Narrative:

[We had] normal operations till approximately 1 hour prior to skrg. [There were] areas of convective activity which are normal for this time of year requiring diversions around cells in the flight plan routing and arrival. We were eventually cleared for the full ILS runway 36; while flying the procedure turn we were handed off from approach control to tower. Checking on there was no response except another jet aircraft in position and hold on runway 36. Skrg had lost all power to the runway lighting; and apparently tower communications. We elected to continue inbound and see if power would be restored during that time. We continued down to approximately 700 ft AGL; noticed the aircraft on the runway and no lighting. We flew the missed approach and entered holding. I switched back to approach and tried to establish radio contact. Nothing. In fact we could not raise medellin approach or tower. We continued in holding trying other available frequencies; to no avail. We finally tried bogota approach control. After 3 attempts; while the controller talked continuously in spanish to other aircraft; she responded to us and told us to standby. Our original alternate was mpto; however; the reserve fuel for this destination was overly optimistic considering the time of year and the operational way things are run in central and south america. From the inbound deviations and holding at lower altitude; knowing we would be deviating around other thunderstorms en-route to mpto; it was no longer an option. We looked at the FMC nearest airports and agreed skbo was the best option. Both of us were familiar with the airport. We made our way over to skbo at 16;000 ft; it was impossible to get a higher (more optimum altitude); as skbo control wanted us at 16;000 ft. In the process of coordinating with dispatch; I checked the landing data for skbo. With cool evening temperatures we were legal to fly in. Dispatch was sending repeated messages of 'are you going to mpto?' we responded; 'no; skbo.' on the third transmission and roughly 60 miles from skbo we received the ACARS message; 'you are not authorized to land at skbo.' as fuel was becoming more of a concern for us; we decided to divert and fly directly to skcl; both being left confused as to why skbo was not authorized; however focused on getting to skcl expeditiously. Inbound to skcl we were given instructions to fly the manga 5 arrival. We mentioned due to our fuel situation we wanted to go direct to the VOR; were told again to fly the magna 5. Upon entering the arrival into the CDU and pushing enter; both CDU's failed for more than a couple of minutes. We had entered a portion of the arrival on the fix page and had raw data to continue flying the approach. We were also in VMC conditions at the time. We were cleared to 12;000 ft and then requested a lower altitude and were told to maintain 12;000 ft. After further requests for lower we were given 10;000 ft. We were continuously being left high on the arrival. While not at a point to declare a full emergency; there was no room to be flying around or eventually performing a missed approach. We were cleared for the arrival and the ILS 01. Being high we requested a deviation to the left and were then instructed to cross the clo VOR at 9000 ft. The approach plate has a crossing at 5600 ft. I verified the altitude. There is no physical way to land an aircraft from 9000 ft over the VOR. I requested lower and was told 9000 ft again. We were at 9000 ft; with the runway in sight. Finally after 2 requests having a visual on the runway we were handed over to skcl tower; we requested a left 360 and descended to the appropriate altitude; and then given clearance to land. Upon landing we were asked why we did not comply with the previous instructions for the manga 5 arrival. We stated we had lost both flight computers and flew the arrival with raw data; and we were left high on the arrival; and then given clearance for the approach. Upon reaching the gate inskcl; we requested engine oil and fuel. Spoke with dispatch who seemed annoyed we had not gone to mpto. Upon explaining the fuel was insufficient for mpto we had decided to divert to skbo; and had verified the landing data. Upon receiving the alarming ACARS of not authorized to land at skbo we went to skcl. We were given ample fuel this time for a quick flight back to skrg where power had been restored to the airport. 1) I appreciate the company's desire to save money on fuel; however; operating realistically in central and south america is nothing like flying in the us. First the divert fuel does not include enough fuel to deal with weather deviations that are standard this time of year; secondly coordination for diverting and getting to an optimum altitude takes more time then we are accustomed to in the us. 2) I would like it shown to me where it is printed that we are not authorized to land in skbo. We checked the diversion guide. Landing page states nothing. The cali page shows skbo as near by airfield. The FMC shows skbo as nearby airport. I looked through the performance section and found no notes on not using skbo. In fact I never remember being instructed in training to not use skbo. Due to the weather and our fuel situation skbo made far more sense to land then skcl. Additionally upon looking more closely at skbo pages; there are obvious notes that B737's operate into this airfield.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: During arrival to SKRG a B737 crew discovered that the airport had experienced a complete power failure. After a missed approach the crew elected to divert to SKBO which the Dispatcher objects to. They then divert and fuel at SKCL then uneventfully return to SKRG where the power had been restored.

