Narrative:

Although VMC on the approach, the new special WX at pit was WX-200 1 1/4 F, snow falling and some snow on runway. F/east was operating radio, I was flying and captain viewing pit stadium and various sights out the window, chatting incessantly. Heavy workload on F/east and first officer. Shortly before G/south intercept aircraft entered IMC conditions. Captain then reviewed procedures for short ground roll on snow covered runways and returned to miscellaneous conversation. Captain advised F/east he would now handle ATC communications. Aircraft broke out approximately 400' AGL with lower ceiling and visibility ahead in snow, only T/D zone of runway in sight, conditions deteriorating. Aircraft T/D approximately 800' of threshold, normal stop. At this time I asked the captain who we were talking to. He wasn't sure exactly what I meant. I asked, 'are we talking to the tower? Were we cleared to land?' as I was going to go to ground control he advised me not to mention the infraction, just advise we were clear of runway and request taxi instructions. While taxiing conversation ensued about whether or not approach control handed us off to tower (I don't believe so), or whether approach control cleared us to land. Regardless, the potential for disaster scenarios should be apparent. All agreed to submit NASA reports. Captain advised and subsequently authored abbreviated version of above landing west/O clearance. The bottom line: lack of professionalism. Captain habitually rambled from pushback to block in through a 4 day trip. This was the first of 2 incidents on the same day (altitude bust, see second report). Woefully complacent, although exciting and challenging, 2 men working on a 3-M aircraft is not acceptable. Delegation of authority is one thing--relegation another. All this after an initial before trip briefing about how tough in-flight standards would be adhered to. Below the line: lack of courage. First officer and F/east not willing to bluntly ask captain to please shut up so we could fly the airplane. Since I was former check airman, this was especially repugnant on my part. The dotted line: sign your name--don't be afraid to speak up or out. Let people, regardless of rank, know the standards you believe in. Please print this somewhere (correct, first). With film and theater experience, I can see these reports coming alive on video during recurrent and upgrade training. Surely we have the resources and safety priorities to train 1980's/90's pilots using up to date and real life techniques in a creative, unusual, albeit hollywood style--long-lasting, yet non-threatening methods. Reprinting these incidents is extremely valuable, but especially when dealing with human factors, 'a picture is worth a thousand words.' if so, how much more worth moving pictures. Please call! Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: this PIC is a real cowboy and apparently is not concerned with SOP. In fact, on a later leg with check airmen giving check ride, continued same complacent attitude. Suggested the reporter try professional standard committee approach, but he thinks with this guy will have no effect. Reporter does have good relationship with chief pilot and is unofficially going to discuss problem with him and hope for some kind of action. Supplemental information from acn 102803: F/east was handling radio communications up until being handed over to approach where the PNF (captain) resumed communication procedures. The captain then began his brief on handling the WX conditions on the field, while I was performing the final landing checklist. Upon landing and on the rollout it was discovered we never switched to tower frequency to receive our landing clearance. F/east should have never been assigned to communicate on radios. Because of this it took one of the pilots out of the loop.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT LANDED WITHOUT GETTING CLRNC OR CONTACTING TWR.

