Narrative:

Summary: after a safe landing in ZZZ; braking action was nil on taxiway. The left main gear outboard tire departed the paved taxiway surface by about 1 foot. We stopped the aircraft; coordinated with all concerned parties; deplaned the passengers; and had the aircraft towed to the gate.during preflight; we were already aware of inclement weather and reduced braking action in ZZZ. However; we received the flight paperwork only 5 min prior to ETD. Almost immediately after the paperwork was delivered; we heard the L1 door close and the flight attendants make a PA to arm the slides. I had not handed out the paperwork or authorized this. I saw the slides arm on the ECAM. I stepped into the galley and instructed the flight attendants to disarm the slides and make a PA instructing the aft flight attendants to do the same. As soon as the slides were disarmed; the gate agent opened the door from the outside without receiving a thumbs up; which surprised the lead flight attendant and me.I instructed the lead flight attendant and the gate agent to enter the cockpit so we could discuss what happened. After hearing each of their descriptions; I determined that the gate agent had felt operational pressure to rush and close the door to (from her perspective) help us depart on time; and had forgotten to receive the paperwork from me first. I reminded the lead flight attendant and the gate agent of the need to check with the captain before closing the door. I also discussed with the gate agent that opening the door from the outside in a surprising manner without a thumbs up could result in relying on the mechanical disarm interconnect as a last resort to prevent slide deployment; if the slides were armed. Finally; I advised the gate agent that due to the late paperwork and the need to fully investigate the weather and braking action in ZZZ; we would be departing late; and I would let her know when we were ready.we delayed departure to review weather and landing distance. -Fzra was reported earlier; but we received an updated report during preflight that stated all precipitation stopped. The taf showed no precipitation forecast after XA00Z. Our scheduled arrival time was XA31Z. Notams stated runway xyr braking action code 2/2/2. The takeoff/landing report (tlr) did not include landing distances for various reduced braking action runway condition assessment matrix (rcam) codes. We calculated a landing distance for this rcam code manually using the communication because it is not possible to obtain a valid result for rcam code 2 using ACARS.we determined rcam code 2 was acceptable with a safe stopping margin even without reverse thrust credit. However; we calculated that if the runway braking action deteriorated to poor; this would not be acceptable. We considered calling dispatch to discuss the situation; but dispatcher remarks on the release stated; 'they have sanded and adding chemicals to the runway in ZZZ. I will update you enroute. They are 90 percent sure everything will be good at your ETA.' we agreed that our landing distance calculation; this remark; and the improving weather report/ forecast indicated to us that dispatch was fully aware of the situation; and no further coordination was necessary. We departed.dispatch did not update us enroute. We regularly re-checked the weather at ZZZ; ZZZ1; and our alternate of ZZZ2 during cruise. All of these reports and forecasts remained acceptable.ZZZ does not have digital ATIS. We received the ATIS when within radio range. Runway xyr was in use. It stated braking action poor on all runways and taxiways. Based on our previous calculation; this braking action was unacceptable. ATC approved us to hold at present position. We conducted one turn in holding while the first officer (first officer) contacted tower on the radio. Tower immediately advised that the braking action report on the ATIS was out of date; the runway and taxiways had just been treated; and tower asked an operations vehicle on the frequency for an updated braking action report. The vehicle replied and we copied runway xyr braking action rcam code between 2 and 3. We confirmed that our previous manual landing distance calculation for rcam code 2 was still valid; and we concurred that the runway was acceptable. We inquired about the condition of the taxiways. A vehicle replied reported taxiway braking action also between code 2 and 3; with a remark to 'use caution.' we asked tower what to expect for a taxi route. Tower recommended to expect to make a 180 degree turn on the runway; backtrack; vacate at D1; and taxi via D to the ramp; and stated that this was because taxiway D was the taxiway in the best condition. We agreed that this plan was acceptable; discontinued the hold; and conducted a stabilized visual approach in conf full.I touched down smoothly but positively approximately 1;200 feet past the threshold and applied maximum reverse. Autobrake medium was selected to get the braking started; but per our landing distance calculation; I immediately applied maximum manual braking. Directional control was excellent and the airplane remained exactly on the centerline. Braking action was good and we reported this. Tower cleared us to taxi as previously discussed. I reduced to a very slow speed and used the beginning of taxiway as a turning bay. Directional control and braking action was good throughout the turn. We backtracked; slowed to a very slow speed well prior to the runway exit; and vacated at D1. We kept both engines running with engine anti-ice on. The first officer completed his after landing flow and started the APU while we were backtracking; well before the turn onto D1. I advised the first officer to hold the after landing checklist until established on taxiway D so we could both be heads-up.directional control during the turn onto D1 was acceptable. The speed was very slow; so I was not applying any brakes at that time. I began the turn from D1 onto D. The airplane began to turn but I realized I was applying more and more tiller input with minimal effect. I attempted to stop the airplane. I applied the brakes moderately; felt no deceleration; and