Narrative:

While being vectored for the power plant visual approach for 26L, we were on a left base leg and about 3 mi from intercepting final approach at about 8 mi from the end of 26L. The final controller asked if we had the airport. We confirmed we did. He then pointed out traffic at 11 O'clock and advised he would be going to the north runway (26R). We were just south of 26L. I responded that we had the traffic and we were cleared for the visual to 26L. About 30 to 45 second later, we started our turn to final, simultaneously initiating a gradual descent. I noticed the rotating beacon of a commuter aircraft on about a 45 degree intercept to us. Although I was not flying at the time, I simultaneously added power, stopped the descent and asked phx approach about our conflicting traffic to our left and underneath. He responded, 'that's the traffic I pointed out.' he then asked the commuter aircraft is he saw us and he responded yes. Approach vectored him away from us. The airport was busy and the controller had to do quite a bit of reshuffling. This situation was too close for comfort. I could not tell if the commuter passed beneath us or behind and beneath us. I called phx approach the next day because I wanted to find out exactly how this situation occurred and how to prevent it in the future. The quality assurance man was very helpful. He listened to the tape but did not look at any displays. All he could offer was that it sounded like we erred by not allowing proper sep after we acknowledged our traffic. He was unable to tell us where the commuter was in mi from our aircraft. He did say that he was 1000' below us prior to being cleared for the visual. The quality assurance man's guess was that the commuter must have been about 2 mi from us and 1000' below us when the traffic was pointed out. We were not told enough information to properly identify the 11 O'clock traffic. All the pilots in our crew observed 11 O'clock traffic about 4 or 5 mi ahead, which appeared to be heading for the north runway. There was no question in our minds that the traffic we saw was the traffic that was pointed out to us. This bothers me greatly. To avoid this in the future, the following steps will help. More information about traffic from controller. A) position. B) altitude. C) mi from our aircraft. D) type of aircraft. East) direction. Require all aircraft to have strobes. The commuter I saw only had a rotating beacon. Require controllers to continue to watch aircraft even after they've acknowledged traffic. They just might have idented the wrong traffic. The quality assurance man told me that all safeguards were removed once traffic is acknowledged, even if they come within 100' of each other. I'm not sure if we could have sep ourselves from our traffic if we had idented him correctly at 1ST, because he was probably too close and too slow. If we had seen him, we could have pointed that out to the controller avoiding a close call. When I pushed the quality assurance man for 'how close was it?' he said we may have come within 300' of him vertically. While I did not see him pass under or behind us, it seemed like there was more sep. He said he got his information from the controller. The last point that could help is to install ILS equipment on 26C. It's a very high density airport where traffic is squeezed hard often to keep delays to a minimum. A visual only approach is marginal with this type of density.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGT GIVEN TRAFFIC INFO ON SMT, CLRED FOR VISUAL APCH AND THEN SAW TRAFFIC IN CLOSE APCH. LGT HAD SIGHTED WRONG ACFT TO BEGIN WITH.

