Narrative:

I was the sic and pilot flying in the left seat of a part 135 passenger. We made a normal; uneventful visual approach to and landing on runway 22 at racine. After touchdown of the nose gear; I deployed the thrust reversers and applied full reverse power; and then gradually applied moderate braking; with normal effect. The airplane decelerated normally; but as it became apparent we would not make the approaching desired exit without more aggressive braking; I released brake pressure (pilot action; not brake failure) and we coasted down the runway towards the next exit. Approaching the next exit; at approximately 30-40 KTS; perhaps less; I applied the brakes to slow for the turn. It was at this point that both brake pedals went hard with no braking action whatsoever. I announced this condition to the pilot not flying; released the pedals and re-applied them a second time; with the same result. I instructed the pilot not flying to try the brakes from the right seat; with no success. By now we were past that exit; still on the runway centerline; moving at 20-30 KTS (estimated); and about 1;200 ft from the runway end. At this point we applied the emergency brakes; stopped the airplane on the runway; and remained there until getting towed off to the hangar. While disabled on the runway; we made a radio call on CTAF stating our situation; monitored that frequency for other traffic; and also notified milwaukee clearance that runway 4/22 was essentially closed. We left all aircraft lights and transponder on. Still on the runway; we offloaded our passengers and their baggage into a waiting vehicle. Soon after; the airport FBO personnel brought out a tug and towed us off the runway to their hangar. Once clear of the runways; we broadcast that on CTAF and notified milwaukee clearance we were clear. We were stopped on the runway for about 30-35 minutes total. The captain and I were newly assigned to the aircraft that afternoon; so it was our first leg on that tail number. During preflight; we both reviewed the aircraft logbook and discussed the maintenance status. There were no MEL's; but we discussed the previous write ups; including [two previous events five days apart] that described the same or nearly the same situation we encountered later that evening. If I remember correctly; the first corrective action was to replace the power brake control valve; and the second corrective action was to bleed the brake lines because the emergency brakes were applied. It appeared to me that neither corrective action addressed the anti-skid system in particular. Admittedly; I do not know the whole story and am not a mechanic. This does point out the value of doing a good CRM type of briefing amongst the crew prior to accepting an airplane. While we didn't specifically address the potential brake problem in our approach briefing; once it happened we were both instantly on the same page and knew what was happening. This situation also shows the value in developing a more useful aircraft maintenance log; one that shows the airplane's history: if the log pages had been cleaned out more recently and we had no knowledge of the previous incidents; we may have reacted differently. If I may; I'd like to mention two other items associated with this trip; but completely unrelated to this situation. We flew into rog the previous evening; and noticed the airport beacon is not where it is depicted on the commercial chart (or the nos chart either). The charts show the beacon just east of the approach end of runway 2; when in reality the beacon is atop the mid field control tower on the west side of the runway. The commercial chart does not show the control tower; the nos chart does but without the beacon. This caused a slight bit of confusion when trying to identify the airport and runway for a visual approach from the northeast the previous evening. Also; the commercial chart for rac does not label the taxiway designations. I'm sure with some digging I could find a contact source to address these discrepancies; and to note others in the future; but was hoping you folks could enlighten me in the meantime.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE400 Captain experiences brake failure after landing. Initial brake application is successful in slowing the aircraft to near taxi speed; but the second application had no effect and emergency braking is used to stop the aircraft. The reporter also laments the lack of taxiway designations at RAC and reports an unrelated issue; that at ROG airport the beacon is not located at the point depicted on both the Commercial and NOS airport diagrams.

Narrative: I was the SIC and pilot flying in the left seat of a Part 135 passenger. We made a normal; uneventful visual approach to and landing on Runway 22 at Racine. After touchdown of the nose gear; I deployed the thrust reversers and applied full reverse power; and then gradually applied moderate braking; with normal effect. The airplane decelerated normally; but as it became apparent we would not make the approaching desired exit without more aggressive braking; I released brake pressure (pilot action; not brake failure) and we coasted down the runway towards the next exit. Approaching the next exit; at approximately 30-40 KTS; perhaps less; I applied the brakes to slow for the turn. It was at this point that both brake pedals went hard with no braking action whatsoever. I announced this condition to the pilot not flying; released the pedals and re-applied them a second time; with the same result. I instructed the pilot not flying to try the brakes from the right seat; with no success. By now we were past that exit; still on the runway centerline; moving at 20-30 KTS (estimated); and about 1;200 FT from the runway end. At this point we applied the emergency brakes; stopped the airplane on the runway; and remained there until getting towed off to the hangar. While disabled on the runway; we made a radio call on CTAF stating our situation; monitored that frequency for other traffic; and also notified Milwaukee Clearance that Runway 4/22 was essentially closed. We left all aircraft lights and transponder on. Still on the runway; we offloaded our passengers and their baggage into a waiting vehicle. Soon after; the airport FBO personnel brought out a tug and towed us off the runway to their hangar. Once clear of the runways; we broadcast that on CTAF and notified Milwaukee Clearance we were clear. We were stopped on the runway for about 30-35 minutes total. The Captain and I were newly assigned to the aircraft that afternoon; so it was our first leg on that tail number. During preflight; we both reviewed the aircraft logbook and discussed the maintenance status. There were no MEL's; but we discussed the previous write ups; including [two previous events five days apart] that described the same or nearly the same situation we encountered later that evening. If I remember correctly; the first corrective action was to replace the power brake control valve; and the second corrective action was to bleed the brake lines because the emergency brakes were applied. It appeared to me that neither corrective action addressed the anti-skid system in particular. Admittedly; I do not know the whole story and am not a mechanic. This does point out the value of doing a good CRM type of briefing amongst the crew prior to accepting an airplane. While we didn't specifically address the potential brake problem in our approach briefing; once it happened we were both instantly on the same page and knew what was happening. This situation also shows the value in developing a more useful aircraft maintenance log; one that shows the airplane's history: if the log pages had been cleaned out more recently and we had no knowledge of the previous incidents; we may have reacted differently. If I may; I'd like to mention two other items associated with this trip; but completely unrelated to this situation. We flew into ROG the previous evening; and noticed the airport beacon is not where it is depicted on the Commercial Chart (or the NOS chart either). The charts show the beacon just east of the approach end of Runway 2; when in reality the beacon is atop the mid field control tower on the west side of the runway. The Commercial Chart does not show the Control Tower; the NOS chart does but without the beacon. This caused a slight bit of confusion when trying to identify the airport and runway for a visual approach from the northeast the previous evening. Also; the Commercial Chart for RAC does not label the taxiway designations. I'm sure with some digging I could find a contact source to address these discrepancies; and to note others in the future; but was hoping you folks could enlighten me in the meantime.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.