then increased brake pressure to the stop. Braking action was nil. I told the first officer we were sliding. Groundspeed at this time was several knots. I applied right differential braking and rudder in addition to the tiller; but it was clear we were not turning right at a rate sufficient to safely make the turn onto taxiway D.I considered the loss of braking memory items. I decided not to apply reverse thrust because the groundspeed was extremely low; lack of directional control was the greatest threat (and reverse thrust reduces directional control); and there was a high risk of engine damage if reverse thrust was used with the engines over unprepared/contaminated surfaces during a potentially imminent taxiway excursion. I also considered that reverse thrust might make us roll uncontrollably backwards; which would be even worse. I did release the brakes; select the nosewheel steering/anti-skid off and re-apply the brakes. Braking action remained nil. I decided to not apply the parking brake because lack of directional control was still the greatest threat; the lack of braking action was obviously due to external conditions and not a mechanical failure; and the parking brake would eliminate the ability to use differential braking; if it was having some small effect.I used a very slight amount of forward thrust on engine 1 and idle reverse on engine 2 to complete the turn onto taxiway D. The aircraft was still moving forward on taxiway D at several knots and starting to fishtail. I set both thrust levers to forward idle. The first officer suggested I turn the nosewheel steering back on; and I did. I released and re-applied the brakes. Braking action was still nil; but now the nosewheel steering was giving me some control over which way the nose was pointed. I directed the first officer to [advise atc]; and he did; requesting airport rescue and fire fighting (arff) and reporting nil braking. After a couple of oscillations; I was able to stabilize aircraft somewhat left of the taxiway centerline; but pointed about 20 degrees right of it to correct. However; the aircraft was weathervaning into the wind from the right and sliding to the left due to it. Despite the aircraft pointing to the right; it was still moving slightly to the left while it was moving forward. I released and re-applied the brakes one more time; and the aircraft came to a stop. During this time; the aircraft had moved several hundred feet down taxiway D.I set the parking brake and made a PA; 'flight attendant stations.' the first officer reminded me that the APU was available; and I shut down both engines. It would have been unsafe to attempt to continue to taxi; and I was concerned that idle thrust could have overcome whatever minimal parking brake force was holding us in place. I directed the first officer to ask tower for their opinion on whether we were still on paved surface and if there was any apparent damage. The tower said they couldn't quite fully see everything; but based on what they could see; the aircraft was still on the pavement and there were no obvious signs of damage. I called the lead flight attendant and asked her to look out the left windows and give me her opinion on whether we had departed the paved surface; and to tell me if there was any signs of damage. After about a minute; she reported back that she couldn't tell whether we were entirely still on the pavement; but there was no damage that was evident to her. I quickly advised the lead flight attendant what I thought happened; advised that I would cancel flight attendant stations; and stated that I would make a PA. I made a PA; 'remain seated; remain seated; remain seated;' and then explained over the PA that due to icy conditions we had to stop our taxi; we would need to have the aircraft checked by maintenance; and then we would likely be towed to the gate when it was safe to do so.the first officer and I discussed; agreed upon; and executed the following plan. The first officer contacted tower to advise that we had stopped taxi and shut down engines due to nil braking action; requested arff inspect the aircraft for any damage; advised that we would need to get mx out to confirm whether there was any damage; asked for airport operations to re-treat the taxiway surface between us and the ramp; and advised that we would need to be towed to the gate when ready. The first officer contacted the FBO over unicom; which relays information to station operations at ZZZ. At my request; he advised them to call dispatch to report the nil braking and suggest that any other inbound flight divert; inform them of our plan; request maintenance; and request a tow crew. The FBO relayed all of this. A bit later; but still early in the sequence of events; the first officer and the FBO coordinated to begin assembling busses and air stairs if it became necessary to deplane the passengers at our current location.I further discussed the situation with the flight attendants. I instructed them that no passenger should be allowed to get out of their seat until ground personnel had given us a better idea of our situation; to ensure that everyone would be safe in the event the aircraft started to slide/be blown by the wind; and to ensure that everyone would be ready in the unlikely event of a gear collapse and potential evacuation. At this point; I was sure the nose and right main gear had never departed paved surface. Based on the information I was given; I believed the left main gear was close to the taxiway edge; but had not departed the pavement.all of the requested ground personnel began to arrive quickly. Arff or airport operations (I'm not sure who) reported no obvious signs of damage. We requested the aircraft be chocked; and it was. At some point after the aircraft was chocked; with my concurrence; the first officer and lead flight attendant discussed whether they should continue stopping anyone who attempted to use the lavatory. We all agreed we did not want to turn off the

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Airbus A320 flight crew reported that after landing; during taxi; they encountered ice on the taxiway.

