Narrative:

I was the first officer in a three-man crew operating a B747-200 flight between [asia] and anchorage. The flight had been required to make a technical fuel stop enroute. I flew the second leg between the fuel stop and anchorage; as the flying pilot. In the left seat was the captain; a company check airman and an experienced flight engineer. Also on board was a company ride-on mechanic. When the flight departed catering was not put aboard; and at the time of our arrival in anchorage; we had been operating for about fifteen hours without a meal. The flight occurred during night hours; with part of the first leg; and most of the second leg conducted in the dark.upon arrival in alaska; we flew the tager five arrival; until given vectors for the ILS runway 7R. I briefed the arrival prior to descent and requested flaps 10. Given fairly dense cloud cover and moisture aloft; we operated nacelle heat during the descent and approach; which necessitated carrying extra engine power to meet operating limitations. One reason for our vector off the arrival was to accommodate another flight which was reporting a potential emergency involving flaps. We were uncertain if they were vectored ahead of us or behind us on the approach; or how that might affect our own landing.as we approached within five miles of the localizer; we were given a runway re-assignment to 7L. We had not briefed that approach; but inserted it in the FMS; and tuned the VHF navigation to the new ILS frequency. The fight engineer provided a landing data card for 7L. I called for flaps 20 to aid in slowing. The captain refused; he asked why I had called for flaps 20; and I pointed out that I was getting a glideslope alive signal and was fast. He told me that it was a false signal; that we still had distance to go (showing approximately 12 DME) and refused the flap setting. I called for gear down; instead. The approach was fast; flown on autopilot; with ILS selected on the navigation mode selector. With glide slope alive and [localizer] captured; I completed configuring; but was at idle; with the N1 low light flashing (due to the requirement for nacelle anti-ice and a need to maintain 45% N1 below 10;000). I was at idle power; fast; and slowing.the weather was low; with RVR less than 4;000 and ceiling reported at 300 broken; we expected a left crosswind of 15 KTS and we were operating at max gross landing weight of 630;000 pounds. We anticipated a requirement for medium auto brakes for the runway length; and the runway was reported wet with patches of snow and ice.between the thousand-foot above touchdown zone call and the five hundred foot call; the captain reported seeing the approach lights in sight. I glanced up; but did not see them. I did see the approach lights for 7R; very faintly; but did not see approach lights for 7L; ahead. At five hundred feet the captain reported the approach lights in sight; and told me I was high. I was on glide slope and on the localizer; with the autopilot engaged in ILS navigation mode; but he made this assessment based on his viewing of the approach lights. The flight engineer was also looking at the approach lights; I could see them; and stated that the lights were for 7R; not our runway. The flight engineer said we needed to get down to the lights; and that we were high. The captain reaffirmed that we were high and told me to 'get down there'. He told me 'you're not going to make it; push it over and get over there; it's off to your right'.I repeated that it was the wrong runway. I disconnected the autopilot; and the captain again told me 'get down there; you're too high'. I stated one more time that it wasn't our runway; but used the terminology that 'that's the right runway'. I meant right vs. Left; but in retrospect I can see that it could also be interpreted as the correct runway. The flight engineer and captain were both adamant that we were high and had to get down; and that we were left of the runway.I was confused bythis insistence; as we were on the localizer and glide slope. I increased the descent and turned slightly for the approach lights on the right. The flight engineer made a statement that 'we gotta go around'. I tended to agree; but the captain was insistent that I get the airplane down to the runway to our right. I knew it was the wrong runway; and was closed for snow removal. I knew that the runways were offset; with 7L being farther down-field than the 7R. It was natural that the lights for the 7R would be seen first. At approximately 300 ft we began to break out; and were aligned between 7L and 7R; moving toward 7R. I announced for a fourth time that 'this is 7R; it's the wrong runway. Go around! Set go around thrust! Flaps 20'!the flight engineer set go-around thrust and the captain moved the flap setting from 25 to 20. I began to climb; now in visual conditions. Company procedure is to call out the flight director settings; which I did. I called for 'altitude select' which preselects the missed approach altitude and provides a flight director indication of approaching that altitude for level-off. The captain did not select it. I called for INS select; in order to fly the missed approach procedure from the database in the FMS; and the captain did not select it.he was arguing loudly with the controller; yelling that the approach lights were illuminated brightly for the wrong runway; and told the controller that we were going around because the wrong runway had been illuminated. I called for a reduced climb at a thousand feet. Normally this is between five hundred and a thousand feet per minute; and being at maximum gross landing weight; I called for 'vertical speed 500' and then 'flaps 10'. I was not given the vertical speed selection called for on the vertical speed mode of the autopilot/flight director panel; I was seeing a pitch-up go-around indication on the flight director; and 'flew through it' to begin accelerating; per procedure. I called for flaps 5; at which point climb thrust is normally set; but the captain refused to move the flaps to the 5 setting; saying we would remain at flaps 10. We continued climbing