Narrative:

Bos tower was conducting simultaneous approachs and lndgs to intersecting runways 27 and 22L with 22L traffic holding short of 27. WX was reported as 100 scattered with 8 mi visibility and wind 2610, however the sky was clear at the time of landing. We were cleared to land runway 27 and advised that another aircraft was landing on 22L to hold short of 27. Upon landing runway 27 we exited on the high speed taxiway just prior to 22L. Crossing the centerline of 22L the tower said to hold short of 22L then almost immediately said to continue and hold short of 22R, which we did. Nothing appeared out of the ordinary and safety was not a factor as the only other aircraft was turning off 22L about 3/4 mi down the runway from us. And I was not aware of an error until the tower called me on the landline. I believed that since I had landing clearance on runway 27 which cross runway 22L, that I had clearance to cross 22L unless advised differently by the tower. This is not what they believed--they said that by utilizing the high speed turn off I no longer had a crossing clearance and was expected to hold short of 22L. If this is true, then we must provide more explicit instructions, especially in this case, where the tower said not one word about holding short of the crossing runway. This situation, and other potentially more serious incidents could have been (or could be) avoided by the tower using phraseology such as: 'cleared to land runway xx, do not use/exit taxiway/turn off xx,' or, 'cleared to land runway xx, the use of exit/turn xx will require you to hold short of runway xx,' or, 'cleared to land runway xx, upon clearing runway hold short of runway xx,' or some other similar phraseology. Also a contributing factor in this situation was the tower's workload (understaffed??). Bos tower told me they normally (that is if they have the time) will advise the landing traffic to hold short of the crossing runway however at this time they were too busy to notice what had happened until we had crossed the centerline of 22L. Recommendation: simultaneous approachs to crossing runways are normally done during high vols of traffic, thereby creating the greatest potential for an incident therefore: require more staffing to monitor and correct potential conflicts before they occur. Being too busy is a pretty poor excuse for something that could be avoided by having another controller in the tower. More training--publications, etc, on when, where one can cross an intersection runway during simultaneous approachs.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG UNAUTH RWY CROSSING.

Narrative: BOS TWR WAS CONDUCTING SIMULTANEOUS APCHS AND LNDGS TO INTERSECTING RWYS 27 AND 22L WITH 22L TFC HOLDING SHORT OF 27. WX WAS RPTED AS 100 SCATTERED WITH 8 MI VISIBILITY AND WIND 2610, HOWEVER THE SKY WAS CLEAR AT THE TIME OF LNDG. WE WERE CLRED TO LAND RWY 27 AND ADVISED THAT ANOTHER ACFT WAS LNDG ON 22L TO HOLD SHORT OF 27. UPON LNDG RWY 27 WE EXITED ON THE HIGH SPD TXWY JUST PRIOR TO 22L. XING THE CENTERLINE OF 22L THE TWR SAID TO HOLD SHORT OF 22L THEN ALMOST IMMEDIATELY SAID TO CONTINUE AND HOLD SHORT OF 22R, WHICH WE DID. NOTHING APPEARED OUT OF THE ORDINARY AND SAFETY WAS NOT A FACTOR AS THE ONLY OTHER ACFT WAS TURNING OFF 22L ABOUT 3/4 MI DOWN THE RWY FROM US. AND I WAS NOT AWARE OF AN ERROR UNTIL THE TWR CALLED ME ON THE LANDLINE. I BELIEVED THAT SINCE I HAD LNDG CLRNC ON RWY 27 WHICH CROSS RWY 22L, THAT I HAD CLRNC TO CROSS 22L UNLESS ADVISED DIFFERENTLY BY THE TWR. THIS IS NOT WHAT THEY BELIEVED--THEY SAID THAT BY UTILIZING THE HIGH SPD TURN OFF I NO LONGER HAD A XING CLRNC AND WAS EXPECTED TO HOLD SHORT OF 22L. IF THIS IS TRUE, THEN WE MUST PROVIDE MORE EXPLICIT INSTRUCTIONS, ESPECIALLY IN THIS CASE, WHERE THE TWR SAID NOT ONE WORD ABOUT HOLDING SHORT OF THE XING RWY. THIS SITUATION, AND OTHER POTENTIALLY MORE SERIOUS INCIDENTS COULD HAVE BEEN (OR COULD BE) AVOIDED BY THE TWR USING PHRASEOLOGY SUCH AS: 'CLRED TO LAND RWY XX, DO NOT USE/EXIT TXWY/TURN OFF XX,' OR, 'CLRED TO LAND RWY XX, THE USE OF EXIT/TURN XX WILL REQUIRE YOU TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY XX,' OR, 'CLRED TO LAND RWY XX, UPON CLRING RWY HOLD SHORT OF RWY XX,' OR SOME OTHER SIMILAR PHRASEOLOGY. ALSO A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN THIS SITUATION WAS THE TWR'S WORKLOAD (UNDERSTAFFED??). BOS TWR TOLD ME THEY NORMALLY (THAT IS IF THEY HAVE THE TIME) WILL ADVISE THE LNDG TFC TO HOLD SHORT OF THE XING RWY HOWEVER AT THIS TIME THEY WERE TOO BUSY TO NOTICE WHAT HAD HAPPENED UNTIL WE HAD CROSSED THE CENTERLINE OF 22L. RECOMMENDATION: SIMULTANEOUS APCHS TO XING RWYS ARE NORMALLY DONE DURING HIGH VOLS OF TFC, THEREBY CREATING THE GREATEST POTENTIAL FOR AN INCIDENT THEREFORE: REQUIRE MORE STAFFING TO MONITOR AND CORRECT POTENTIAL CONFLICTS BEFORE THEY OCCUR. BEING TOO BUSY IS A PRETTY POOR EXCUSE FOR SOMETHING THAT COULD BE AVOIDED BY HAVING ANOTHER CTLR IN THE TWR. MORE TRAINING--PUBLICATIONS, ETC, ON WHEN, WHERE ONE CAN CROSS AN INTXN RWY DURING SIMULTANEOUS APCHS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.