Narrative:

[We] reported to aircraft on time. Inbound captain reported to me that the aircraft (B-767-300ER) had 9 previous write-ups for the hpsov (high pressure shut-off valve) and engine bld (engine bleed) messages coming on 3-5 hours into the flight and had occurred again on his inbound leg. In addition it had write-ups for EICAS indications flickering on the same side and engine fire loop number 2 overheat warnings in the previous 3 days. I talked to maintenance control and they said that they replaced the hp valve and even the engine but could not get the problem resolved; so they believed it was a problem in the warning system or annunciator lights and since the valves was manually closed and placarded they could go with it. Meanwhile contract maintenance did not like the fact that this was a chronic unresolved problem and would not endorse it as airworthy. Complicating matters was the fact that when you get this warning the QRH commands you to shut down the corresponding AC pack rendering the aircraft un-airworthy for ETOPS. Maintenance control said to change out the EICAS card but maintenance was not convinced this would do anything useful. Card was changed and then maintenance control told them to do a run-up. Supervisor mechanic was summoned to do the run-up and evaluation. Run-up was accomplished but he was only given 15 minutes on the runway to complete the task. [He] could not duplicate problem. He came back and said that this only occurs 3-5 hours into the flight according to the write-up information; that a 15 minute run-up was not a realistic test. [We] called maintenance control again. After going over the history of the problem; its chronic condition; problems with ETOPS operations; contributing discrepancies; I presented the question to maintenance control again and he said that he suspected a short circuit occurring in the wiring bundles in the engine pylon and that it needed a specialist to inspect it and troubleshoot. Based on this analysis none of the local mechanics would endorse the aircraft as airworthy including the supervisor mechanic who performed the run-up as they felt it would be compromising safety and I could only agree with their assessment. They then deferred the decision to maintenance control who also would not endorse the aircraft in its present condition. With everyone's reluctance to endorse the airplane as airworthy I could only turn the aircraft over to the station and maintenance control. Flight was canceled.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-300 aircraft was rejected because the cause of repeat HPSOV and ENG BLD EICAS alerts could not be isolated and repaired so the aircraft was not acceptable for ETOPS operations. In addition the aircraft had engine FIRE LOOP #2 OVERHEAT warnings.

Narrative: [We] reported to aircraft on time. Inbound Captain reported to me that the aircraft (B-767-300ER) had 9 previous write-ups for the HPSOV (High Pressure Shut-Off Valve) and ENG BLD (Engine Bleed) messages coming on 3-5 hours into the flight and had occurred again on his inbound leg. In addition it had write-ups for EICAS indications flickering on the same side and engine FIRE LOOP NUMBER 2 OVERHEAT warnings in the previous 3 days. I talked to Maintenance Control and they said that they replaced the HP valve and even the engine but could not get the problem resolved; so they believed it was a problem in the warning system or annunciator lights and since the valves was manually closed and placarded they could go with it. Meanwhile Contract Maintenance did not like the fact that this was a chronic unresolved problem and would not endorse it as airworthy. Complicating matters was the fact that when you get this warning the QRH commands you to shut down the corresponding AC pack rendering the aircraft un-airworthy for ETOPS. Maintenance Control said to change out the EICAS card but Maintenance was not convinced this would do anything useful. Card was changed and then Maintenance Control told them to do a run-up. Supervisor Mechanic was summoned to do the run-up and evaluation. Run-up was accomplished but he was only given 15 minutes on the runway to complete the task. [He] could not duplicate problem. He came back and said that this only occurs 3-5 hours into the flight according to the write-up information; that a 15 minute run-up was not a realistic test. [We] called Maintenance Control again. After going over the history of the problem; its chronic condition; problems with ETOPS operations; contributing discrepancies; I presented the question to Maintenance Control again and he said that he suspected a short circuit occurring in the wiring bundles in the engine pylon and that it needed a specialist to inspect it and troubleshoot. Based on this analysis none of the local mechanics would endorse the aircraft as airworthy including the Supervisor Mechanic who performed the run-up as they felt it would be compromising safety and I could only agree with their assessment. They then deferred the decision to Maintenance Control who also would not endorse the aircraft in its present condition. With everyone's reluctance to endorse the airplane as airworthy I could only turn the aircraft over to the station and Maintenance Control. Flight was canceled.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.