Narrative:

Flight departed early am local time. While on the ground maintenance procedure #1 delayed flight departure. Pushback was started. Very shortly after flight documentation was received (late) due to a computer outage. The second officer called for and received the load advisory by radio which he read back. Gross weight cg and out times which was acknowledged by operations. The flight taxied out with the takeoff #'south card being filled out and the appropriate checklists accomplished. The takeoff roll was normal until at 8 or 9 degree pitch up in the rotation where a slight bump was felt as the flight lifted off. All systems were normal during gear and flap retraction with the airplane operating normally. The flight crew had tower check the runway for anything that might have departed the airplane (tire, etc). The flight crew received a report of nothing found and at that time were unable to determine the nature of any problem. The flight continued to destination where a normal approach and landing was made after determining a weight error and correcting speeds for the landing. The problem arose partially from time of day, time on duty and late arrival of flight papers. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: crew was on third day of the 'wrong side of the clock' operation, performing the third night departure for that one period. Aircraft left late due to a maintenance function and captain elected to push back for departure prior to receiving load control data from a contract service organization other than their own. Information was delayed and finally called to aircraft on the radio right after engine start. During data transfer the second officer was interrupted by cabin attendant call re: cabin being ready for departure. That came between 0 fuel weight and gross weight information from load control. Captain felt schedule pressure and felt rushed during short taxi. First officer made the takeoff. First officer was dual qualified and normally on X equipment. This was Y equipment which he was called to operate about once a month. Captain stated that there was nothing abnormal observed during takeoff and thought that they had not exceeded a 9 degree rotation. In cruise the flight crew recalculated the takeoff weight and found that they had a 150000 pounds error as the fuel had not been included in the takeoff gross weight figures that had been radioed to the flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TAIL STRIKE ON TKOF.

Narrative: FLT DEPARTED EARLY AM LCL TIME. WHILE ON THE GND MAINT PROC #1 DELAYED FLT DEP. PUSHBACK WAS STARTED. VERY SHORTLY AFTER FLT DOCUMENTATION WAS RECEIVED (LATE) DUE TO A COMPUTER OUTAGE. THE S/O CALLED FOR AND RECEIVED THE LOAD ADVISORY BY RADIO WHICH HE READ BACK. GROSS WT CG AND OUT TIMES WHICH WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BY OPS. THE FLT TAXIED OUT WITH THE TKOF #'S CARD BEING FILLED OUT AND THE APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS ACCOMPLISHED. THE TKOF ROLL WAS NORMAL UNTIL AT 8 OR 9 DEG PITCH UP IN THE ROTATION WHERE A SLIGHT BUMP WAS FELT AS THE FLT LIFTED OFF. ALL SYSTEMS WERE NORMAL DURING GEAR AND FLAP RETRACTION WITH THE AIRPLANE OPERATING NORMALLY. THE FLT CREW HAD TWR CHK THE RWY FOR ANYTHING THAT MIGHT HAVE DEPARTED THE AIRPLANE (TIRE, ETC). THE FLT CREW RECEIVED A RPT OF NOTHING FOUND AND AT THAT TIME WERE UNABLE TO DETERMINE THE NATURE OF ANY PROB. THE FLT CONTINUED TO DEST WHERE A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG WAS MADE AFTER DETERMINING A WT ERROR AND CORRECTING SPDS FOR THE LNDG. THE PROB AROSE PARTIALLY FROM TIME OF DAY, TIME ON DUTY AND LATE ARR OF FLT PAPERS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: CREW WAS ON THIRD DAY OF THE 'WRONG SIDE OF THE CLOCK' OPERATION, PERFORMING THE THIRD NIGHT DEP FOR THAT ONE PERIOD. ACFT LEFT LATE DUE TO A MAINT FUNCTION AND CAPT ELECTED TO PUSH BACK FOR DEP PRIOR TO RECEIVING LOAD CONTROL DATA FROM A CONTRACT SVC ORGANIZATION OTHER THAN THEIR OWN. INFO WAS DELAYED AND FINALLY CALLED TO ACFT ON THE RADIO RIGHT AFTER ENG START. DURING DATA TRANSFER THE S/O WAS INTERRUPTED BY CABIN ATTENDANT CALL RE: CABIN BEING READY FOR DEP. THAT CAME BTWN 0 FUEL WT AND GROSS WT INFO FROM LOAD CTL. CAPT FELT SCHEDULE PRESSURE AND FELT RUSHED DURING SHORT TAXI. F/O MADE THE TKOF. F/O WAS DUAL QUALIFIED AND NORMALLY ON X EQUIPMENT. THIS WAS Y EQUIPMENT WHICH HE WAS CALLED TO OPERATE ABOUT ONCE A MONTH. CAPT STATED THAT THERE WAS NOTHING ABNORMAL OBSERVED DURING TKOF AND THOUGHT THAT THEY HAD NOT EXCEEDED A 9 DEG ROTATION. IN CRUISE THE FLT CREW RECALCULATED THE TKOF WT AND FOUND THAT THEY HAD A 150000 LBS ERROR AS THE FUEL HAD NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN THE TKOF GROSS WT FIGURES THAT HAD BEEN RADIOED TO THE FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.