Narrative:

Ground controller instructed an aircraft to cross an active runway while another aircraft was on takeoff roll. The aircraft passed within 200' of each other. Contributing factors: the local controller was extremely busy working an hour with over 100+ operations. They were being assisted by the first line supervisor. Both of these controllers were fatigued, having worked a large vol of traffic into and out of the airport west/O the assistance of radar or approach control services to relieve the pressure from the large amount of aircraft requesting services on practice INS approachs. The first line supervisor was assisting the local controller by handling coordination with the ground controller. The first line supervisor instructed the ground controller that the runway would be inactive after the aircraft in position departed. The ground instrument misunderstood and through the runway was inactive and crossed that runway. The local controller had already cleared the aircraft into position for takeoff. The 2 aircraft passed in very close proximity at the intersection. Corrective actions: install BRITE radar in the tower to help reduce controller workload. The local controller is responsible to ensure that runway is clear before issuing a clearance, yet the workload is so high at this airport under the present working conditions that this is sometimes impossible to do. Controllers rely on the help of other controllers that may be less than ideal, as in this case with almost disastrous results.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: VERY CLOSE PROX BETWEEN SMA CROSSING RWY AND ANOTHER SMA ON TKOF ROLL. NMAC AND OPERATIONAL ERROR.

Narrative: GND CTLR INSTRUCTED AN ACFT TO CROSS AN ACTIVE RWY WHILE ANOTHER ACFT WAS ON TKOF ROLL. THE ACFT PASSED WITHIN 200' OF EACH OTHER. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: THE LCL CTLR WAS EXTREMELY BUSY WORKING AN HR WITH OVER 100+ OPS. THEY WERE BEING ASSISTED BY THE FIRST LINE SUPVR. BOTH OF THESE CTLRS WERE FATIGUED, HAVING WORKED A LARGE VOL OF TFC INTO AND OUT OF THE ARPT W/O THE ASSISTANCE OF RADAR OR APCH CTL SVCS TO RELIEVE THE PRESSURE FROM THE LARGE AMOUNT OF ACFT REQUESTING SVCS ON PRACTICE INS APCHS. THE FIRST LINE SUPVR WAS ASSISTING THE LCL CTLR BY HANDLING COORD WITH THE GND CTLR. THE FIRST LINE SUPVR INSTRUCTED THE GND CTLR THAT THE RWY WOULD BE INACTIVE AFTER THE ACFT IN POS DEPARTED. THE GND INSTR MISUNDERSTOOD AND THROUGH THE RWY WAS INACTIVE AND CROSSED THAT RWY. THE LCL CTLR HAD ALREADY CLRED THE ACFT INTO POS FOR TKOF. THE 2 ACFT PASSED IN VERY CLOSE PROX AT THE INTXN. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: INSTALL BRITE RADAR IN THE TWR TO HELP REDUCE CTLR WORKLOAD. THE LCL CTLR IS RESPONSIBLE TO ENSURE THAT RWY IS CLR BEFORE ISSUING A CLRNC, YET THE WORKLOAD IS SO HIGH AT THIS ARPT UNDER THE PRESENT WORKING CONDITIONS THAT THIS IS SOMETIMES IMPOSSIBLE TO DO. CTLRS RELY ON THE HELP OF OTHER CTLRS THAT MAY BE LESS THAN IDEAL, AS IN THIS CASE WITH ALMOST DISASTROUS RESULTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.