Narrative:

Departed patrick henry international airport, newport news, va, to roa at xa EST in order to drop off company mechanic and parts. First officer was flying the aircraft and the en route flight to roa was uneventful. WX reported at roa was MVFR (8 scattered, 16 overcast, 4R-F). First officer made the ldg runway 6 approach. Vref for landing was 4300# of fuel and 1 passenger was 142 KIAS. Aircraft broke out of clouds around 1500' with good visibility and light rain. Due to high vref, I was unable to drop full flaps until short final. At that time I checked: 3 green lights, good hydraulic pressure and clear to land. Aircraft landed at vref in the T/D zone of the runway. I immediately armed the thrust reversers and noticed 2 armed lights. Observed first officer engage spoiler and thrust reversers. I was anticipating the sharp hump on runway 6. About the time that we went over the hump, first officer said, 'something is wrong, nothing is happening.' I took control of the aircraft and tried the brakes, spoilers and thrust reversers. Noticed that there was no spoiler lights and did not hear the usual engine sounds from the thrust reverser. Brake response was nil, but there was resistance on the pedals. I observed how far down the runway we had traveled and remembered the steep drop off at the end of the runway and decided to takeoff. I tried to advance the thrust levers and they would not move. I had to use my left hand to push the thrust reverser throttles down in order to advance the thrust levers. On the go, just before the aircraft left the end of the runway, I eased in back pressure on the control wheel to see if aircraft was ready to fly. At this time the aircraft went off the end of the runway onto the grass overrun. When I felt the aircraft go over the bank, it was flying, but losing altitude. Once a positive rate was observed, I called for gear up. The first officer selected the gear up and informed me that we still had 2 green lights. I called for flaps and the first officer stated that we had no hydraulic pressure. He then stated that flaps were still indicating 40. I asked first officer for after takeoff checklist and continued to climb the aircraft toward thene and contacted the tower. The tower advised us to turn to 070 degrees and climb to 5000' and contact departure control. During the climb out we felt the aircraft yawing, but it eventually went away. We leveled off at 6000', which departure had assigned and started to assess the damage. I asked the mechanic to come up front in order to get his input. Mechanic looked outside the windows for visible damage. He reported that both flaps were intact and that the spoilers were up a little bit. Fuel was indicating about 3800# at this time. We were still looking at a left main gear green light and a nose gear green light. The hydraulic pressure was still 0. We went through the emergency checklist and decided to do an emergency gear extension to try to get the right main gear down. The main gear door lights illuminated, but no right main gear green light. We decided to shoot another approach and requested a fly-by for a visibility indication of the right main gear. The tower reported that they did not see a right main gear down. We requested another approach and fly by and asked for a visibility indication of the left main gear and the nose gear. The tower reported that they saw gear doors down, but no gear. We climbed back up to a safe altitude and discussed our options. We decided that runway 33 would be the best runway for the approach and landing, due to the flat open areas on each side of the runway and the grass overrun at the end of the runway. I also knew that it had the shortest drop off at the airport boundary. We advised approach control of our intentions and asked if the emergency equipment had been moved to the new runway. We secured all loose items in the aircraft and were well briefed on what to expect upon landing. Fuel was around 2600# before we started the ILS 33 approach. Vref was around 133 KIAS. All checklist items had been performed before we turned onto the localizer. We broke out around 1800' with good visibility. Over the threshold, the tower reported that there was no gear. We confirmed that we had no gear while over the runway and I slowly eased the airplane onto the runway and shut off the engines. The airplane skidded on the centerline to the end of the runway and onto the grass overrun. It came to a stop about 200' past the departure end of the runway and 10' off centerline. I turned the battery off and we immediately evacuated the aircraft. Estimate that we landed around xb EST. The actual aircraft inspection is not complete at this time. An initial investigation by the crew and airport personnel found that the nose gear and the right main gear had been torn off the airplane by a berm at the end of the runway 6 overrun. The decision to abort the landing and attempt to takeoff was based on my knowledge of the terrain at the end of the runway, which drops off about 300' into a ravine. I feel that the actions taken by the crew were correct for the conditions encountered and would be glad to talk to a safety analyst if more information is requested.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WHILE LNDG ACFT WAS UNABLE TO STOP DUE TO SYSTEM MALFUNCTION. PIC ELECTED TO GO AROUND AND ACFT SUSTAINED DAMAGE DURING THE GO AROUND THAT REQUIRED A SUBSEQUENT LNDG WITH NO LNDG GEAR RESULTING IN THE ACFT LEAVING THE RWY SUSTAINING DAMAGE BUT NO PASSENGER OR CREW INJURIES.