Narrative: Summary: after a safe landing in ZZZ; braking action was nil on taxiway. The left main gear outboard tire departed the paved taxiway surface by about 1 foot. We stopped the aircraft; coordinated with all concerned parties; deplaned the passengers; and had the aircraft towed to the gate.During preflight; we were already aware of inclement weather and reduced braking action in ZZZ. However; we received the flight paperwork only 5 min prior to ETD. Almost immediately after the paperwork was delivered; we heard the L1 door close and the flight attendants make a PA to arm the slides. I had not handed out the paperwork or authorized this. I saw the slides arm on the ECAM. I stepped into the galley and instructed the flight attendants to disarm the slides and make a PA instructing the aft flight attendants to do the same. As soon as the slides were disarmed; the gate agent opened the door from the outside without receiving a thumbs up; which surprised the lead FA and me.I instructed the lead FA and the gate agent to enter the cockpit so we could discuss what happened. After hearing each of their descriptions; I determined that the gate agent had felt operational pressure to rush and close the door to (from her perspective) help us depart on time; and had forgotten to receive the paperwork from me first. I reminded the lead FA and the gate agent of the need to check with the captain before closing the door. I also discussed with the gate agent that opening the door from the outside in a surprising manner without a thumbs up could result in relying on the mechanical disarm interconnect as a last resort to prevent slide deployment; if the slides were armed. Finally; I advised the gate agent that due to the late paperwork and the need to fully investigate the weather and braking action in ZZZ; we would be departing late; and I would let her know when we were ready.We delayed departure to review weather and landing distance. -FZRA was reported earlier; but we received an updated report during preflight that stated all precipitation stopped. The TAF showed no precipitation forecast after XA00Z. Our scheduled arrival time was XA31Z. NOTAMs stated RWY XYR braking action code 2/2/2. The Takeoff/Landing Report (TLR) did not include landing distances for various reduced braking action Runway Condition Assessment Matrix (RCAM) codes. We calculated a landing distance for this RCAM code manually using the COM because it is not possible to obtain a valid result for RCAM code 2 using ACARS.We determined RCAM code 2 was acceptable with a safe stopping margin even without reverse thrust credit. However; we calculated that if the runway braking action deteriorated to poor; this would not be acceptable. We considered calling dispatch to discuss the situation; but dispatcher remarks on the release stated; 'They have sanded and adding chemicals to the runway in ZZZ. I will update you enroute. They are 90 percent sure everything will be good at your ETA.' We agreed that our landing distance calculation; this remark; and the improving weather report/ forecast indicated to us that dispatch was fully aware of the situation; and no further coordination was necessary. We departed.Dispatch did not update us enroute. We regularly re-checked the weather at ZZZ; ZZZ1; and our alternate of ZZZ2 during cruise. All of these reports and forecasts remained acceptable.ZZZ does not have digital ATIS. We received the ATIS when within radio range. Runway XYR was in use. It stated braking action poor on all runways and taxiways. Based on our previous calculation; this braking action was unacceptable. ATC approved us to hold at present position. We conducted one turn in holding while the First Officer (FO) contacted Tower on the radio. Tower immediately advised that the braking action report on the ATIS was out of date; the runway and taxiways had just been treated; and Tower asked an operations vehicle on the frequency for an updated braking action report. The vehicle replied and we copied runway XYR braking action RCAM code between 2 and 3. We confirmed that our previous manual landing distance calculation for RCAM code 2 was still valid; and we concurred that the runway was acceptable. We inquired about the condition of the taxiways. A vehicle replied reported taxiway braking action also between code 2 and 3; with a remark to 'use caution.' We asked Tower what to expect for a taxi route. Tower recommended to expect to make a 180 degree turn on the runway; backtrack; vacate at D1; and taxi via D to the ramp; and stated that this was because taxiway D was the taxiway in the best condition. We agreed that this plan was acceptable; discontinued the hold; and conducted a stabilized visual approach in CONF FULL.I touched down smoothly but positively approximately 1;200 feet past the threshold and applied maximum reverse. Autobrake medium was selected to get the braking started; but per our landing distance calculation; I immediately applied maximum manual braking. Directional control was excellent and the airplane remained exactly on the centerline. Braking action was good and we reported this. Tower cleared us to taxi as previously discussed. I reduced to a very slow speed and used the beginning of taxiway as a turning bay. Directional control and braking action was good throughout the turn. We backtracked; slowed to a very slow speed well prior to the runway exit; and vacated at D1. We kept both engines running with engine anti-ice on. The FO completed his After Landing Flow and started the APU while we were backtracking; well before the turn onto D1. I advised the FO to hold the After Landing Checklist until established on taxiway D so we could both be heads-up.Directional control during the turn onto D1 was acceptable. The speed was very slow; so I was not applying any brakes at that time. I began the turn from D1 onto D. The airplane began to turn but I realized I was applying more and more tiller input with minimal effect. I attempted