Narrative: WHILE BEING VECTORED FOR THE POWER PLANT VISUAL APCH FOR 26L, WE WERE ON A LEFT BASE LEG AND ABOUT 3 MI FROM INTERCEPTING FINAL APCH AT ABOUT 8 MI FROM THE END OF 26L. THE FINAL CTLR ASKED IF WE HAD THE ARPT. WE CONFIRMED WE DID. HE THEN POINTED OUT TFC AT 11 O'CLOCK AND ADVISED HE WOULD BE GOING TO THE N RWY (26R). WE WERE JUST S OF 26L. I RESPONDED THAT WE HAD THE TFC AND WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL TO 26L. ABOUT 30 TO 45 SEC LATER, WE STARTED OUR TURN TO FINAL, SIMULTANEOUSLY INITIATING A GRADUAL DSCNT. I NOTICED THE ROTATING BEACON OF A COMMUTER ACFT ON ABOUT A 45 DEG INTERCEPT TO US. ALTHOUGH I WAS NOT FLYING AT THE TIME, I SIMULTANEOUSLY ADDED PWR, STOPPED THE DSCNT AND ASKED PHX APCH ABOUT OUR CONFLICTING TFC TO OUR LEFT AND UNDERNEATH. HE RESPONDED, 'THAT'S THE TFC I POINTED OUT.' HE THEN ASKED THE COMMUTER ACFT IS HE SAW US AND HE RESPONDED YES. APCH VECTORED HIM AWAY FROM US. THE ARPT WAS BUSY AND THE CTLR HAD TO DO QUITE A BIT OF RESHUFFLING. THIS SITUATION WAS TOO CLOSE FOR COMFORT. I COULD NOT TELL IF THE COMMUTER PASSED BENEATH US OR BEHIND AND BENEATH US. I CALLED PHX APCH THE NEXT DAY BECAUSE I WANTED TO FIND OUT EXACTLY HOW THIS SITUATION OCCURRED AND HOW TO PREVENT IT IN THE FUTURE. THE QUALITY ASSURANCE MAN WAS VERY HELPFUL. HE LISTENED TO THE TAPE BUT DID NOT LOOK AT ANY DISPLAYS. ALL HE COULD OFFER WAS THAT IT SOUNDED LIKE WE ERRED BY NOT ALLOWING PROPER SEP AFTER WE ACKNOWLEDGED OUR TFC. HE WAS UNABLE TO TELL US WHERE THE COMMUTER WAS IN MI FROM OUR ACFT. HE DID SAY THAT HE WAS 1000' BELOW US PRIOR TO BEING CLRED FOR THE VISUAL. THE QUALITY ASSURANCE MAN'S GUESS WAS THAT THE COMMUTER MUST HAVE BEEN ABOUT 2 MI FROM US AND 1000' BELOW US WHEN THE TFC WAS POINTED OUT. WE WERE NOT TOLD ENOUGH INFO TO PROPERLY IDENT THE 11 O'CLOCK TFC. ALL THE PLTS IN OUR CREW OBSERVED 11 O'CLOCK TFC ABOUT 4 OR 5 MI AHEAD, WHICH APPEARED TO BE HDG FOR THE N RWY. THERE WAS NO QUESTION IN OUR MINDS THAT THE TFC WE SAW WAS THE TFC THAT WAS POINTED OUT TO US. THIS BOTHERS ME GREATLY. TO AVOID THIS IN THE FUTURE, THE FOLLOWING STEPS WILL HELP. MORE INFO ABOUT TFC FROM CTLR. A) POS. B) ALT. C) MI FROM OUR ACFT. D) TYPE OF ACFT. E) DIRECTION. REQUIRE ALL ACFT TO HAVE STROBES. THE COMMUTER I SAW ONLY HAD A ROTATING BEACON. REQUIRE CTLRS TO CONTINUE TO WATCH ACFT EVEN AFTER THEY'VE ACKNOWLEDGED TFC. THEY JUST MIGHT HAVE IDENTED THE WRONG TFC. THE QUALITY ASSURANCE MAN TOLD ME THAT ALL SAFEGUARDS WERE REMOVED ONCE TFC IS ACKNOWLEDGED, EVEN IF THEY COME WITHIN 100' OF EACH OTHER. I'M NOT SURE IF WE COULD HAVE SEP OURSELVES FROM OUR TFC IF WE HAD IDENTED HIM CORRECTLY AT 1ST, BECAUSE HE WAS PROBABLY TOO CLOSE AND TOO SLOW. IF WE HAD SEEN HIM, WE COULD HAVE POINTED THAT OUT TO THE CTLR AVOIDING A CLOSE CALL. WHEN I PUSHED THE QUALITY ASSURANCE MAN FOR 'HOW CLOSE WAS IT?' HE SAID WE MAY HAVE COME WITHIN 300' OF HIM VERTICALLY. WHILE I DID NOT SEE HIM PASS UNDER OR BEHIND US, IT SEEMED LIKE THERE WAS MORE SEP. HE SAID HE GOT HIS INFO FROM THE CTLR. THE LAST POINT THAT COULD HELP IS TO INSTALL ILS EQUIP ON 26C. IT'S A VERY HIGH DENSITY ARPT WHERE TFC IS SQUEEZED HARD OFTEN TO KEEP DELAYS TO A MINIMUM. A VISUAL ONLY APCH IS MARGINAL WITH THIS TYPE OF DENSITY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.