Narrative:

The first officer was flying a very accurate approach to runway 25 left at lax, as we had been cleared to do so. The final approach controller advised that commuter Y was behind us, also to runway 25L. He had us in sight and would maintain visual sep from us. However, this commuter plane then overtook us on our left side and positioned himself directly in front of us. Our descent profiles coincided. He slowed to lower his gear. We were rapidly gaining on him, only seconds from a rear end collision. We broke off the approach to the left. The first officer started to clean up the aircraft with my help at the same time as I asked approach control for immediate instructions. Their response was to give me a frequency change. When I instantly argued that I needed controling, not another controller, their orders were repeated--this time abusively. So, lax tower was contacted and they gave us a heading and an altitude. They too had a hostile attitude. We followed these instructions but almost immediately we were changed to yet another frequency. This time to lax departure as we were beginning to approach the shoreline. We were now at 250 KTS and 2000' MSL. About this time the #1 F/a burst into the cockpit to tell us that 285 very apprehensive passenger needed to be told what was happening--and so did the cabin crew. At this time we could see an air carrier that had just taken off from lax. We were told to follow it to our left & maintain visual contact. To our left was an small aircraft heading towards us but apparently higher. In the confusion I missed the controller's total set of instructions. He had now changed our vector to a northerly heading. A request for him to repeat earned me not just a rebuke, but a lecture about not paying attention. We finally got some calmer instructions & settled down ourselves, flying over santa monica to land on runway 24R. Conclusions? At the moment that we broke off the approach we needed controling. We needed help. We were off the landing escalator & on our own in hazy conditions, almost above lax. Instead we got a frequency change. This meant almost 3 heads down in the cockpit--'what was that frequency he just gave us?' the controllers weren't helpful, downright hostile in fact, & very rude. They had intended to clear us for a sidestep to runway 25R but had omitted to do so. So they got 2 aircraft at the same place at the same time. In this situation, a frequency change, any fooling with the radios, should not be. We were super busy & we had all just been scared. Approach controller should be able to issue immediate, preplanned instructions. ATC should be the communicators among themselves, not the overloaded pilots who are now virtually west/O ATC instructions in a crowded, hostile environment. And, yelling at the pilots accomplishes nothing except only to further rattle them some more right after they have all possibly been frightened. The sequel to this incident was that a check of the tapes showed that we had been 'grossly mishandled.' we were given very sincere apologies by the FAA. The matter has apparently been dropped, most certainly between ourselves as pilots and the FAA. Whether the FAA pursues the commuter pilot is a very good reason for a NASA report from him. Our company was indignant at the wasted flying time that was incurred, not to mention the late arrival of their plane at lax. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: after landing the reporter (PIC) called TRACON and was talked down to by the ATC supervisor. He then called his company safety rep who in turn contacted FAA for review of incident. After tape review the reporter was contacted by FAA rep who was very apologetic and said that the aircraft had been 'grossly mishandled' by controllers, and asked if reporter wished to pursue a complaint. Reporter declined as he was satisfied with ATC apology. During approach and landing after second approach he had been worked by 4 different controllers at lax (approach, tower, departure and a second approach controller). Only one with a decent attitude was the second approach controller (north side runway 24R). Supplemental information from acn 95775: we were told by approach to expect a visual approach to runway 25L and look for widebody transport air carrier X on final for runway 25R at our approximately 3 O'clock position.we responded that we had air carrier X in sight, although he was at our 5 O'clock position (behind us, about 1500' higher). Lax approach then cleared us for a visual approach for runway 25L and said 'stay behind the widebody transport air carrier X.' by the time we hit the OM for runway 25L we checked in with tower and they cleared us to land on runway 25L. At that point, we had lost visual contact with air carrier X, who had slowed up more than we had, and we told tower we had lost visual contact with air carrier X. Moments later I saw X going around off our left side and we landed on runway 25L. This incident would have been avoided if air carrier X had listened to his clearance more carefully and stayed on the runway 25R course west/O veering off towards our approach course runway 25L, and also if lax approach would not have given us such a bogus clearance to follow air carrier X when we were clearly in front of him to begin with.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION AND VERY CLOSE PROX BETWEEN WDB-ACR AND COMMUTER ACFT. BOTH ON APCH. OPERATIONAL ERROR.