at go-around thrust; pitching up to keep speed from increasing above the flaps 10 (+ 10 KTS) setting.clearly the captain and controller were agitated. A second controller came on as I approached the missed approach altitude. I was distracted by the arguing and the lack of guidance on the flight director. I was reaching up to select the INS navigation mode selection; which had not been selected; when I passed through the missed approach altitude. The captain looked up; and yelled 'altitude'! I replied 'correcting;' and began to level and return to the missed-approach altitude. The captain pushed forward on the control column; but didn't take control. He pushed harder forward; and nosed the airplane ten degrees nose-down; yelling 'you're going to get me violated'!the captain demanded vectors; and we were given one by the controller. I again called for 'heading select' and this time received it; though I had to dial my own heading for the flight director. I called for 'autopilot B to command' but the captain didn't engage it. I engaged it myself; selecting altitude hold; and set thrust. We were subsequently given a short vector back to the localizer for runway 7L; with an uneventful approach and landing.the approach lights for runway 7L were very dim compared to the runway lights for 7R. The approach lights and runway lights for 7R were still very bright; while 7L still appeared dim. Visibility and ceiling had gone up in the interim between the missed approach; and the return for landing; however; and we had no trouble acquiring the runway and landing from the category 1 ILS 7L. On the ground; the crew van driver that took us from the airplane to the customs building asked what had happened. He heard the exchange over the radio and saw the go-around. He remarked that another airplane which followedus on the first approach had affirmed the captain's comments; that the wrong runway appeared illuminated; and that 7R was illuminated brightly; but not 7L.the captain refused to speak to me or answer me in the van; or at the hotel. When we debriefed over coffee an hour later at the hotel; both the captain and flight engineer looked very surprised when I said I knew we had been looking at the lights for 7R. I had voiced this observation three times before turning for the runway and a fourth when we broke out and saw the runway. In retrospect; I knew it was the wrong runway. I should have refused the pressure to go to that runway or commanded a missed approach. We were at the end of a long flight and had more reserve fuel available than usual; though with low weather I was reluctant to go missed when the ILS was already locked up on the autopilot. I did feel considerable pressure as the captain was also a company check airman who had administered a check ride to me several days previously. I should not have departed the approach for the other runway; and should have been more vocal and insistent that it was the incorrect runway. The terminology 'right' may have been confused with meaning 'correct'.during the missed approach; I missed the level-off altitude. I was carrying extra power; and expected to climb to that altitude at climb thrust; not go-around thrust. I was distracted by the lack of guidance of panel support; and the argument in progress on the radio. When I had passed through the altitude; I intended to level and return back to that altitude; but was disturbed by the steep push made by the captain. The captain began pushing on the controls without announcing his intentions or taking control; and we ended up with one pilot pushing; and one pilot pulling; at a relatively low altitude.at numerous points throughout the procedure; before and after the approach; the captain refused my calls for flaps and flight director settings; and disregarded my responses regarding the runway. Some level of distrust was already present given the no-notice '6 month line safety check' that I received from him a week prior; and a discussion we had at our departure airport. I felt considerable pressure since that check ride and our conversation; and felt strongly that the check ride and subsequent legs with the captain/check airman were established looking for a 'bust'. This pressure; along with some level of fatigue; and having missed three meals during the course of the flight were contributing factors.the change of runways while we were preparing for course intercept was also distracting. When attempting to conduct the missed approach; not having the missed approach altitude selected in the altitude alerter/selector on the autopilot/flight director panel meant that as I approached the missed approach altitude; the flight director was still giving me a nine degree pitch-up command as though I had not yet reached the selected altitude. These commands; along with cockpit distractions; were contributing factors to my failure to level off at the missed approach altitude. Ultimately; I passed it by nearly 400 ft before descending back down to 2;500 ft; because I was still climbing under go-around thrust with a fly-up indication when I approached and passed the missed approach altitude.the preoccupation with seeing the approach lights should never have taken focus from the glide slope and localizer indications. The captain later told me he was seeing a 'fly right' indication on his display; though I showed on-course with the localizer and glide slope captured and maintained by the autopilot. Runway-in-sight information is nice-to-know information during the approach; but isn't really a factor until approaching minimums; and the approach lights are useful generally for identification...but one shouldn't be making calls to divert from the on-course indications to go after approach lights. I knew this; and I shouldn't have list

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Wide Body First Officer related an out of control arrival to ANC in which almost every aspect of CRM was abused and/or abandoned. Track and altitude deviations and harsh verbal and physical disagreements and conflicts between the three crewmembers contributed to a highly unprofessional operation.

