Narrative:

The santa ana (sna) airport is a unique noise sensitive area that has necessitated the development by company airlines of a unique noise abatement takeoff. The pitch and thrust changes are so abrupt that the flight crew is required to brief the passenger prior to takeoff. The takeoff requires a maximum thrust, flap 15 liftoff and climb to 1000'. At this altitude the flaps are positioned to 5, the thrust reduced rapidly to a very low N1 RPM and pitch reduced from 25 to 11 degree to maintain a speed of V2. This RPM is determined by a chart based on aircraft weight to maintain 1000' and a speed of V2 until 1 mi south of the airport and then thrust increased 5% to accelerate to maneuvering speed and maintain a 200 FPM climb. There are noise monitors along and either side of this departure path that record the decibels as each aircraft passes overhead. I consider this erratic abrupt maneuvering to be a compromise of safety and good judgement. This report is specifically written about the departure that I performed on 6/mon/89. I thoroughly briefed the first officer on the departure as described above and specifically instructed him to reduce the thrust, at my command at the 1000' point, at or below the cutback RPM and then make the final adjustments upward as necessary. This instruction was made because previous first officer's did not reduce the thrust rapidly enough or low enough and then made the final adjustment downward to the cutback RPM. This technique results in excessively high noise readings with the potential of company loosing slots at sna. At the 1000' point I called for flaps 5, cutback, maintained V2 until the one DME on sna localizer and turned to the 175 heading as published on the SID. At approximately this point the GPWS began to command 'don't sink'. This is not unusual considering the absolute minimum of thrust being utilized. I increased pitch slightly although maintaining V2 but sink continued at a very slow rate. I anticipated the first officer increasing the thrust 5% according to the company procedure and a verbal command was impossible due to the ground proximity system commands. At approximately 2 DME I took control of the throttles and advanced them to about 70% N1. Several bystanders observed the RPM cutback maneuver and shallow descent that followed and interpreted this as a dual engine flameout. This problem is primarily a result of the impotence of the FAA to stand up to the sna area politicians and not allow any commercial air service into sna if these very low noise readings are mandated. The airspace system is federal and should not be controled by local politicians and special interest groups. The second contributing factor was my reluctance to increase the thrust and void any chances of noise readings under the maximum. From the human performance standpoint this maneuver is very unusual, complex, requires very precise crew coordination, qualifies as an acrobatic maneuver, requires intense in-cockpit scanning within an area of major traffic mix and congestion. One final factor affecting performance on this unusual noise abatement takeoff is the lack of currency of individual flight crews on this maneuver. Supplemental information from acn 113740: prior to engine start, the captain thoroughly briefed his noise abatement takeoff with departure cut-back. He asked that I be sure to sharply reduce to the quadrant mark used as a target, an undershoot could easily be remedied. I had planned to verify the throttle quadrant mark upon advancement of takeoff power but was unable to do so when cleared for immediate takeoff. These procedures were developed by our company with FAA approval in response to local community dictates for new entrants in the sna market. I believe the most compromising aspect of this maneuver is the very rapid rotation at liftoff.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG EXCURSION FROM NOISE ABATEMENT ALT AND COMPLAINT ABOUT SNA NOISE PROC.

