Uncoordinated penetration of airspace. Operational deviation.

Attributes
ACN	132450
Time
Date	198912
Day	Sat
Local Time Of Day	1801 To 2400
Place
Locale Reference	atc facility : jfk
State Reference	NY
Altitude	msl bound lower : 3000 msl bound upper : 3000
Environment
Flight Conditions	Mixed
Light	Night
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tracon : n90
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	Widebody, Low Wing, 3 Turbojet Eng
Flight Phase	cruise other
Route In Use	enroute : on vectors
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	government : faa
Function	controller : approach
Qualification	controller : radar
Experience	controller military : 5 controller radar : 7 controller supervisory : 2
ASRS Report	132450
Person 2
Affiliation	government : faa
Function	controller : approach
Qualification	controller : developmental
Events
Anomaly	non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other other anomaly other
Independent Detector	other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	controller : issued new clearance other
Consequence	faa : investigated
Supplementary
Primary Problem	ATC Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	Operational Deviation

Narrative:

During an OJT session with pq (over 200 radar hours), a jfk arrival aircraft asked for a turn toward the airport. At that time, I (the instrument) became aware that the aircraft was no longer on my scope. I immediately got his position/altitude and blocked the required airspace. I then attempted to re-identify him, but due to limited radar coverage, it took approximately 5 mins, after which the aircraft was handled west/O further delay (approximately 60 mi). After review of ATC tapes and a dump of ARTS tracking, it appears the trnee had vectored the aircraft at an altitude that was below radar coverage (at that distance), and because of a pending conflict on the opp side of the scope, observation of the tag falling off was not observed, thus losing radar identify. Then as the trnee reviewed his strips, he became aware that he was no longer controling that flight, and passed it on (believing he had transferred the flight to the next controller). Overall factors: 1) OJT during high vol traffic; 2) complexity of operation; 3) poor WX, requiring an increase in in-trail; and 4) limited radar coverage.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UNCOORDINATED PENETRATION OF AIRSPACE. OPERATIONAL DEVIATION.

Narrative: DURING AN OJT SESSION WITH PQ (OVER 200 RADAR HRS), A JFK ARR ACFT ASKED FOR A TURN TOWARD THE ARPT. AT THAT TIME, I (THE INSTR) BECAME AWARE THAT THE ACFT WAS NO LONGER ON MY SCOPE. I IMMEDIATELY GOT HIS POS/ALT AND BLOCKED THE REQUIRED AIRSPACE. I THEN ATTEMPTED TO RE-IDENT HIM, BUT DUE TO LIMITED RADAR COVERAGE, IT TOOK APPROX 5 MINS, AFTER WHICH THE ACFT WAS HANDLED W/O FURTHER DELAY (APPROX 60 MI). AFTER REVIEW OF ATC TAPES AND A DUMP OF ARTS TRACKING, IT APPEARS THE TRNEE HAD VECTORED THE ACFT AT AN ALT THAT WAS BELOW RADAR COVERAGE (AT THAT DISTANCE), AND BECAUSE OF A PENDING CONFLICT ON THE OPP SIDE OF THE SCOPE, OBSERVATION OF THE TAG FALLING OFF WAS NOT OBSERVED, THUS LOSING RADAR IDENT. THEN AS THE TRNEE REVIEWED HIS STRIPS, HE BECAME AWARE THAT HE WAS NO LONGER CTLING THAT FLT, AND PASSED IT ON (BELIEVING HE HAD TRANSFERRED THE FLT TO THE NEXT CTLR). OVERALL FACTORS: 1) OJT DURING HIGH VOL TFC; 2) COMPLEXITY OF OPERATION; 3) POOR WX, REQUIRING AN INCREASE IN IN-TRAIL; AND 4) LIMITED RADAR COVERAGE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.