Narrative: ALTHOUGH VMC ON THE APCH, THE NEW SPECIAL WX AT PIT WAS WX-200 1 1/4 F, SNOW FALLING AND SOME SNOW ON RWY. F/E WAS OPERATING RADIO, I WAS FLYING AND CAPT VIEWING PIT STADIUM AND VARIOUS SIGHTS OUT THE WINDOW, CHATTING INCESSANTLY. HEAVY WORKLOAD ON F/E AND F/O. SHORTLY BEFORE G/S INTERCEPT ACFT ENTERED IMC CONDITIONS. CAPT THEN REVIEWED PROCS FOR SHORT GND ROLL ON SNOW COVERED RWYS AND RETURNED TO MISC CONVERSATION. CAPT ADVISED F/E HE WOULD NOW HANDLE ATC COMS. ACFT BROKE OUT APPROX 400' AGL WITH LOWER CEILING AND VISIBILITY AHEAD IN SNOW, ONLY T/D ZONE OF RWY IN SIGHT, CONDITIONS DETERIORATING. ACFT T/D APPROX 800' OF THRESHOLD, NORMAL STOP. AT THIS TIME I ASKED THE CAPT WHO WE WERE TALKING TO. HE WASN'T SURE EXACTLY WHAT I MEANT. I ASKED, 'ARE WE TALKING TO THE TWR? WERE WE CLRED TO LAND?' AS I WAS GOING TO GO TO GND CTL HE ADVISED ME NOT TO MENTION THE INFRACTION, JUST ADVISE WE WERE CLR OF RWY AND REQUEST TAXI INSTRUCTIONS. WHILE TAXIING CONVERSATION ENSUED ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT APCH CTL HANDED US OFF TO TWR (I DON'T BELIEVE SO), OR WHETHER APCH CTL CLRED US TO LAND. REGARDLESS, THE POTENTIAL FOR DISASTER SCENARIOS SHOULD BE APPARENT. ALL AGREED TO SUBMIT NASA RPTS. CAPT ADVISED AND SUBSEQUENTLY AUTHORED ABBREVIATED VERSION OF ABOVE LNDG W/O CLRNC. THE BOTTOM LINE: LACK OF PROFESSIONALISM. CAPT HABITUALLY RAMBLED FROM PUSHBACK TO BLOCK IN THROUGH A 4 DAY TRIP. THIS WAS THE FIRST OF 2 INCIDENTS ON THE SAME DAY (ALT BUST, SEE SECOND RPT). WOEFULLY COMPLACENT, ALTHOUGH EXCITING AND CHALLENGING, 2 MEN WORKING ON A 3-M ACFT IS NOT ACCEPTABLE. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY IS ONE THING--RELEGATION ANOTHER. ALL THIS AFTER AN INITIAL BEFORE TRIP BRIEFING ABOUT HOW TOUGH INFLT STANDARDS WOULD BE ADHERED TO. BELOW THE LINE: LACK OF COURAGE. F/O AND F/E NOT WILLING TO BLUNTLY ASK CAPT TO PLEASE SHUT UP SO WE COULD FLY THE AIRPLANE. SINCE I WAS FORMER CHK AIRMAN, THIS WAS ESPECIALLY REPUGNANT ON MY PART. THE DOTTED LINE: SIGN YOUR NAME--DON'T BE AFRAID TO SPEAK UP OR OUT. LET PEOPLE, REGARDLESS OF RANK, KNOW THE STANDARDS YOU BELIEVE IN. PLEASE PRINT THIS SOMEWHERE (CORRECT, FIRST). WITH FILM AND THEATER EXPERIENCE, I CAN SEE THESE RPTS COMING ALIVE ON VIDEO DURING RECURRENT AND UPGRADE TRNING. SURELY WE HAVE THE RESOURCES AND SAFETY PRIORITIES TO TRAIN 1980'S/90'S PLTS USING UP TO DATE AND REAL LIFE TECHNIQUES IN A CREATIVE, UNUSUAL, ALBEIT HOLLYWOOD STYLE--LONG-LASTING, YET NON-THREATENING METHODS. REPRINTING THESE INCIDENTS IS EXTREMELY VALUABLE, BUT ESPECIALLY WHEN DEALING WITH HUMAN FACTORS, 'A PICTURE IS WORTH A THOUSAND WORDS.' IF SO, HOW MUCH MORE WORTH MOVING PICTURES. PLEASE CALL! CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: THIS PIC IS A REAL COWBOY AND APPARENTLY IS NOT CONCERNED WITH SOP. IN FACT, ON A LATER LEG WITH CHK AIRMEN GIVING CHK RIDE, CONTINUED SAME COMPLACENT ATTITUDE. SUGGESTED THE RPTR TRY PROFESSIONAL STANDARD COMMITTEE APCH, BUT HE THINKS WITH THIS GUY WILL HAVE NO EFFECT. RPTR DOES HAVE GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH CHIEF PLT AND IS UNOFFICIALLY GOING TO DISCUSS PROB WITH HIM AND HOPE FOR SOME KIND OF ACTION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 102803: F/E WAS HANDLING RADIO COMS UP UNTIL BEING HANDED OVER TO APCH WHERE THE PNF (CAPT) RESUMED COM PROCS. THE CAPT THEN BEGAN HIS BRIEF ON HANDLING THE WX CONDITIONS ON THE FIELD, WHILE I WAS PERFORMING THE FINAL LNDG CHKLIST. UPON LNDG AND ON THE ROLLOUT IT WAS DISCOVERED WE NEVER SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ TO RECEIVE OUR LNDG CLRNC. F/E SHOULD HAVE NEVER BEEN ASSIGNED TO COMMUNICATE ON RADIOS. BECAUSE OF THIS IT TOOK ONE OF THE PLTS OUT OF THE LOOP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.