Narrative:

After a lengthy delay for loading extra baggage and freight, aircraft taxied out for takeoff with captain in right seat and reserve captain-first officer flying from left seat. The pretkof checklist was read and reaching the end of the taxiway switched to tower who just then called and cleared us for takeoff. As we rolled around the corner onto the runway the first officer started to advance the throttles for takeoff. At that time the takeoff warning horn sounded. I was absolutely shocked to look up and see the flap indicator at up and the flap lever in the 0 detent. The engines weren't even spooled up, so I quickly retarded the throttles to idle, even though technically it was the person in the left seat's responsibility, I recognized the problem and didn't intend to pursue that takeoff any further. I told tower we would like to roll to the first turnoff, then taxi back for another takeoff. While taxiing back around we reread and this time accomplished the entire pretkof checklist. Later on into the flight as we began to overcome some of our embarrassment we talked about what might have caused our error. I honestly couldn't remember if I had inadvertently skipped over the wing flaps on the checklist or if I had read it and he had responded correctly but had not really checked it. I reminded him of the need to establish good habit patterns and the fact that he had previously forgotten to call for takeoff flaps at the prescribed time, but that before we had always caught the oversight when we accomplished the checklist. For my own part, I vowed to be extra diligent in proper use of the checklist, especially when swapping seats and performing duties different from my usual routine. I have no false illusions about making a successful flaps up takeoff at a heavy gross weight. The record is pretty dismal on that point. I am grateful that the takeoff warning worked as advertised and saved us from the ultimate embarrassment. I would caution that if your aircraft has a takeoff warning device, always test it during your preflight to make sure that it works and never do anything that would disable it, because in 22 yrs of flying as a student, fighter pilot and the last 12 yrs as a captain for the airlines, I have never forgotten to set my flaps for takeoff, so boy was I surprised when it happened to me. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: this was one of those hurry takeoffs where load close out came in with change that had to be entered in FMC. Also short taxi and when switched to tower controller was already calling flight to give takeoff clearance. PIC flying in right seat for experience for newly qualified captain in left seat feels with the distraction of input to FMC he missed the flaps on the before takeoff checklist and did not call them out. Realizes now when swapping seats he has to emphasis to PF flying as PIC that one in left seat has to take command. Aircraft had just barely begun to move, so not really an abort and apparently FAA has not become involved.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG STARTED TKOF RUN WITHOUT FLAPS IN PROPER POSITION. TKOF ABORTED.

Narrative: AFTER A LENGTHY DELAY FOR LOADING EXTRA BAGGAGE AND FREIGHT, ACFT TAXIED OUT FOR TKOF WITH CAPT IN RIGHT SEAT AND RESERVE CAPT-F/O FLYING FROM LEFT SEAT. THE PRETKOF CHKLIST WAS READ AND REACHING THE END OF THE TXWY SWITCHED TO TWR WHO JUST THEN CALLED AND CLRED US FOR TKOF. AS WE ROLLED AROUND THE CORNER ONTO THE RWY THE F/O STARTED TO ADVANCE THE THROTTLES FOR TKOF. AT THAT TIME THE TKOF WARNING HORN SOUNDED. I WAS ABSOLUTELY SHOCKED TO LOOK UP AND SEE THE FLAP INDICATOR AT UP AND THE FLAP LEVER IN THE 0 DETENT. THE ENGS WEREN'T EVEN SPOOLED UP, SO I QUICKLY RETARDED THE THROTTLES TO IDLE, EVEN THOUGH TECHNICALLY IT WAS THE PERSON IN THE LEFT SEAT'S RESPONSIBILITY, I RECOGNIZED THE PROB AND DIDN'T INTEND TO PURSUE THAT TKOF ANY FURTHER. I TOLD TWR WE WOULD LIKE TO ROLL TO THE FIRST TURNOFF, THEN TAXI BACK FOR ANOTHER TKOF. WHILE TAXIING BACK AROUND WE REREAD AND THIS TIME ACCOMPLISHED THE ENTIRE PRETKOF CHKLIST. LATER ON INTO THE FLT AS WE BEGAN TO OVERCOME SOME OF OUR EMBARRASSMENT WE TALKED ABOUT WHAT MIGHT HAVE CAUSED OUR ERROR. I HONESTLY COULDN'T REMEMBER IF I HAD INADVERTENTLY SKIPPED OVER THE WING FLAPS ON THE CHKLIST OR IF I HAD READ IT AND HE HAD RESPONDED CORRECTLY BUT HAD NOT REALLY CHKED IT. I REMINDED HIM OF THE NEED TO ESTABLISH GOOD HABIT PATTERNS AND THE FACT THAT HE HAD PREVIOUSLY FORGOTTEN TO CALL FOR TKOF FLAPS AT THE PRESCRIBED TIME, BUT THAT BEFORE WE HAD ALWAYS CAUGHT THE OVERSIGHT WHEN WE ACCOMPLISHED THE CHKLIST. FOR MY OWN PART, I VOWED TO BE EXTRA DILIGENT IN PROPER USE OF THE CHKLIST, ESPECIALLY WHEN SWAPPING SEATS AND PERFORMING DUTIES DIFFERENT FROM MY USUAL ROUTINE. I HAVE NO FALSE ILLUSIONS ABOUT MAKING A SUCCESSFUL FLAPS UP TKOF AT A HVY GROSS WT. THE RECORD IS PRETTY DISMAL ON THAT POINT. I AM GRATEFUL THAT THE TKOF WARNING WORKED AS ADVERTISED AND SAVED US FROM THE ULTIMATE EMBARRASSMENT. I WOULD CAUTION THAT IF YOUR ACFT HAS A TKOF WARNING DEVICE, ALWAYS TEST IT DURING YOUR PREFLT TO MAKE SURE THAT IT WORKS AND NEVER DO ANYTHING THAT WOULD DISABLE IT, BECAUSE IN 22 YRS OF FLYING AS A STUDENT, FIGHTER PLT AND THE LAST 12 YRS AS A CAPT FOR THE AIRLINES, I HAVE NEVER FORGOTTEN TO SET MY FLAPS FOR TKOF, SO BOY WAS I SURPRISED WHEN IT HAPPENED TO ME. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: THIS WAS ONE OF THOSE HURRY TKOFS WHERE LOAD CLOSE OUT CAME IN WITH CHANGE THAT HAD TO BE ENTERED IN FMC. ALSO SHORT TAXI AND WHEN SWITCHED TO TWR CTLR WAS ALREADY CALLING FLT TO GIVE TKOF CLRNC. PIC FLYING IN RIGHT SEAT FOR EXPERIENCE FOR NEWLY QUALIFIED CAPT IN LEFT SEAT FEELS WITH THE DISTR OF INPUT TO FMC HE MISSED THE FLAPS ON THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST AND DID NOT CALL THEM OUT. REALIZES NOW WHEN SWAPPING SEATS HE HAS TO EMPHASIS TO PF FLYING AS PIC THAT ONE IN LEFT SEAT HAS TO TAKE COMMAND. ACFT HAD JUST BARELY BEGUN TO MOVE, SO NOT REALLY AN ABORT AND APPARENTLY FAA HAS NOT BECOME INVOLVED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.