Narrative:

I was the PIC of a CE560. My copilot and I arrived at the FBO three hours before departure. During the preflight we noticed that the pfd's and mfd were in a condition that approximated a reversion. My first officer was familiar with the situation and recognized that; following a data update; maintenance had failed to throw a concealed switch. After cessna maintenance set the switch; the remainder of the preflight proceeded normally. Following the checklist; we set-up for our takeoff including pressing the heading button (upper left position) on the flight director mode selector panel. The flight director's v-bars responded normally by rising above the horizon. During the takeoff roll the first officer called for rotation and I pulled back on the yoke and focused my attention on the v-bars. Instead of finding the bars above the horizon as expected they were on it. I reached up and pushed the upper left selector panel button again; but the bars did not spring into place as anticipated. I glanced back at the panel and; for the first time; realized that it had been installed upside-down. Looking across; I found the copilot's side was upside-down as well. We returned to the airport and reported the discrepancy to our company and the FBO. Upon reflection; I've realized that I've become so accustomed to the panel that I may no longer read the writing on the buttons; rather I just press the place where that button should be. Instead of pressing heading; I pushed vs on the inverted panel and confirmed that the activation light was illuminated and the v-bars rose. The faulty installation escaped the attention of two avionics technicians; one quality control inspector and; of course; both pilots. The panel looks exactly the same whether right-side-up or upside-down except for the labels. I find it surprising that it was designed in such a way that it could be installed incorrectly. It is clear that pilots need to be extra cautious when accepting an aircraft that has been in maintenance. In this situation however; there seemed no logical reason for giving extra attention to the mode selector panel since none of the maintenance directly involved avionics repair or installation. (We later learned that the panels had been removed during the replacement of the nose fans.) if anyone had asked me if I observe the mode selector prior to pushing a button; I would have assured them that I do. Since this incident; I've come to notice how often I (and I suspect most people) rely on standard position placement. For example; I now realize that I rarely look at the numbers on my analog watch; I simply note the position of the hands. The lesson is obvious: be more observant. I must also question the wisdom of manufacturing a part that is capable of being installed incorrectly.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CE560 Captain reported that both Flight Director Mode Control Panels were installed upside down following maintenance the night before. Neither pilot noticed the faulty installation until takeoff when VS was pressed instead of HDG.

Narrative: I was the PIC of a CE560. My copilot and I arrived at the FBO three hours before departure. During the preflight we noticed that the PFD's and MFD were in a condition that approximated a reversion. My First Officer was familiar with the situation and recognized that; following a data update; maintenance had failed to throw a concealed switch. After Cessna maintenance set the switch; the remainder of the preflight proceeded normally. Following the checklist; we set-up for our takeoff including pressing the HDG button (upper left position) on the flight director mode selector panel. The flight director's V-bars responded normally by rising above the horizon. During the takeoff roll The First Officer called for rotation and I pulled back on the yoke and focused my attention on the V-bars. Instead of finding the bars above the horizon as expected they were on it. I reached up and pushed the upper left selector panel button again; but the bars did not spring into place as anticipated. I glanced back at the panel and; for the first time; realized that it had been installed upside-down. Looking across; I found the copilot's side was upside-down as well. We returned to the airport and reported the discrepancy to our Company and the FBO. Upon reflection; I've realized that I've become so accustomed to the panel that I may no longer read the writing on the buttons; rather I just press the place where that button should be. Instead of pressing HDG; I pushed VS on the inverted panel and confirmed that the activation light was illuminated and the V-bars rose. The faulty installation escaped the attention of two avionics technicians; one quality control inspector and; of course; both pilots. The panel looks exactly the same whether right-side-up or upside-down except for the labels. I find it surprising that it was designed in such a way that it could be installed incorrectly. It is clear that pilots need to be extra cautious when accepting an aircraft that has been in maintenance. In this situation however; there seemed no logical reason for giving extra attention to the mode selector panel since none of the maintenance directly involved avionics repair or installation. (We later learned that the panels had been removed during the replacement of the nose fans.) If anyone had asked me if I observe the mode selector prior to pushing a button; I would have assured them that I do. Since this incident; I've come to notice how often I (and I suspect most people) rely on standard position placement. For example; I now realize that I rarely look at the numbers on my analog watch; I simply note the position of the hands. The lesson is obvious: Be more observant. I must also question the wisdom of manufacturing a part that is capable of being installed incorrectly.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.