Narrative: DEPARTED PATRICK HENRY INTL ARPT, NEWPORT NEWS, VA, TO ROA AT XA EST IN ORDER TO DROP OFF COMPANY MECH AND PARTS. F/O WAS FLYING THE ACFT AND THE ENRTE FLT TO ROA WAS UNEVENTFUL. WX RPTED AT ROA WAS MVFR (8 SCATTERED, 16 OVCST, 4R-F). F/O MADE THE LDG RWY 6 APCH. VREF FOR LNDG WAS 4300# OF FUEL AND 1 PAX WAS 142 KIAS. ACFT BROKE OUT OF CLOUDS AROUND 1500' WITH GOOD VISIBILITY AND LIGHT RAIN. DUE TO HIGH VREF, I WAS UNABLE TO DROP FULL FLAPS UNTIL SHORT FINAL. AT THAT TIME I CHKED: 3 GREEN LIGHTS, GOOD HYD PRESSURE AND CLR TO LAND. ACFT LANDED AT VREF IN THE T/D ZONE OF THE RWY. I IMMEDIATELY ARMED THE THRUST REVERSERS AND NOTICED 2 ARMED LIGHTS. OBSERVED F/O ENGAGE SPOILER AND THRUST REVERSERS. I WAS ANTICIPATING THE SHARP HUMP ON RWY 6. ABOUT THE TIME THAT WE WENT OVER THE HUMP, F/O SAID, 'SOMETHING IS WRONG, NOTHING IS HAPPENING.' I TOOK CONTROL OF THE ACFT AND TRIED THE BRAKES, SPOILERS AND THRUST REVERSERS. NOTICED THAT THERE WAS NO SPOILER LIGHTS AND DID NOT HEAR THE USUAL ENG SOUNDS FROM THE THRUST REVERSER. BRAKE RESPONSE WAS NIL, BUT THERE WAS RESISTANCE ON THE PEDALS. I OBSERVED HOW FAR DOWN THE RWY WE HAD TRAVELED AND REMEMBERED THE STEEP DROP OFF AT THE END OF THE RWY AND DECIDED TO TKOF. I TRIED TO ADVANCE THE THRUST LEVERS AND THEY WOULD NOT MOVE. I HAD TO USE MY LEFT HAND TO PUSH THE THRUST REVERSER THROTTLES DOWN IN ORDER TO ADVANCE THE THRUST LEVERS. ON THE GO, JUST BEFORE THE ACFT LEFT THE END OF THE RWY, I EASED IN BACK PRESSURE ON THE CONTROL WHEEL TO SEE IF ACFT WAS READY TO FLY. AT THIS TIME THE ACFT WENT OFF THE END OF THE RWY ONTO THE GRASS OVERRUN. WHEN I FELT THE ACFT GO OVER THE BANK, IT WAS FLYING, BUT LOSING ALT. ONCE A POSITIVE RATE WAS OBSERVED, I CALLED FOR GEAR UP. THE F/O SELECTED THE GEAR UP AND INFORMED ME THAT WE STILL HAD 2 GREEN LIGHTS. I CALLED FOR FLAPS AND THE F/O STATED THAT WE HAD NO HYD PRESSURE. HE THEN STATED THAT FLAPS WERE STILL INDICATING 40. I ASKED F/O FOR AFTER TKOF CHKLIST AND CONTINUED TO CLB THE ACFT TOWARD THENE AND CONTACTED THE TWR. THE TWR ADVISED US TO TURN TO 070 DEGS AND CLB TO 5000' AND CONTACT DEP CTL. DURING THE CLBOUT WE FELT THE ACFT YAWING, BUT IT EVENTUALLY WENT AWAY. WE LEVELED OFF AT 6000', WHICH DEP HAD ASSIGNED AND STARTED TO ASSESS THE DAMAGE. I ASKED THE MECHANIC TO COME UP FRONT IN ORDER TO GET HIS INPUT. MECH LOOKED OUTSIDE THE WINDOWS FOR VISIBLE DAMAGE. HE RPTED THAT BOTH FLAPS WERE INTACT AND THAT THE SPOILERS WERE UP