to stop the airplane. I applied the brakes moderately; felt no deceleration; and then increased brake pressure to the stop. Braking action was nil. I told the FO we were sliding. Groundspeed at this time was several knots. I applied right differential braking and rudder in addition to the tiller; but it was clear we were not turning right at a rate sufficient to safely make the turn onto taxiway D.I considered the loss of braking memory items. I decided not to apply reverse thrust because the groundspeed was extremely low; lack of directional control was the greatest threat (and reverse thrust reduces directional control); and there was a high risk of engine damage if reverse thrust was used with the engines over unprepared/contaminated surfaces during a potentially imminent taxiway excursion. I also considered that reverse thrust might make us roll uncontrollably backwards; which would be even worse. I did release the brakes; select the nosewheel steering/anti-skid off and re-apply the brakes. Braking action remained nil. I decided to not apply the parking brake because lack of directional control was still the greatest threat; the lack of braking action was obviously due to external conditions and not a mechanical failure; and the parking brake would eliminate the ability to use differential braking; if it was having some small effect.I used a very slight amount of forward thrust on engine 1 and idle reverse on engine 2 to complete the turn onto taxiway D. The aircraft was still moving forward on taxiway D at several knots and starting to fishtail. I set both thrust levers to forward idle. The FO suggested I turn the nosewheel steering back on; and I did. I released and re-applied the brakes. Braking action was still nil; but now the nosewheel steering was giving me some control over which way the nose was pointed. I directed the FO to [advise atc]; and he did; requesting Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) and reporting nil braking. After a couple of oscillations; I was able to stabilize aircraft somewhat left of the taxiway centerline; but pointed about 20 degrees right of it to correct. However; the aircraft was weathervaning into the wind from the right and sliding to the left due to it. Despite the aircraft pointing to the right; it was still moving slightly to the left while it was moving forward. I released and re-applied the brakes one more time; and the aircraft came to a stop. During this time; the aircraft had moved several hundred feet down taxiway D.I set the parking brake and made a PA; 'Flight Attendant Stations.' The FO reminded me that the APU was available; and I shut down both engines. It would have been unsafe to attempt to continue to taxi; and I was concerned that idle thrust could have overcome whatever minimal parking brake force was holding us in place. I directed the FO to ask Tower for their opinion on whether we were still on paved surface and if there was any apparent damage. The Tower said they couldn't quite fully see everything; but based on what they could see; the aircraft was still on the pavement and there were no obvious signs of damage. I called the lead FA and asked her to look out the left windows and give me her opinion on whether we had departed the paved surface; and to tell me if there was any signs of damage. After about a minute; she reported back that she couldn't tell whether we were entirely still on the pavement; but there was no damage that was evident to her. I quickly advised the lead FA what I thought happened; advised that I would cancel flight attendant stations; and stated that I would make a PA. I made a PA; 'Remain seated; remain seated; remain seated;' and then explained over the PA that due to icy conditions we had to stop our taxi; we would need to have the aircraft checked by maintenance; and then we would likely be towed to the gate when it was safe to do so.The FO and I discussed; agreed upon; and executed the following plan. The FO contacted Tower to advise that we had stopped taxi and shut down engines due to nil braking action; requested ARFF inspect the aircraft for any damage; advised that we would need to get MX out to confirm whether there was any damage; asked for airport operations to re-treat the taxiway surface between us and the ramp; and advised that we would need to be towed to the gate when ready. The FO contacted the FBO over UNICOM; which relays information to station operations at ZZZ. At my request; he advised them to call dispatch to report the nil braking and suggest that any other inbound flight divert; inform them of our plan; request maintenance; and request a tow crew. The FBO relayed all of this. A bit later; but still early in the sequence of events; the FO and the FBO coordinated to begin assembling busses and air stairs if it became necessary to deplane the passengers at our current location.I further discussed the situation with the flight attendants. I instructed them that no passenger should be allowed to get out of their seat until ground personnel had given us a better idea of our situation; to ensure that everyone would be safe in the event the aircraft started to slide/be blown by the wind; and to ensure that everyone would be ready in the unlikely event of a gear collapse and potential evacuation. At this point; I was sure the nose and right main gear had never departed paved surface. Based on the information I was given; I believed the left main gear was close to the taxiway edge; but had not departed the pavement.All of the requested ground personnel began to arrive quickly. ARFF or airport operations (I'm not sure who) reported no obvious signs of damage. We requested the aircraft be chocked; and it was. At some point after the aircraft was chocked; with my concurrence; the FO and lead FA discussed whether they should continue stopping anyone who attempted to use the lavatory. We all agreed we did not want to turn off the

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.