Narrative: THE F/O WAS FLYING A VERY ACCURATE APCH TO RWY 25 LEFT AT LAX, AS WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO DO SO. THE FINAL APCH CTLR ADVISED THAT COMMUTER Y WAS BEHIND US, ALSO TO RWY 25L. HE HAD US IN SIGHT AND WOULD MAINTAIN VISUAL SEP FROM US. HOWEVER, THIS COMMUTER PLANE THEN OVERTOOK US ON OUR LEFT SIDE AND POSITIONED HIMSELF DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF US. OUR DSCNT PROFILES COINCIDED. HE SLOWED TO LOWER HIS GEAR. WE WERE RAPIDLY GAINING ON HIM, ONLY SECS FROM A REAR END COLLISION. WE BROKE OFF THE APCH TO THE LEFT. THE F/O STARTED TO CLEAN UP THE ACFT WITH MY HELP AT THE SAME TIME AS I ASKED APCH CTL FOR IMMEDIATE INSTRUCTIONS. THEIR RESPONSE WAS TO GIVE ME A FREQ CHANGE. WHEN I INSTANTLY ARGUED THAT I NEEDED CTLING, NOT ANOTHER CTLR, THEIR ORDERS WERE REPEATED--THIS TIME ABUSIVELY. SO, LAX TWR WAS CONTACTED AND THEY GAVE US A HDG AND AN ALT. THEY TOO HAD A HOSTILE ATTITUDE. WE FOLLOWED THESE INSTRUCTIONS BUT ALMOST IMMEDIATELY WE WERE CHANGED TO YET ANOTHER FREQ. THIS TIME TO LAX DEP AS WE WERE BEGINNING TO APCH THE SHORELINE. WE WERE NOW AT 250 KTS AND 2000' MSL. ABOUT THIS TIME THE #1 F/A BURST INTO THE COCKPIT TO TELL US THAT 285 VERY APPREHENSIVE PAX NEEDED TO BE TOLD WHAT WAS HAPPENING--AND SO DID THE CABIN CREW. AT THIS TIME WE COULD SEE AN ACR THAT HAD JUST TAKEN OFF FROM LAX. WE WERE TOLD TO FOLLOW IT TO OUR LEFT & MAINTAIN VISUAL CONTACT. TO OUR LEFT WAS AN SMA HEADING TOWARDS US BUT APPARENTLY HIGHER. IN THE CONFUSION I MISSED THE CTLR'S TOTAL SET OF INSTRUCTIONS. HE HAD NOW CHANGED OUR VECTOR TO A NORTHERLY HDG. A REQUEST FOR HIM TO REPEAT EARNED ME NOT JUST A REBUKE, BUT A LECTURE ABOUT NOT PAYING ATTN. WE FINALLY GOT SOME CALMER INSTRUCTIONS & SETTLED DOWN OURSELVES, FLYING OVER SANTA MONICA TO LAND ON RWY 24R. CONCLUSIONS? AT THE MOMENT THAT WE BROKE OFF THE APCH WE NEEDED CTLING. WE NEEDED HELP. WE WERE OFF THE LNDG ESCALATOR & ON OUR OWN IN HAZY CONDITIONS, ALMOST ABOVE LAX. INSTEAD WE GOT A FREQ CHANGE. THIS MEANT ALMOST 3 HEADS DOWN IN THE COCKPIT--'WHAT WAS THAT FREQ HE JUST GAVE US?' THE CTLRS WEREN'T HELPFUL, DOWNRIGHT HOSTILE IN FACT, & VERY RUDE. THEY HAD INTENDED TO CLR US FOR A SIDESTEP TO RWY 25R BUT HAD OMITTED TO DO SO. SO THEY GOT 2 ACFT AT THE SAME PLACE AT THE SAME TIME. IN THIS SITUATION, A FREQ CHANGE, ANY FOOLING WITH THE RADIOS, SHOULD NOT BE. WE WERE SUPER BUSY & WE HAD ALL JUST BEEN SCARED. APCH CTLR SHOULD BE ABLE TO ISSUE IMMEDIATE, PREPLANNED INSTRUCTIONS. ATC SHOULD BE THE COMMUNICATORS AMONG