Narrative: [We had] normal operations till approximately 1 hour prior to SKRG. [There were] areas of convective activity which are normal for this time of year requiring diversions around cells in the flight plan routing and arrival. We were eventually cleared for the full ILS Runway 36; while flying the procedure turn we were handed off from Approach Control to Tower. Checking on there was no response except another jet aircraft in position and hold on Runway 36. SKRG had lost all power to the runway lighting; and apparently tower communications. We elected to continue inbound and see if power would be restored during that time. We continued down to approximately 700 FT AGL; noticed the aircraft on the runway and no lighting. We flew the missed approach and entered holding. I switched back to Approach and tried to establish radio contact. Nothing. In fact we could not raise Medellin Approach or Tower. We continued in holding trying other available frequencies; to no avail. We finally tried Bogota Approach Control. After 3 attempts; while the Controller talked continuously in Spanish to other aircraft; she responded to us and told us to standby. Our original alternate was MPTO; however; the reserve fuel for this destination was overly optimistic considering the time of year and the operational way things are run in Central and South America. From the inbound deviations and holding at lower altitude; knowing we would be deviating around other thunderstorms en-route to MPTO; it was no longer an option. We looked at the FMC nearest airports and agreed SKBO was the best option. Both of us were familiar with the airport. We made our way over to SKBO at 16;000 FT; it was impossible to get a higher (more optimum altitude); as SKBO Control wanted us at 16;000 FT. In the process of coordinating with Dispatch; I checked the landing data for SKBO. With cool evening temperatures we were legal to fly in. Dispatch was sending repeated messages of 'Are you going to MPTO?' We responded; 'No; SKBO.' On the third transmission and roughly 60 miles from SKBO we received the ACARS message; 'You are not authorized to land at SKBO.' As fuel was becoming more of a concern for us; we decided to divert and fly directly to SKCL; both being left confused as to why SKBO was not authorized; however focused on getting to SKCL expeditiously. Inbound to SKCL we were given instructions to fly the MANGA 5 Arrival. We mentioned due to our fuel situation we wanted to go direct to the VOR; were told again to fly the MAGNA 5. Upon entering the arrival into the CDU and pushing enter; both CDU's failed for more than a couple of minutes. We had entered a portion of the arrival on the fix page and had raw data to continue flying the approach. We were also in VMC conditions at the time. We were cleared to 12;000 FT and then requested a lower altitude and were told to maintain 12;000 FT. After further requests for lower we were given 10;000 FT. We were continuously being left high on the arrival. While not at a point to declare a full emergency; there was no room to be flying around or eventually performing a missed approach. We were cleared for the arrival and the ILS 01. Being high we requested a deviation to the left and were then instructed to cross the CLO VOR at 9000 FT. The approach plate has a crossing at 5600 FT. I verified the altitude. There is no physical way to land an aircraft from 9000 FT over the VOR. I requested lower and was told 9000 FT again. We were at 9000 FT; with the runway in sight. Finally after 2 requests having a visual on the runway we were handed over to SKCL Tower; we requested a left 360 and descended to the appropriate altitude; and then given clearance to land. Upon landing we were asked why we did not comply with the previous instructions for the MANGA 5 arrival. We stated we had lost both flight computers and flew the arrival with raw data; and we were left high on the arrival; and then given clearance for the approach. Upon reaching the gate inSKCL; we requested engine oil and fuel. Spoke with Dispatch who seemed annoyed we had not gone to MPTO. Upon explaining the fuel was insufficient for MPTO we had decided to divert to SKBO; and had verified the landing data. Upon receiving the alarming ACARS of not authorized to land at SKBO we went to SKCL. We were given ample fuel this time for a quick flight back to SKRG where power had been restored to the airport. 1) I appreciate the company's desire to save money on fuel; however; operating realistically in Central and South America is nothing like flying in the US. First the divert fuel does not include enough fuel to deal with weather deviations that are STANDARD this time of year; secondly coordination for diverting and getting to an optimum altitude takes more time then we are accustomed to in the US. 2) I would like it shown to me where it is printed that we are not authorized to land in SKBO. We checked the Diversion Guide. Landing page states nothing. The Cali page shows SKBO as near by airfield. The FMC shows SKBO as nearby airport. I looked through the performance section and found no notes on not using SKBO. In fact I never remember being instructed in training to not use SKBO. Due to the weather and our fuel situation SKBO made far more sense to land then SKCL. Additionally upon looking more closely at SKBO pages; there are obvious notes that B737's operate into this airfield.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.