Narrative:

The ATIS stated that the field was using ILS's to runway 28L. Upon contacting approach we were told to expect an ILS to runway 32. During the approach we monitored the VOR at the field and the 32 ILS. There is no NDB associated with the runway. During the approach we were descended to 4000' on a heading of 070 degrees. Approach control told us that the field was 10 O'clock and ?? Miles. All I could see was a bunch of lights that I assumed were the terminals. Occasionally, I caught the rotating beacon. I have been to the field several times in the last few months, but was not familiar enough with other landmarks to even consider going visual. Neither of us had any idea of the exact location of the approach end of runway 32. It became apparent, though never stated, that approach control was maneuvering us for a tight turn on final for a visual. I slowed to 150 KIAS and went all the way to 28 degree flaps (planned final flaps was 40 degrees). We were given a turn to 360 degrees, descended to 3000', and the runway was point out to us again. We told approach that we were not familiar enough to pick the runway out from our current position. I saw what I assumed to be the part of the approach lighting system, and noted that we were at least one DOT above the G/south. As the localizer started centering, the runway came into view. We were right at the marker and too high to make a safe approach, especially knowing that the terrain on final approach to this particular runway can cause wind gust problems. We told approach that we could not get down and that we needed a 360 degree turn to complete a landing. Approach, instead, said that they would vector us for another approach. We were vectored in a left box for an ILS to runway 32. You would assume that the second time that the vectors would improve. Wrong! We were 90 degrees to the localizer just outside the marker, and despite using 25 degrees of bank (I won't use 30 degrees that close to the ground), we overshot the localizer by so much that we initiated a 30 degree re-intercept. I called them after landing. Using all the tact I could muster, I discussed the fact that these vectors were totally unsatisfactory. The supervisor was very defensive. His basic points were that: all that approach needs to issue a visual is that the pilot acknowledge that they have the airport in sight, that if we needed special handling we should have let them know, and that they had complied with all the altitude marks on their scope. I told him: to accept a visual approach the pilot must have sufficient visual clues to allow him to safely execute an approach, that we didn't need special handling--we needed professional handling that is standard at almost every ATC facility in the us, and altitude marks are meaningless to me--I must see the runway to land. I don't care about the letter of the law. I won't risk my license on a bad approach. Vectors to the marker, above the G/south, at night in a hilly terrain with a 40 degree intercept, is unacceptable. Visual approachs have become the problem child of the industry. If the FAA wants to fine a pilot for every time he blinks, then the pilot has no choice but to refuse to accept marginal vectors and visual approachs. The FAA claims that this will bog down the system. Capacity problems are due to the ineptitude of the FAA's bureaucracy. I'm willing to work with ATC and accept a visual approach. However, ATC must give vectors that will provide the pilot with the visual clues he needs and place him in a position to land.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG WAS UNABLE TO COMPLETE A VISUAL APCH INTO PIT. FLT CREW CLAIMS POOR RADAR VECTORS WAS THE PROBLEM.

