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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 919885 |
Time | |
Date | 201011 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | SLC.Airport |
State Reference | UT |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | HS 125 Series |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Takeoff |
Route In Use | STAR PECOP2 |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100 Flight Crew Total 5600 Flight Crew Type 120 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Track / Heading All Types |
Narrative:
Immediately after takeoff; I noticed the heading was incorrect for our runway; it should have been 166 degrees (which was previously set) and was showing 161; which is the heading for runway 16L. We were taking off on runway 17. I reset the bug and saw thought the navigation mode was engaging when the ATC controller asked if we were turning towards ppigg. I said yes; at which point she said we were turning east and should be turning of west. I told the first officer to say yes; we are turning towards ppigg and realized that perhaps the wrong departure was loaded. I immediately asked for a vector and turned towards the west. We received a vector and with that turn; I made sure the correct departure was loaded; as the first officer was new and he was struggling with loading the departure. The controller gave us a heading of 280 and although the heading bug was turned towards 280; the navigation mode was still engaged (standby navigation; e.g. 'Heading-to-intercept) as it was during the departure. The airplane turned to capture the departure and the controller had to again issue the heading clearance. We promptly turned towards the correct heading and informed her that we could now resume the departure. We stayed on the heading until the next controller handoff. The rest of the flight was routine.in my head I retraced the taxi/takeoff to find out where I went wrong. It was my fault for getting distracted with a new first officer and not completing the full takeoff briefing; the part where the flight continues normally. I was concerned about an abort and a continued takeoff with a failure. Normally the full brief has those elements and ends with the normal items such as our cleared/expected route; altitude; squawk code; etc. This somehow was missed. The other item which contributed was keeping both the taxi chart and departure up on our mfd's. The larger navigation map on my mfd would have shown more clearly where we were navigating to; instead I was using the smaller map on the pfd. This is not our standard procedure; and somehow got missed due to the fact that this was a VFR day. Simply put; complacency got the best of me. The flight was never in any imminent danger; but I'm sure the controller didn't appreciate a jet crew not on the departure as simple as this one. I always review the departure; but somehow this one got by; and my only theory is that the wrong departure got loaded and started the course of events. The lesson learned is that I must slow down with new(er) pilots and make sure was are conducting SOP's and not missing item; I was counting on the first officer to make a few changes to our avionics which did not happen and that contributed to the event.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: An HS125 Captain reported confusion departing on the PECOP 2 RNAV departure from SLC Runway 17. The wrong departure procedure was loaded by the new First Officer unnoticed by the Captain.
Narrative: Immediately after takeoff; I noticed the heading was incorrect for our runway; it should have been 166 degrees (which was previously set) and was showing 161; which is the heading for Runway 16L. We were taking off on Runway 17. I reset the bug and saw thought the NAV mode was engaging when the ATC Controller asked if we were turning towards PPIGG. I said yes; at which point she said we were turning east and should be turning of west. I told the First Officer to say YES; we are turning towards PPIGG and realized that perhaps the wrong departure was loaded. I immediately asked for a vector and turned towards the west. We received a vector and with that turn; I made sure the correct departure was loaded; as the First Officer was new and he was struggling with loading the departure. The Controller gave us a heading of 280 and although the heading bug was turned towards 280; the NAV mode was still engaged (standby navigation; e.g. 'heading-to-intercept) as it was during the departure. The airplane turned to capture the departure and the Controller had to again issue the heading clearance. We promptly turned towards the correct heading and informed her that we could now resume the departure. We stayed on the heading until the next controller handoff. The rest of the flight was routine.In my head I retraced the taxi/takeoff to find out where I went wrong. It was my fault for getting distracted with a new First Officer and not completing the full takeoff briefing; the part where the flight continues normally. I was concerned about an abort and a continued takeoff with a failure. Normally the full brief has those elements and ends with the normal items such as our cleared/expected route; altitude; squawk code; etc. This somehow was missed. The other item which contributed was keeping both the taxi chart and departure up on our MFD's. The larger navigation map on my MFD would have shown more clearly where we were navigating to; instead I was using the smaller map on the PFD. This is not our standard procedure; and somehow got missed due to the fact that this was a VFR day. Simply put; complacency got the best of me. The flight was never in any imminent danger; but I'm sure the Controller didn't appreciate a jet crew not on the departure as simple as this one. I always review the departure; but somehow this one got by; and my only theory is that the wrong departure got loaded and started the course of events. The lesson learned is that I must slow down with new(er) pilots and make sure was are conducting SOP's and not missing item; I was counting on the First Officer to make a few changes to our avionics which did not happen and that contributed to the event.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.