Narrative:

Aircraft X departed san and was shipped to la center sector 9 climbing out of approximately 8;000. About 5 miles east of pgy; aircraft X said 'center we have an aircraft passing off our left side 500 feet below us.' at the time of the incident aircraft X was in southern california (socal) approach control's; south bay sector's; airspace; which they control 140 and below. The aircraft that was an near midair collision with aircraft X was squawking discrete code [numbers removed]; which is known to sector 9 controllers to be an aircraft conducting parachute operations in socal approach control's airspace. TCAS; collision alarm; nor any other safety preventative measure went off to avoid this incident and the only thing standing between these two aircraft and a mid-air collision were the air traffic controller's involved. Considering it was a known aircraft in the transferring controller's area of jurisdiction and that socal approach is able to climb above their airspace so that they can provide safe passage to the aircraft operating in the congested airspace around the san diego/tijuana area; I feel like the socal approach controller should not have switched aircraft X to my frequency until that aircraft was clear of all aircraft that were potentially in conflict with aircraft X. There is more than one thing that should be done to prevent an event like this from happening again: 1.) the ca suppression should be lifted from en route automation modernization (eram)s probing in socal approach control airspace to bring attention to a developing safety event like this one. 2.) as per FAA order 7110.65; the transferring controller shall not change an aircraft to the receiving controller's frequency until all potential conflicts for that aircraft are resolved. 3.) air traffic controllers should drop this portentous attitude of VFR aircraft not being their responsibility to provide air traffic service to; and should instead consider them for what they are; taxpayer's that pay them a lot of money to maintain the integrity and safety of all aircraft operating within the national airspace system (NAS).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZLA Controller explains that an aircraft reported an aircraft 500 feet below them. The area and altitude of the aircraft was in SCT airspace and also an area of known parachuting. The aircraft was on a discreet code indicating its involvement. The ZLA Controller advised that SCT should have issued traffic to the aircraft or kept the aircraft until the conflict was no longer a factor.

Narrative: Aircraft X departed SAN and was shipped to LA Center sector 9 climbing out of approximately 8;000. About 5 miles east of PGY; aircraft X said 'Center we have an aircraft passing off our left side 500 feet below us.' At the time of the incident aircraft X was in Southern California (SOCAL) Approach control's; south bay sector's; airspace; which they control 140 and below. The aircraft that was an NMAC with aircraft X was squawking discrete code [numbers removed]; which is known to sector 9 controllers to be an aircraft conducting parachute operations in SOCAL approach control's airspace. TCAS; collision alarm; nor any other safety preventative measure went off to avoid this incident and the only thing standing between these two aircraft and a mid-air collision were the air traffic controller's involved. Considering it was a known aircraft in the transferring controller's area of jurisdiction and that SOCAL Approach is able to climb above their airspace so that they can provide safe passage to the aircraft operating in the congested airspace around the San Diego/Tijuana area; I feel like the SOCAL Approach controller should not have switched aircraft X to my frequency until that aircraft was clear of all aircraft that were potentially in conflict with aircraft X. There is more than one thing that should be done to prevent an event like this from happening again: 1.) The CA suppression should be lifted from En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM)s probing in SOCAL Approach control airspace to bring attention to a developing safety event like this one. 2.) As per FAA order 7110.65; the transferring controller shall not change an aircraft to the receiving controller's frequency until all potential conflicts for that aircraft are resolved. 3.) Air traffic controllers should drop this portentous attitude of VFR aircraft not being their responsibility to provide air traffic service to; and should instead consider them for what they are; taxpayer's that pay them a lot of money to maintain the integrity and safety of all aircraft operating within the National Airspace System (NAS).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.