Narrative: THE ATIS STATED THAT THE FIELD WAS USING ILS'S TO RWY 28L. UPON CONTACTING APCH WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT AN ILS TO RWY 32. DURING THE APCH WE MONITORED THE VOR AT THE FIELD AND THE 32 ILS. THERE IS NO NDB ASSOCIATED WITH THE RWY. DURING THE APCH WE WERE DSNDED TO 4000' ON A HDG OF 070 DEGS. APCH CTL TOLD US THAT THE FIELD WAS 10 O'CLOCK AND ?? MILES. ALL I COULD SEE WAS A BUNCH OF LIGHTS THAT I ASSUMED WERE THE TERMINALS. OCCASIONALLY, I CAUGHT THE ROTATING BEACON. I HAVE BEEN TO THE FIELD SEVERAL TIMES IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS, BUT WAS NOT FAMILIAR ENOUGH WITH OTHER LANDMARKS TO EVEN CONSIDER GOING VISUAL. NEITHER OF US HAD ANY IDEA OF THE EXACT LOCATION OF THE APCH END OF RWY 32. IT BECAME APPARENT, THOUGH NEVER STATED, THAT APCH CTL WAS MANEUVERING US FOR A TIGHT TURN ON FINAL FOR A VISUAL. I SLOWED TO 150 KIAS AND WENT ALL THE WAY TO 28 DEG FLAPS (PLANNED FINAL FLAPS WAS 40 DEGS). WE WERE GIVEN A TURN TO 360 DEGS, DSNDED TO 3000', AND THE RWY WAS POINT OUT TO US AGAIN. WE TOLD APCH THAT WE WERE NOT FAMILIAR ENOUGH TO PICK THE RWY OUT FROM OUR CURRENT POS. I SAW WHAT I ASSUMED TO BE THE PART OF THE APCH LIGHTING SYS, AND NOTED THAT WE WERE AT LEAST ONE DOT ABOVE THE G/S. AS THE LOC STARTED CENTERING, THE RWY CAME INTO VIEW. WE WERE RIGHT AT THE MARKER AND TOO HIGH TO MAKE A SAFE APCH, ESPECIALLY KNOWING THAT THE TERRAIN ON FINAL APCH TO THIS PARTICULAR RWY CAN CAUSE WIND GUST PROBS. WE TOLD APCH THAT WE COULD NOT GET DOWN AND THAT WE NEEDED A 360 DEG TURN TO COMPLETE A LNDG. APCH, INSTEAD, SAID THAT THEY WOULD VECTOR US FOR ANOTHER APCH. WE WERE VECTORED IN A LEFT BOX FOR AN ILS TO RWY 32. YOU WOULD ASSUME THAT THE SECOND TIME THAT THE VECTORS WOULD IMPROVE. WRONG! WE WERE 90 DEGS TO THE LOC JUST OUTSIDE THE MARKER, AND DESPITE USING 25 DEGS OF BANK (I WON'T USE 30 DEGS THAT CLOSE TO THE GND), WE OVERSHOT THE LOC BY SO MUCH THAT WE INITIATED A 30 DEG RE-INTERCEPT. I CALLED THEM AFTER LNDG. USING ALL THE TACT I COULD MUSTER, I DISCUSSED THE FACT THAT THESE VECTORS WERE TOTALLY UNSATISFACTORY. THE SUPVR WAS VERY DEFENSIVE. HIS BASIC POINTS WERE THAT: ALL THAT APCH NEEDS TO ISSUE A VISUAL IS THAT THE PLT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEY HAVE THE ARPT IN SIGHT, THAT IF WE NEEDED SPECIAL HANDLING WE SHOULD HAVE LET THEM KNOW, AND THAT THEY HAD COMPLIED WITH ALL THE ALT MARKS ON THEIR SCOPE. I TOLD HIM: TO ACCEPT A VISUAL APCH THE PLT MUST HAVE SUFFICIENT VISUAL CLUES TO ALLOW HIM TO SAFELY EXECUTE AN APCH, THAT WE DIDN'T NEED SPECIAL HANDLING--WE NEEDED PROFESSIONAL HANDLING THAT IS STANDARD AT ALMOST EVERY ATC FAC IN THE U.S., AND ALT MARKS ARE MEANINGLESS TO ME--I MUST SEE THE RWY TO LAND. I DON'T CARE ABOUT THE LETTER OF THE LAW. I WON'T RISK MY LICENSE ON A BAD APCH. VECTORS TO THE MARKER, ABOVE THE G/S, AT NIGHT IN A HILLY TERRAIN WITH A 40 DEG INTERCEPT, IS UNACCEPTABLE. VISUAL APCHS HAVE BECOME THE PROB CHILD OF THE INDUSTRY. IF THE FAA WANTS TO FINE A PLT FOR EVERY TIME HE BLINKS, THEN THE PLT HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO REFUSE TO ACCEPT MARGINAL VECTORS AND VISUAL APCHS. THE FAA CLAIMS THAT THIS WILL BOG DOWN THE SYS. CAPACITY PROBS ARE DUE TO THE INEPTITUDE OF THE FAA'S BUREAUCRACY. I'M WILLING TO WORK WITH ATC AND ACCEPT A VISUAL APCH. HOWEVER, ATC MUST GIVE VECTORS THAT WILL PROVIDE THE PLT WITH THE VISUAL CLUES HE NEEDS AND PLACE HIM IN A POS TO LAND.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.