Narrative:

I was working the 3I position; parallel monitor for runway 28 during triple simultaneous approaches to ord (west flow.) C90 was providing 6 miles between arrivals to runway 28; and ord ATC tower was departing runway 28 between each arrival. An A319 was approaching wavie on the 28 localizer at 5;000 feet. An E145 was directly next to the A319 on the runway 27L localizer about to leave 6;000 feet. The A319 had not checked in on the local/monitor frequency. I called to the 1w1 position (west arrival) to try the A319 again; but he was not there. While this was occurring; local had put an aircraft in position on runway 28; and another aircraft was inside of the final approach fix. I did not feel it was safe to override the local control position at this time; on an IFR/MVFR day; to verify that the A319; who appeared to be flying the localizer normally; was monitoring the frequency. After local had cleared the departure for takeoff; and I observed the airborne target; I used the local frequency and verified that the A319 was on frequency; they were. The E145 had descended below 6;000 feet before I was able to verify the A319 was on the frequency. I posted a systemic safety issue several months ago based on this scenario. I will reiterate that I believe ord should either not depart runway 28 while conducting simultaneous ILS approaches to that runway; or there should be a separate monitor frequency for arrivals that can be used by the parallel monitor without overriding the local controller during critical moments; i.e. An aircraft holding in position with another aircraft inside the final approach fix.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C90 Controller expressed concern regarding the use of Runway 28 when simultaneous arrival operations are being conducted.

Narrative: I was working the 3I position; parallel monitor for Runway 28 during triple simultaneous approaches to ORD (West Flow.) C90 was providing 6 miles between arrivals to Runway 28; and ORD ATC Tower was departing Runway 28 between each arrival. An A319 was approaching WAVIE on the 28 localizer at 5;000 feet. An E145 was directly next to the A319 on the Runway 27L localizer about to leave 6;000 feet. The A319 had not checked in on the local/monitor frequency. I called to the 1W1 position (West Arrival) to try the A319 again; but he was not there. While this was occurring; Local had put an aircraft in position on Runway 28; and another aircraft was inside of the final approach fix. I did not feel it was safe to override the Local Control position at this time; on an IFR/MVFR day; to verify that the A319; who appeared to be flying the localizer normally; was monitoring the frequency. After Local had cleared the departure for takeoff; and I observed the airborne target; I used the Local frequency and verified that the A319 was on frequency; they were. The E145 had descended below 6;000 feet before I was able to verify the A319 was on the frequency. I posted a systemic safety issue several months ago based on this scenario. I will reiterate that I believe ORD should either not depart Runway 28 while conducting simultaneous ILS approaches to that runway; or there should be a separate monitor frequency for arrivals that can be used by the parallel monitor without overriding the Local Controller during critical moments; i.e. an aircraft holding in position with another aircraft inside the final approach fix.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.