually. I also advised passengers before returning to departure airport that system pressure was restored and that we would not be making an emergency landing. We landed without incident; pulled off the runway and stopped the aircraft. Maintenance met us on the taxiway; examined the aircraft; and put pins in the gears and asked us to taxi to the gate. We parkedat the gate and deplaned normally.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD83 flight crew experienced an apparent dual hydraulic system failure shortly after takeoff. The gear does not completely retract and low or no pressure is noted on both systems. While talking to the company and troubleshooting; the right system returns to normal operation; the gear doors close and the flaps retract. The left system quantity goes to two quarts and the pressure remains at zero. The flight returns to departure airport for an uneventful landing. The left hydraulic transfer pump was replaced by Maintenance.

Narrative: There was a hydraulic system failure. Initially; both hydraulic systems indicated no; or low pressure. Quantity was normal. Later; we recovered pressure to the right system. After the indications listed above; we selected flaps up; climb power. The flaps retracted to approximately 5 degrees. Slats were left in the extended position. As the non flying pilot; I selected the 'Red Gear Light With Gear Handle Up' checklist. The first item on the checklist directed us to check hydraulic pressures. The pressures on both systems indicated 0 PSI. The quantities were normal; approximately 15 quarts per side. The checklist also directed us to select the landing gear down. The gear came down and locked; three green lights; but the gear door open light remained illuminated. Being in Class B airspace; I wanted to get away from such a traffic dense environment so we could have fewer interruptions whilst completing further checklist. The aircraft was under full control; only limited in climb performance; so I directed the First Officer to join our route. We did; and First Officer advised ATC of a 230 KT speed restriction. I then selected the Dual Hydraulic System Failure checklist. The items were accomplished; and the notes in the checklist were reviewed. I then declared the emergency with ATC. I asked to level our climb; and the receive delay vectors in order to give the entire crew time to complete the various checklists; and to attempt to burn off fuel and reduce our landing gross weight. We received instructions to hold northwest of the VOR; which we did. I then told the flight attendants a brief version of what the situation was; and made a brief description of the problem to the passengers. Next; I contacted Dispatch. I spoke with Dispatch and Maintenance; and it was agreed to attempt a no flaps landing. While in the holding pattern; I repeated the checklist to insure that nothing had been overlooked. The First Officer and I discussed our situation and we decided we would be better off landing in the large airport due to the 12;000 FT runway length. We coordinated this with Dispatch; then ATC. We remained in holding; and I gave flight attendants a full description of the situation and the ramifications. I told them they would have plenty of time to complete all their emergency preparations while we burned off fuel. I briefed the passengers in lay terms so they would also know the situation. When this was complete; the noise level from the nose gear got quiet; and the gear door light went out. Now we noticed the right system pressure was returned to 3;100 PSI; and the left side pressure was 1;500 PSI. We also noticed that the left system quantity was bleeding out; and bled out to 2 quart indicated. The right quantity remained at 15-16 quarts. We now decided that with these pressures; we could probably make a normal landing at normal configuration. We call Dispatch and told them the new situation; and they agreed that we could attempt normal landing at our departure airport. I then notified ATC of our new intentions; and we were re cleared direct to our departure airport. I requested a long final so that we could verify that we could get configured normally and that our pressures would maintain. The flaps extended normally; and the pressures and quantities remained unchanged. We were cleared to land. I also noted that brake accumulator pressure was normal. Tower gave me the Fire Department's frequency. I called them on short final and said that we would be making a normal landing; and that they could stand down unless I called for them. They stood down; and monitored the landing visually. I also advised passengers before returning to departure airport that system pressure was restored and that we would not be making an emergency landing. We landed without incident; pulled off the runway and stopped the aircraft. Maintenance met us on the taxiway; examined the aircraft; and put pins in the gears and asked us to taxi to the gate. We parkedat the gate and deplaned normally.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.