Narrative:

Upon approach to lax, the controller cleared the aircraft direct seal beach VOR and heading 320 degrees, after seal beach, expect ILS runway 25L approach. Charts were selected and briefed for the ILS. The captain (PF) asked the first officer to leave his NAVAID on the lax VOR for purposes of using the DME off that NAVAID. The flight was then advised for a change of approach to the ILS runway 24R instead of runway 25L. Both pilots got out the approach charts and were unable to brief that approach due to the short time involved for the turn on the final vector and clearance for approach was shortly received and the captain turned onto the approach after capturing G/south and localizer. After turning on and starting down the controller advised the crew that they were tracking in on the runway 25L approach instead of runway 24R. The aircraft was flown over to the approach and continued the proper ILS runway 24R. The captain's decision to tune the first officer's navigation to the VOR for the DME reference was questionable. By limiting the ILS approach to 1 radio (navigation) set to the captain's side only prevents proper back up by the first officer for all prephases of the approach. It is my opinion this could have been avoided by allowing the first officer to use normal back up procedures and set up for the approach early. If the captain misses setting a new frequency in the navigation, there is a better chance for the other pilot to note the discrepancy. This also prevents changing frequencys at a critical phase of an approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG WRONG RWY APCH AT LAX.

Narrative: UPON APCH TO LAX, THE CTLR CLRED THE ACFT DIRECT SEAL BEACH VOR AND HDG 320 DEGS, AFTER SEAL BEACH, EXPECT ILS RWY 25L APCH. CHARTS WERE SELECTED AND BRIEFED FOR THE ILS. THE CAPT (PF) ASKED THE F/O TO LEAVE HIS NAVAID ON THE LAX VOR FOR PURPOSES OF USING THE DME OFF THAT NAVAID. THE FLT WAS THEN ADVISED FOR A CHANGE OF APCH TO THE ILS RWY 24R INSTEAD OF RWY 25L. BOTH PLTS GOT OUT THE APCH CHARTS AND WERE UNABLE TO BRIEF THAT APCH DUE TO THE SHORT TIME INVOLVED FOR THE TURN ON THE FINAL VECTOR AND CLRNC FOR APCH WAS SHORTLY RECEIVED AND THE CAPT TURNED ONTO THE APCH AFTER CAPTURING G/S AND LOC. AFTER TURNING ON AND STARTING DOWN THE CTLR ADVISED THE CREW THAT THEY WERE TRACKING IN ON THE RWY 25L APCH INSTEAD OF RWY 24R. THE ACFT WAS FLOWN OVER TO THE APCH AND CONTINUED THE PROPER ILS RWY 24R. THE CAPT'S DECISION TO TUNE THE F/O'S NAV TO THE VOR FOR THE DME REF WAS QUESTIONABLE. BY LIMITING THE ILS APCH TO 1 RADIO (NAV) SET TO THE CAPT'S SIDE ONLY PREVENTS PROPER BACK UP BY THE F/O FOR ALL PREPHASES OF THE APCH. IT IS MY OPINION THIS COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BY ALLOWING THE F/O TO USE NORMAL BACK UP PROCS AND SET UP FOR THE APCH EARLY. IF THE CAPT MISSES SETTING A NEW FREQ IN THE NAV, THERE IS A BETTER CHANCE FOR THE OTHER PLT TO NOTE THE DISCREPANCY. THIS ALSO PREVENTS CHANGING FREQS AT A CRITICAL PHASE OF AN APCH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.