Narrative: I was the First Officer in a three-man crew operating a B747-200 flight between [Asia] and Anchorage. The flight had been required to make a technical fuel stop enroute. I flew the second leg between the fuel stop and Anchorage; as the flying pilot. In the left seat was the Captain; a company check airman and an experienced Flight Engineer. Also on board was a company ride-on mechanic. When the flight departed catering was not put aboard; and at the time of our arrival in Anchorage; we had been operating for about fifteen hours without a meal. The flight occurred during night hours; with part of the first leg; and most of the second leg conducted in the dark.Upon arrival in Alaska; we flew the Tager Five arrival; until given vectors for the ILS Runway 7R. I briefed the arrival prior to descent and requested flaps 10. Given fairly dense cloud cover and moisture aloft; we operated nacelle heat during the descent and approach; which necessitated carrying extra engine power to meet operating limitations. One reason for our vector off the arrival was to accommodate another flight which was reporting a potential emergency involving flaps. We were uncertain if they were vectored ahead of us or behind us on the approach; or how that might affect our own landing.As we approached within five miles of the localizer; we were given a runway re-assignment to 7L. We had not briefed that approach; but inserted it in the FMS; and tuned the VHF navigation to the new ILS frequency. The Fight Engineer provided a landing data card for 7L. I called for flaps 20 to aid in slowing. The Captain refused; he asked why I had called for flaps 20; and I pointed out that I was getting a glideslope alive signal and was fast. He told me that it was a false signal; that we still had distance to go (showing approximately 12 DME) and refused the flap setting. I called for gear down; instead. The approach was fast; flown on autopilot; with ILS selected on the navigation mode selector. With glide slope alive and [Localizer] captured; I completed configuring; but was at idle; with the N1 low light flashing (due to the requirement for nacelle anti-ice and a need to maintain 45% N1 below 10;000). I was at idle power; fast; and slowing.The weather was low; with RVR less than 4;000 and ceiling reported at 300 broken; we expected a left crosswind of 15 KTS and we were operating at max gross landing weight of 630;000 LBS. We anticipated a requirement for medium auto brakes for the runway length; and the runway was reported wet with patches of snow and ice.Between the thousand-foot above touchdown zone call and the five hundred foot call; the Captain reported seeing the approach lights in sight. I glanced up; but did not see them. I did see the approach lights for 7R; very faintly; but did not see approach lights for 7L; ahead. At five hundred feet the Captain reported the approach lights in sight; and told me I was high. I was on glide slope and on the localizer; with the autopilot engaged in ILS NAV mode; but he made this assessment based on his viewing of the approach lights. The Flight Engineer was also looking at the approach lights; I could see them; and stated that the lights were for 7R; not our runway. The Flight Engineer said we needed to get down to the lights; and that we were high. The Captain reaffirmed that we were high and told me to 'get down there'. He told me 'You're not going to make it; push it over and get over there; it's off to your right'.I repeated that it was the wrong runway. I disconnected the autopilot; and the Captain again told me 'get down there; you're too high'. I stated one more time that it wasn't our runway; but used the terminology that 'That's the right runway'. I meant right vs. left; but in retrospect I can see that it could also be interpreted as the correct runway. The Flight Engineer and Captain were both adamant that we were high and had to get down; and that we were left of the runway.I was confused bythis insistence; as we were on the localizer and glide slope. I increased the descent and turned slightly for the approach lights on the right. The Flight Engineer made a statement that 'we gotta go around'. I tended to agree; but the Captain was insistent that I get the airplane down to the runway to our right. I knew it was the wrong runway; and was closed for snow removal. I knew that the runways were offset; with 7L being farther down-field than the 7R. It was natural that the lights for the 7R would be seen first. At approximately 300 FT we began to break out; and were aligned between 7L and 7R; moving toward 7R. I announced for a fourth time that 'this is 7R; it's the wrong runway. Go around! Set go around thrust! Flaps 20'!The Flight Engineer set go-around thrust and the Captain moved the flap setting from 25 to 20. I began to climb; now in visual conditions. Company procedure is to call out the flight director settings; which I did. I called for 'Altitude select' which preselects the missed approach altitude and provides a flight director indication of approaching that altitude for level-off. The Captain did not select it. I called for INS select; in order to fly the missed approach procedure from the database in the FMS; and the captain did not select it.He was arguing loudly with the Controller; yelling that the approach lights were illuminated brightly for the wrong runway; and told the Controller that we were going around because the wrong runway had been illuminated. I called for a reduced climb at a thousand feet. Normally this is between five hundred and a thousand feet per minute; and being at maximum gross landing weight; I called for 'Vertical speed 500' and then 'flaps 10'. I was not given the vertical speed selection called for on the vertical speed mode of the autopilot/flight director panel; I was seeing a pitch-up go-around indication on the flight director; and 'flew through it' to begin accelerating; per procedure. I called for flaps 5; at which point