37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 976572 |
Time | |
Date | 201110 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B757-200 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Climb |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Hydraulic System Pump |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying First Officer |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210 Flight Crew Total 12000 Flight Crew Type 1500 |
Person 2 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210 Flight Crew Total 18000 Flight Crew Type 8000 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe |
Narrative:
We were in the climbout passing 15K when we got a left hydraulic electric pump EICAS; followed by a left hydraulic engine pump EICAS; followed by a left hydraulic system press EICAS in quick succession. The captain continued to fly while I coordinated a level off and worked the QRH. Although I was calm throughout the incident because I was confident in my abilities and experience as a pilot; I had difficulty using the QRH. It got to the point where I decided that even if I couldn't use it completely correctly; I would draw on my experience to come a good resolution. Among my problems included finding the right checklist; no reference in the checklist to running the overweight landing checklist; and inability to find the 'approach climb limit weight' referenced in the overweight landing checklist. We diverted; giving us time to work through these issues. I never did find the approach climb limit weight even with the captain's help. We landed without incident. This is no credit to the QRH but to our previous training. In other words; we succeeded in spite of our current training. After we landed; my global feeling was that I wished I had received better training using the QRH. In particular; some simulator training would have been beneficial. The index of the QRH is different; as in the syntax and the philosophy. For example; there is a list of checklists inside other checklists that lists procedures not to do. This runs contrary to previous training in which we look up all the secondary EICAS failures. Thank god we both have a lot of experience overall and in specific aircraft type. This would not have gone down well with a new captain and new hire.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B757 flight crew experiences a Left Hydraulic system failure due to fluid loss during climb and elects to divert to a suitable alternate.
Narrative: We were in the climbout passing 15K when we got a Left Hydraulic Electric Pump EICAS; followed by a Left Hydraulic Engine Pump EICAS; followed by a Left Hydraulic System Press EICAS in quick succession. The Captain continued to fly while I coordinated a level off and worked the QRH. Although I was calm throughout the incident because I was confident in my abilities and experience as a pilot; I had difficulty using the QRH. It got to the point where I decided that even if I couldn't use it completely correctly; I would draw on my experience to come a good resolution. Among my problems included finding the right checklist; no reference in the checklist to running the overweight landing checklist; and inability to find the 'approach climb limit weight' referenced in the overweight landing checklist. We diverted; giving us time to work through these issues. I never did find the approach climb limit weight even with the Captain's help. We landed without incident. This is no credit to the QRH but to our previous training. In other words; we succeeded IN SPITE of our current training. After we landed; my global feeling was that I wished I had received better training using the QRH. In particular; some simulator training would have been beneficial. The index of the QRH is different; as in the syntax and the philosophy. For example; there is a list of checklists inside other checklists that lists procedures NOT to do. This runs contrary to previous training in which we look up all the secondary EICAS failures. Thank God we both have a lot of experience overall and in specific aircraft type. This would not have gone down well with a new Captain and new hire.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.