Narrative: THE SANTA ANA (SNA) ARPT IS A UNIQUE NOISE SENSITIVE AREA THAT HAS NECESSITATED THE DEVELOPMENT BY COMPANY AIRLINES OF A UNIQUE NOISE ABATEMENT TKOF. THE PITCH AND THRUST CHANGES ARE SO ABRUPT THAT THE FLT CREW IS REQUIRED TO BRIEF THE PAX PRIOR TO TKOF. THE TKOF REQUIRES A MAX THRUST, FLAP 15 LIFTOFF AND CLIMB TO 1000'. AT THIS ALT THE FLAPS ARE POSITIONED TO 5, THE THRUST REDUCED RAPIDLY TO A VERY LOW N1 RPM AND PITCH REDUCED FROM 25 TO 11 DEG TO MAINTAIN A SPEED OF V2. THIS RPM IS DETERMINED BY A CHART BASED ON ACFT WEIGHT TO MAINTAIN 1000' AND A SPEED OF V2 UNTIL 1 MI S OF THE ARPT AND THEN THRUST INCREASED 5% TO ACCELERATE TO MANEUVERING SPEED AND MAINTAIN A 200 FPM CLIMB. THERE ARE NOISE MONITORS ALONG AND EITHER SIDE OF THIS DEP PATH THAT RECORD THE DECIBELS AS EACH ACFT PASSES OVERHEAD. I CONSIDER THIS ERRATIC ABRUPT MANEUVERING TO BE A COMPROMISE OF SAFETY AND GOOD JUDGEMENT. THIS REPORT IS SPECIFICALLY WRITTEN ABOUT THE DEP THAT I PERFORMED ON 6/MON/89. I THOROUGHLY BRIEFED THE F/O ON THE DEP AS DESCRIBED ABOVE AND SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCTED HIM TO REDUCE THE THRUST, AT MY COMMAND AT THE 1000' POINT, AT OR BELOW THE CUTBACK RPM AND THEN MAKE THE FINAL ADJUSTMENTS UPWARD AS NECESSARY. THIS INSTRUCTION WAS MADE BECAUSE PREVIOUS F/O'S DID NOT REDUCE THE THRUST RAPIDLY ENOUGH OR LOW ENOUGH AND THEN MADE THE FINAL ADJUSTMENT DOWNWARD TO THE CUTBACK RPM. THIS TECHNIQUE RESULTS IN EXCESSIVELY HIGH NOISE READINGS WITH THE POTENTIAL OF COMPANY LOOSING SLOTS AT SNA. AT THE 1000' POINT I CALLED FOR FLAPS 5, CUTBACK, MAINTAINED V2 UNTIL THE ONE DME ON SNA LOC AND TURNED TO THE 175 HDG AS PUBLISHED ON THE SID. AT APPROX THIS POINT THE GPWS BEGAN TO COMMAND 'DON'T SINK'. THIS IS NOT UNUSUAL CONSIDERING THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM OF THRUST BEING UTILIZED. I INCREASED PITCH SLIGHTLY ALTHOUGH MAINTAINING V2 BUT SINK CONTINUED AT A VERY SLOW RATE. I ANTICIPATED THE F/O INCREASING THE THRUST 5% ACCORDING TO THE COMPANY PROC AND A VERBAL COMMAND WAS IMPOSSIBLE DUE TO THE GND PROX SYSTEM COMMANDS. AT APPROX 2 DME I TOOK CONTROL OF THE THROTTLES AND ADVANCED THEM TO ABOUT 70% N1. SEVERAL BYSTANDERS OBSERVED THE RPM CUTBACK MANEUVER AND SHALLOW DSCNT THAT FOLLOWED AND INTERPRETED THIS AS A DUAL ENGINE FLAMEOUT. THIS PROBLEM IS PRIMARILY A RESULT OF THE IMPOTENCE OF THE FAA TO STAND UP TO THE SNA AREA POLITICIANS AND NOT ALLOW ANY COMMERCIAL AIR SERVICE INTO SNA IF THESE VERY LOW NOISE READINGS ARE MANDATED. THE AIRSPACE SYSTEM IS FEDERAL AND SHOULD NOT BE CTLED BY LOCAL POLITICIANS AND SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS. THE SECOND CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS MY RELUCTANCE TO INCREASE THE THRUST AND VOID ANY CHANCES OF NOISE READINGS UNDER THE MAX. FROM THE HUMAN PERFORMANCE STANDPOINT THIS MANEUVER IS VERY UNUSUAL, COMPLEX, REQUIRES VERY PRECISE CREW COORD, QUALIFIES AS AN ACROBATIC MANEUVER, REQUIRES INTENSE IN-COCKPIT SCANNING WITHIN AN AREA OF MAJOR TFC MIX AND CONGESTION. ONE FINAL FACTOR AFFECTING PERFORMANCE ON THIS UNUSUAL NOISE ABATEMENT TKOF IS THE LACK OF CURRENCY OF INDIVIDUAL FLT CREWS ON THIS MANEUVER. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 113740: PRIOR TO ENGINE START, THE CAPT THOROUGHLY BRIEFED HIS NOISE ABATEMENT TKOF WITH DEP CUT-BACK. HE ASKED THAT I BE SURE TO SHARPLY REDUCE TO THE QUADRANT MARK USED AS A TARGET, AN UNDERSHOOT COULD EASILY BE REMEDIED. I HAD PLANNED TO VERIFY THE THROTTLE QUADRANT MARK UPON ADVANCEMENT OF TKOF POWER BUT WAS UNABLE TO DO SO WHEN CLRED FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF. THESE PROCS WERE DEVELOPED BY OUR COMPANY WITH FAA APPROVAL IN RESPONSE TO LOCAL COMMUNITY DICTATES FOR NEW ENTRANTS IN THE SNA MARKET. I BELIEVE THE MOST COMPROMISING ASPECT OF THIS MANEUVER IS THE VERY RAPID ROTATION AT LIFTOFF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.