climb thrust is normally set; but the Captain refused to move the flaps to the 5 setting; saying we would remain at flaps 10. We continued climbing at go-around thrust; pitching up to keep speed from increasing above the flaps 10 (+ 10 KTS) setting.Clearly the Captain and Controller were agitated. A second Controller came on as I approached the missed approach altitude. I was distracted by the arguing and the lack of guidance on the flight director. I was reaching up to select the INS NAV mode selection; which had not been selected; when I passed through the missed approach altitude. The Captain looked up; and yelled 'Altitude'! I replied 'correcting;' and began to level and return to the missed-approach altitude. The Captain pushed forward on the control column; but didn't take control. He pushed harder forward; and nosed the airplane ten degrees nose-down; yelling 'you're going to get me violated'!The Captain demanded vectors; and we were given one by the Controller. I again called for 'Heading select' and this time received it; though I had to dial my own heading for the flight director. I called for 'Autopilot B to Command' but the Captain didn't engage it. I engaged it myself; selecting Altitude Hold; and set thrust. We were subsequently given a short vector back to the localizer for Runway 7L; with an uneventful approach and landing.The approach lights for Runway 7L were very dim compared to the runway lights for 7R. The approach lights and runway lights for 7R were still very bright; while 7L still appeared dim. Visibility and ceiling had gone up in the interim between the missed approach; and the return for landing; however; and we had no trouble acquiring the runway and landing from the Category 1 ILS 7L. On the ground; the crew van driver that took us from the airplane to the customs building asked what had happened. He heard the exchange over the radio and saw the go-around. He remarked that another airplane which followedus on the first approach had affirmed the Captain's comments; that the wrong runway appeared illuminated; and that 7R was illuminated brightly; but not 7L.The Captain refused to speak to me or answer me in the van; or at the hotel. When we debriefed over coffee an hour later at the hotel; both the Captain and Flight Engineer looked very surprised when I said I knew we had been looking at the lights for 7R. I had voiced this observation three times before turning for the runway and a fourth when we broke out and saw the runway. In retrospect; I knew it was the wrong runway. I should have refused the pressure to go to that runway or commanded a missed approach. We were at the end of a long flight and had more reserve fuel available than usual; though with low weather I was reluctant to go missed when the ILS was already locked up on the autopilot. I did feel considerable pressure as the captain was also a company check airman who had administered a check ride to me several days previously. I should not have departed the approach for the other runway; and should have been more vocal and insistent that it was the incorrect runway. The terminology 'right' may have been confused with meaning 'correct'.During the missed approach; I missed the level-off altitude. I was carrying extra power; and expected to climb to that altitude at climb thrust; not go-around thrust. I was distracted by the lack of guidance of panel support; and the argument in progress on the radio. When I had passed through the altitude; I intended to level and return back to that altitude; but was disturbed by the steep push made by the Captain. The Captain began pushing on the controls without announcing his intentions or taking control; and we ended up with one pilot pushing; and one pilot pulling; at a relatively low altitude.At numerous points throughout the procedure; before and after the approach; the Captain refused my calls for flaps and flight director settings; and disregarded my responses regarding the runway. Some level of distrust was already present given the no-notice '6 month line safety check' that I received from him a week prior; and a discussion we had at our departure airport. I felt considerable pressure since that check ride and our conversation; and felt strongly that the check ride and subsequent legs with the Captain/Check Airman were established looking for a 'bust'. This pressure; along with some level of fatigue; and having missed three meals during the course of the flight were contributing factors.The change of runways while we were preparing for course intercept was also distracting. When attempting to conduct the missed approach; not having the missed approach altitude selected in the altitude alerter/selector on the autopilot/flight director panel meant that as I approached the missed approach altitude; the flight director was still giving me a nine degree pitch-up command as though I had not yet reached the selected altitude. These commands; along with cockpit distractions; were contributing factors to my failure to level off at the missed approach altitude. Ultimately; I passed it by nearly 400 FT before descending back down to 2;500 FT; because I was still climbing under go-around thrust with a fly-up indication when I approached and passed the missed approach altitude.The preoccupation with seeing the approach lights should never have taken focus from the glide slope and localizer indications. The Captain later told me he was seeing a 'fly right' indication on his display; though I showed on-course with the localizer and glide slope captured and maintained by the autopilot. Runway-in-sight information is nice-to-know information during the approach; but isn't really a factor until approaching minimums; and the approach lights are useful generally for identification...but one shouldn't be making calls to divert from the on-course indications to go after approach lights. I knew this; and I shouldn't have list

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.