Narrative:

Because of construction on twy H; parallel to ryw 16L/34R; departures from the passenger terminals outbound to runway 34R are required to back taxi on the runway; or cross midfield and taxi on the other side of the runway. Traffic was relatively light; I had coordinated a release for aircraft X from runway 34R; and issued the takeoff clearance as aircraft X was approaching the runway from twy M; after crossing runway 34R midfield. I also issued instruction to aircraft Y to cross runway 34R midfield; after giving aircraft X takeoff clearance. Just as aircraft X had turned the corner onto runway 34R and was commencing takeoff roll; my scan informed me that aircraft Y was not slowing to stop at the hold line at twy H6. I immediately canceled aircraft X's takeoff clearance. The aircraft had made some forward progress on the runway surface; came to a complete stop; and I advised the pilot of aircraft X to expect takeoff clearance after traffic completed crossing down field. The pilot advised me that he would need to review their departure numbers; and I asked him to advise ready for takeoff. He called ready after about a minute; I again cleared aircraft X for takeoff; and the aircraft departed without further incident. I thanked the pilot for his help; and advised him to contact departure control. In retrospect; I realized that I had not employed basic strip board management when I conducted the crossing operation. I led myself into this oversight of sticking to air traffic basics because I allowed myself to be lulled into a false sense of security because of the light volume of traffic. The basic procedure that I violated was that of doing the right thing; every time; with every aircraft. When my scan revealed that I had not maintained complete situational awareness; and had improperly sequenced the movement of aircraft; I felt as though a bucket of ice water had been poured down my spine. The only saving grace that I can carry away from this operation is the importance of sticking to the basics; and the absolute value of keeping up a good scan. On the positive side; the shock that I felt when I realized that I had to take immediate corrective action will motivate me to avoid drifting into a 'normalization of deviation' mode; I never want to experience that again; and I will employ it as a training tool with developmental controllers in the future! As stated above; I will repeat the mantra of always sticking with the basics; and scanning relentlessly.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SLC Tower Controller clears an aircraft for takeoff and also clears an aircraft to cross. Controller realizes actions are too quick; and aborts the departures takeoff.

Narrative: Because of construction on TWY H; parallel to RYW 16L/34R; departures from the passenger terminals outbound to RWY 34R are required to back taxi on the runway; or cross midfield and taxi on the other side of the runway. Traffic was relatively light; I had coordinated a release for Aircraft X from RWY 34R; and issued the takeoff clearance as Aircraft X was approaching the runway from TWY M; after crossing RWY 34R midfield. I also issued instruction to Aircraft Y to cross RWY 34R midfield; after giving Aircraft X takeoff clearance. Just as Aircraft X had turned the corner onto RWY 34R and was commencing takeoff roll; my scan informed me that Aircraft Y was not slowing to stop at the hold line at TWY H6. I immediately canceled Aircraft X's takeoff clearance. The aircraft had made some forward progress on the runway surface; came to a complete stop; and I advised the pilot of Aircraft X to expect takeoff clearance after traffic completed crossing down field. The pilot advised me that he would need to review their departure numbers; and I asked him to advise ready for takeoff. He called ready after about a minute; I again cleared Aircraft X for takeoff; and the aircraft departed without further incident. I thanked the pilot for his help; and advised him to contact departure control. In retrospect; I realized that I had not employed basic strip board management when I conducted the crossing operation. I led myself into this oversight of sticking to air traffic basics because I allowed myself to be lulled into a false sense of security because of the light volume of traffic. The basic procedure that I violated was that of doing the right thing; every time; with every aircraft. When my scan revealed that I had not maintained complete situational awareness; and had improperly sequenced the movement of aircraft; I felt as though a bucket of ice water had been poured down my spine. The only saving grace that I can carry away from this operation is the importance of sticking to the basics; and the absolute value of keeping up a good scan. On the positive side; the shock that I felt when I realized that I had to take immediate corrective action will motivate me to avoid drifting into a 'normalization of deviation' mode; I never want to experience that again; and I will employ it as a training tool with developmental controllers in the future! As stated above; I will repeat the mantra of always sticking with the basics; and scanning relentlessly.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.