THEMSELVES, NOT THE OVERLOADED PLTS WHO ARE NOW VIRTUALLY W/O ATC INSTRUCTIONS IN A CROWDED, HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT. AND, YELLING AT THE PLTS ACCOMPLISHES NOTHING EXCEPT ONLY TO FURTHER RATTLE THEM SOME MORE RIGHT AFTER THEY HAVE ALL POSSIBLY BEEN FRIGHTENED. THE SEQUEL TO THIS INCIDENT WAS THAT A CHK OF THE TAPES SHOWED THAT WE HAD BEEN 'GROSSLY MISHANDLED.' WE WERE GIVEN VERY SINCERE APOLOGIES BY THE FAA. THE MATTER HAS APPARENTLY BEEN DROPPED, MOST CERTAINLY BETWEEN OURSELVES AS PLTS AND THE FAA. WHETHER THE FAA PURSUES THE COMMUTER PLT IS A VERY GOOD REASON FOR A NASA RPT FROM HIM. OUR COMPANY WAS INDIGNANT AT THE WASTED FLYING TIME THAT WAS INCURRED, NOT TO MENTION THE LATE ARR OF THEIR PLANE AT LAX. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: AFTER LNDG THE RPTR (PIC) CALLED TRACON AND WAS TALKED DOWN TO BY THE ATC SUPVR. HE THEN CALLED HIS COMPANY SAFETY REP WHO IN TURN CONTACTED FAA FOR REVIEW OF INCIDENT. AFTER TAPE REVIEW THE RPTR WAS CONTACTED BY FAA REP WHO WAS VERY APOLOGETIC AND SAID THAT THE ACFT HAD BEEN 'GROSSLY MISHANDLED' BY CTLRS, AND ASKED IF RPTR WISHED TO PURSUE A COMPLAINT. RPTR DECLINED AS HE WAS SATISFIED WITH ATC APOLOGY. DURING APCH AND LNDG AFTER SECOND APCH HE HAD BEEN WORKED BY 4 DIFFERENT CTLRS AT LAX (APCH, TWR, DEP AND A SECOND APCH CTLR). ONLY ONE WITH A DECENT ATTITUDE WAS THE SECOND APCH CTLR (N SIDE RWY 24R). SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 95775: WE WERE TOLD BY APCH TO EXPECT A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 25L AND LOOK FOR WDB ACR X ON FINAL FOR RWY 25R AT OUR APPROX 3 O'CLOCK POS.WE RESPONDED THAT WE HAD ACR X IN SIGHT, ALTHOUGH HE WAS AT OUR 5 O'CLOCK POS (BEHIND US, ABOUT 1500' HIGHER). LAX APCH THEN CLRED US FOR A VISUAL APCH FOR RWY 25L AND SAID 'STAY BEHIND THE WDB ACR X.' BY THE TIME WE HIT THE OM FOR RWY 25L WE CHKED IN WITH TWR AND THEY CLRED US TO LAND ON RWY 25L. AT THAT POINT, WE HAD LOST VISUAL CONTACT WITH ACR X, WHO HAD SLOWED UP MORE THAN WE HAD, AND WE TOLD TWR WE HAD LOST VISUAL CONTACT WITH ACR X. MOMENTS LATER I SAW X GOING AROUND OFF OUR LEFT SIDE AND WE LANDED ON RWY 25L. THIS INCIDENT WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF ACR X HAD LISTENED TO HIS CLRNC MORE CAREFULLY AND STAYED ON THE RWY 25R COURSE W/O VEERING OFF TOWARDS OUR APCH COURSE RWY 25L, AND ALSO IF LAX APCH WOULD NOT HAVE GIVEN US SUCH A BOGUS CLRNC TO FOLLOW ACR X WHEN WE WERE CLEARLY IN FRONT OF HIM TO BEGIN WITH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.