A LITTLE BIT. FUEL WAS INDICATING ABOUT 3800# AT THIS TIME. WE WERE STILL LOOKING AT A LEFT MAIN GEAR GREEN LIGHT AND A NOSE GEAR GREEN LIGHT. THE HYD PRESSURE WAS STILL 0. WE WENT THROUGH THE EMER CHKLIST AND DECIDED TO DO AN EMER GEAR EXTENSION TO TRY TO GET THE RIGHT MAIN GEAR DOWN. THE MAIN GEAR DOOR LIGHTS ILLUMINATED, BUT NO RIGHT MAIN GEAR GREEN LIGHT. WE DECIDED TO SHOOT ANOTHER APCH AND REQUESTED A FLY-BY FOR A VIS INDICATION OF THE RIGHT MAIN GEAR. THE TWR RPTED THAT THEY DID NOT SEE A RIGHT MAIN GEAR DOWN. WE REQUESTED ANOTHER APCH AND FLY BY AND ASKED FOR A VIS INDICATION OF THE LEFT MAIN GEAR AND THE NOSE GEAR. THE TWR RPTED THAT THEY SAW GEAR DOORS DOWN, BUT NO GEAR. WE CLBED BACK UP TO A SAFE ALT AND DISCUSSED OUR OPTIONS. WE DECIDED THAT RWY 33 WOULD BE THE BEST RWY FOR THE APCH AND LNDG, DUE TO THE FLAT OPEN AREAS ON EACH SIDE OF THE RWY AND THE GRASS OVERRUN AT THE END OF THE RWY. I ALSO KNEW THAT IT HAD THE SHORTEST DROP OFF AT THE ARPT BOUNDARY. WE ADVISED APCH CTL OF OUR INTENTIONS AND ASKED IF THE EMER EQUIP HAD BEEN MOVED TO THE NEW RWY. WE SECURED ALL LOOSE ITEMS IN THE ACFT AND WERE WELL BRIEFED ON WHAT TO EXPECT UPON LNDG. FUEL WAS AROUND 2600# BEFORE WE STARTED THE ILS 33 APCH. VREF WAS AROUND 133 KIAS. ALL CHKLIST ITEMS HAD BEEN PERFORMED BEFORE WE TURNED ONTO THE LOC. WE BROKE OUT AROUND 1800' WITH GOOD VISIBILITY. OVER THE THRESHOLD, THE TWR RPTED THAT THERE WAS NO GEAR. WE CONFIRMED THAT WE HAD NO GEAR WHILE OVER THE RWY AND I SLOWLY EASED THE AIRPLANE ONTO THE RWY AND SHUT OFF THE ENGS. THE AIRPLANE SKIDDED ON THE CENTERLINE TO THE END OF THE RWY AND ONTO THE GRASS OVERRUN. IT CAME TO A STOP ABOUT 200' PAST THE DEP END OF THE RWY AND 10' OFF CENTERLINE. I TURNED THE BATTERY OFF AND WE IMMEDIATELY EVACUATED THE ACFT. ESTIMATE THAT WE LANDED AROUND XB EST. THE ACTUAL ACFT INSPECTION IS NOT COMPLETE AT THIS TIME. AN INITIAL INVESTIGATION BY THE CREW AND ARPT PERSONNEL FOUND THAT THE NOSE GEAR AND THE RIGHT MAIN GEAR HAD BEEN TORN OFF THE AIRPLANE BY A BERM AT THE END OF THE RWY 6 OVERRUN. THE DECISION TO ABORT THE LNDG AND ATTEMPT TO TKOF WAS BASED ON MY KNOWLEDGE OF THE TERRAIN AT THE END OF THE RWY, WHICH DROPS OFF ABOUT 300' INTO A RAVINE. I FEEL THAT THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE CREW WERE CORRECT FOR THE CONDITIONS ENCOUNTERED AND WOULD BE GLAD TO TALK TO A SAFETY ANALYST IF MORE INFO IS REQUESTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.