Narrative:

I was the first officer on a scheduled part 121 commuter flight from lafayette regional airport to dfw. We had a report time of xa am. The captain and I were finishing up a very rigorous 5 day trip that the company had instituted on the first of the month that I feel was too tiring. The captain and I were both exhausted. As we came to operations the captain called dispatch for WX particulars and was informed that the aircraft had 2800 # of fuel on board--more than enough for the flight. He told me this as I walked out to the aircraft (an light transport) for the preflight. I preflted the aircraft, tuned the radios and went through my panel scan. I glanced off the fuel gauges but did not let my mind really register what they were telling me. I still had the statement of '2800# on board' from the captain fresh in my mind. The captain then got on board and we went through the checklist with me reading off the items and he checking them and responding. I read the part that said 'fuel qty' and he responded, 'checked and adequate.' after this checklist we fired up the aircraft and departed. About 45 mins into the flight the captain asked what fuel was on the load manifest. I looked it up and replied '2800#.' at that point the captain said that the fuel quantity was inadequate for the flight to continue to dfw. We checked the fuel qty against our current usage and determined that we only had a 6 min reserve. At this point the captain and I decided to play it smart and we diverted to another airport on our company's route system, tyler, tx. When we landed we checked the fuel cap for security and found it to be tight. We therefore deduced that we had taken off west/O the required fuel on board--both of us failing to check it adequately. I feel this oversight and its resultant diversion was caused by many factors: the crew was at the end of a very tiring 5 day trip that the company has just instituted--a trip that does not provide for good crew rest. I have a father that I am very close to in intensive care in the hospital with his life barely hanging on a thread--this has caused many hours of disturbed sleep and worry (the night prior to this accident I got only 2 hours sleep and was thoroughly exhausted). The statement by the captain that we had '2800 3--plenty of fuel,' caused me to be very lackadaisical about checking the gauges combined with my exhaustion and the predawn report to work time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UNSCHEDULED LNDG DUE TO LOW FUEL.

Narrative: I WAS THE F/O ON A SCHEDULED PART 121 COMMUTER FLT FROM LAFAYETTE REGIONAL ARPT TO DFW. WE HAD A RPT TIME OF XA AM. THE CAPT AND I WERE FINISHING UP A VERY RIGOROUS 5 DAY TRIP THAT THE COMPANY HAD INSTITUTED ON THE FIRST OF THE MONTH THAT I FEEL WAS TOO TIRING. THE CAPT AND I WERE BOTH EXHAUSTED. AS WE CAME TO OPS THE CAPT CALLED DISPATCH FOR WX PARTICULARS AND WAS INFORMED THAT THE ACFT HAD 2800 # OF FUEL ON BOARD--MORE THAN ENOUGH FOR THE FLT. HE TOLD ME THIS AS I WALKED OUT TO THE ACFT (AN LTT) FOR THE PREFLT. I PREFLTED THE ACFT, TUNED THE RADIOS AND WENT THROUGH MY PANEL SCAN. I GLANCED OFF THE FUEL GAUGES BUT DID NOT LET MY MIND REALLY REGISTER WHAT THEY WERE TELLING ME. I STILL HAD THE STATEMENT OF '2800# ON BOARD' FROM THE CAPT FRESH IN MY MIND. THE CAPT THEN GOT ON BOARD AND WE WENT THROUGH THE CHKLIST WITH ME READING OFF THE ITEMS AND HE CHKING THEM AND RESPONDING. I READ THE PART THAT SAID 'FUEL QTY' AND HE RESPONDED, 'CHKED AND ADEQUATE.' AFTER THIS CHKLIST WE FIRED UP THE ACFT AND DEPARTED. ABOUT 45 MINS INTO THE FLT THE CAPT ASKED WHAT FUEL WAS ON THE LOAD MANIFEST. I LOOKED IT UP AND REPLIED '2800#.' AT THAT POINT THE CAPT SAID THAT THE FUEL QUANTITY WAS INADEQUATE FOR THE FLT TO CONTINUE TO DFW. WE CHKED THE FUEL QTY AGAINST OUR CURRENT USAGE AND DETERMINED THAT WE ONLY HAD A 6 MIN RESERVE. AT THIS POINT THE CAPT AND I DECIDED TO PLAY IT SMART AND WE DIVERTED TO ANOTHER ARPT ON OUR COMPANY'S ROUTE SYS, TYLER, TX. WHEN WE LANDED WE CHKED THE FUEL CAP FOR SECURITY AND FOUND IT TO BE TIGHT. WE THEREFORE DEDUCED THAT WE HAD TAKEN OFF W/O THE REQUIRED FUEL ON BOARD--BOTH OF US FAILING TO CHK IT ADEQUATELY. I FEEL THIS OVERSIGHT AND ITS RESULTANT DIVERSION WAS CAUSED BY MANY FACTORS: THE CREW WAS AT THE END OF A VERY TIRING 5 DAY TRIP THAT THE COMPANY HAS JUST INSTITUTED--A TRIP THAT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR GOOD CREW REST. I HAVE A FATHER THAT I AM VERY CLOSE TO IN INTENSIVE CARE IN THE HOSPITAL WITH HIS LIFE BARELY HANGING ON A THREAD--THIS HAS CAUSED MANY HRS OF DISTURBED SLEEP AND WORRY (THE NIGHT PRIOR TO THIS ACCIDENT I GOT ONLY 2 HRS SLEEP AND WAS THOROUGHLY EXHAUSTED). THE STATEMENT BY THE CAPT THAT WE HAD '2800 3--PLENTY OF FUEL,' CAUSED ME TO BE VERY LACKADAISICAL ABOUT CHKING THE GAUGES COMBINED WITH MY EXHAUSTION AND THE PREDAWN RPT TO WORK TIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.