Narrative:

After landing on runway 11 we used the full length before turning off to the left on taxiway a. Taxiway a makes another left turn and parallels runway 11/29. The first thing a crosses after paralleling 11 is 18/36. While still on runway 11, after landing, tower instructed to exit 11 at a and hold short of 18/36. I did not hear the instructions because of being busy bringing the aircraft to a stop, etc. During taxi on a to our ate we crossed 18/36. After crossing 18/36 the ground controller stated that we were supposed to hold short of 18/36, but that it didn't matter and to continue our taxi. We looked out to the north and saw a small single engine aircraft on final for 18 approximately 1 1/2 mi from the runway. That aircraft was practicing touch and goes at pwm. I apologized to pwm and was told that it didn't matter and it was ok. Fortunately the single engine aircraft didn't touch down until we were well clear of the runway and was airborne again well before the intersection. Also there was approximately 4000' of runway available to him before runway. This occurrence was clearly my fault. However I believe that there are several contributing factors. 1) fatigue: the day of this occurrence was the 3RD day of a 4 day trip. At the time it happened we had just finished 7:37 hours of flight time. All 4 days required an xa wake-up. The captain and copilot had both slept badly the night before because of the unusual sleep pattern and outside noise at the hotel. Also contributing to fatigue was the fact that we had had no opportunity to eat since the night before. Air carrier doesn't feed their own family! 2) tower issued important instructions at an inappropriate time. A better time would have been after we were clear of the runway and no longer so involved with immediate landing and after landing duties and responsibilities. 3) more total crew involvement first officer heard the instruction but didn't realize that I hadn't heard them. Second officer doesn't recall if he heard the instructions or not and he was involved with other duties. Air carrier is now starting to train their new hires to be slightly more involved with 'pilot' things instead of just 'engineer' duties. This needs to be emphasized much more -- it could make a major difference.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER LNDG REPORTER ACFT DID NOT COMPLY WITH HOLD SHORT CLRNC BUT CROSSED ACTIVE RWY. NO CONFLICT WITH ACFT ON FINAL APCH.

Narrative: AFTER LNDG ON RWY 11 WE USED THE FULL LENGTH BEFORE TURNING OFF TO THE LEFT ON TXWY A. TXWY A MAKES ANOTHER LEFT TURN AND PARALLELS RWY 11/29. THE FIRST THING A CROSSES AFTER PARALLELING 11 IS 18/36. WHILE STILL ON RWY 11, AFTER LNDG, TWR INSTRUCTED TO EXIT 11 AT A AND HOLD SHORT OF 18/36. I DID NOT HEAR THE INSTRUCTIONS BECAUSE OF BEING BUSY BRINGING THE ACFT TO A STOP, ETC. DURING TAXI ON A TO OUR ATE WE CROSSED 18/36. AFTER XING 18/36 THE GND CTLR STATED THAT WE WERE SUPPOSED TO HOLD SHORT OF 18/36, BUT THAT IT DIDN'T MATTER AND TO CONTINUE OUR TAXI. WE LOOKED OUT TO THE N AND SAW A SMALL SINGLE ENGINE ACFT ON FINAL FOR 18 APPROX 1 1/2 MI FROM THE RWY. THAT ACFT WAS PRACTICING TOUCH AND GOES AT PWM. I APOLOGIZED TO PWM AND WAS TOLD THAT IT DIDN'T MATTER AND IT WAS OK. FORTUNATELY THE SINGLE ENGINE ACFT DIDN'T TOUCH DOWN UNTIL WE WERE WELL CLEAR OF THE RWY AND WAS AIRBORNE AGAIN WELL BEFORE THE INTXN. ALSO THERE WAS APPROX 4000' OF RWY AVAILABLE TO HIM BEFORE RWY. THIS OCCURRENCE WAS CLEARLY MY FAULT. HOWEVER I BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE SEVERAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS. 1) FATIGUE: THE DAY OF THIS OCCURRENCE WAS THE 3RD DAY OF A 4 DAY TRIP. AT THE TIME IT HAPPENED WE HAD JUST FINISHED 7:37 HRS OF FLT TIME. ALL 4 DAYS REQUIRED AN XA WAKE-UP. THE CAPT AND COPLT HAD BOTH SLEPT BADLY THE NIGHT BEFORE BECAUSE OF THE UNUSUAL SLEEP PATTERN AND OUTSIDE NOISE AT THE HOTEL. ALSO CONTRIBUTING TO FATIGUE WAS THE FACT THAT WE HAD HAD NO OPPORTUNITY TO EAT SINCE THE NIGHT BEFORE. ACR DOESN'T FEED THEIR OWN FAMILY! 2) TWR ISSUED IMPORTANT INSTRUCTIONS AT AN INAPPROPRIATE TIME. A BETTER TIME WOULD HAVE BEEN AFTER WE WERE CLEAR OF THE RWY AND NO LONGER SO INVOLVED WITH IMMEDIATE LNDG AND AFTER LNDG DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES. 3) MORE TOTAL CREW INVOLVEMENT F/O HEARD THE INSTRUCTION BUT DIDN'T REALIZE THAT I HADN'T HEARD THEM. S/O DOESN'T RECALL IF HE HEARD THE INSTRUCTIONS OR NOT AND HE WAS INVOLVED WITH OTHER DUTIES. ACR IS NOW STARTING TO TRAIN THEIR NEW HIRES TO BE SLIGHTLY MORE INVOLVED WITH 'PILOT' THINGS INSTEAD OF JUST 'ENGINEER' DUTIES. THIS NEEDS TO BE EMPHASIZED MUCH MORE -- IT COULD MAKE A MAJOR DIFFERENCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.