Narrative:

The aircraft, an large transport, was prepositioned before passenger boarding to allow a straight out taxi and a pushback was not required. We prepared for engine start. With no response on the interphone to the ground crew, a ground crewman was spotted standing on the left side of the aircraft. I made the common twirling motion with my finger to obtain clearance to start the engines and a similar motion was given by the ground crewman. During the engine start another ground handler was seen in front of the aircraft with his wands raised over his head to identify himself as our marshaller and giving further evidence that there would be no interphone contact. When the landing lights were flashed he gave the normal signals and we proceeded to taxi to runway 31. Immediately after liftoff a banging was heard on the right side of the aircraft. It was assumed (correctly) than an interphone headset was still plugged into the aircraft. The landing gear was retracted and the flaps left at their takeoff position to keep the speed down. Fearing the imminent danger of the headset coming off and being ingested by the engine, an immediate return to the airport was requested and permission was granted by the tower. No emergency was declared and the tower gave us clearance to land on any runway. After landing we were allowed to roll to the end of the runway for another takeoff and the tower coordinated with the ground handlers to retrieve their headset. After they got the headset and closed the door (interphone) a thumbs-up signal was given to the first officer. Since no mechanical discrepancy existed, we took off. To explain why a landing in acy was in the log book an informational note was written in to explain the situation. It was thought, perhaps incorrectly, that this type of note would require no further action. It has been brought to my attention that since we had to make a return for landing that we should have made a write up and had a mechanic sign it off. It was my view that since the ground crew had the headset safely in their hands and the interphone door closed, no mechanical defect existed. Had the headset ripped loose then common sense would have dictated that a detailed inspection was in order to verify no other damage. I give crew to this crew for preventing that occurrence and getting the aircraft on the ground as soon as possible. This whole incident stems from the fact that a ground crewman left the headset plugged into the aircraft. Who was responsible and why they did not communicate with the flight crew while engines were being started I don't now. There is no way we can tell if headsets are in unless they talk to us. How to prevent an occurrence such as this again is beyond me, given the high rate of employee turnover with most ground handling agencies. Interphone contact is always desirable, but not always possible. That is why hand signals were devised. Training and supervision is just as important with ground crews as it is with flight crews. I hope lessons were learned by all involved.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CHARTER LGT MADE TKOF WITH GND CREW HEADSET STILL PLUGGED INTO ACFT. RETURN LAND.

Narrative: THE ACFT, AN LGT, WAS PREPOSITIONED BEFORE PAX BOARDING TO ALLOW A STRAIGHT OUT TAXI AND A PUSHBACK WAS NOT REQUIRED. WE PREPARED FOR ENG START. WITH NO RESPONSE ON THE INTERPHONE TO THE GND CREW, A GND CREWMAN WAS SPOTTED STANDING ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE ACFT. I MADE THE COMMON TWIRLING MOTION WITH MY FINGER TO OBTAIN CLRNC TO START THE ENGS AND A SIMILAR MOTION WAS GIVEN BY THE GND CREWMAN. DURING THE ENG START ANOTHER GND HANDLER WAS SEEN IN FRONT OF THE ACFT WITH HIS WANDS RAISED OVER HIS HEAD TO IDENT HIMSELF AS OUR MARSHALLER AND GIVING FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO INTERPHONE CONTACT. WHEN THE LNDG LIGHTS WERE FLASHED HE GAVE THE NORMAL SIGNALS AND WE PROCEEDED TO TAXI TO RWY 31. IMMEDIATELY AFTER LIFTOFF A BANGING WAS HEARD ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE ACFT. IT WAS ASSUMED (CORRECTLY) THAN AN INTERPHONE HEADSET WAS STILL PLUGGED INTO THE ACFT. THE LNDG GEAR WAS RETRACTED AND THE FLAPS LEFT AT THEIR TKOF POS TO KEEP THE SPD DOWN. FEARING THE IMMINENT DANGER OF THE HEADSET COMING OFF AND BEING INGESTED BY THE ENG, AN IMMEDIATE RETURN TO THE ARPT WAS REQUESTED AND PERMISSION WAS GRANTED BY THE TWR. NO EMER WAS DECLARED AND THE TWR GAVE US CLRNC TO LAND ON ANY RWY. AFTER LNDG WE WERE ALLOWED TO ROLL TO THE END OF THE RWY FOR ANOTHER TKOF AND THE TWR COORDINATED WITH THE GND HANDLERS TO RETRIEVE THEIR HEADSET. AFTER THEY GOT THE HEADSET AND CLOSED THE DOOR (INTERPHONE) A THUMBS-UP SIGNAL WAS GIVEN TO THE F/O. SINCE NO MECHANICAL DISCREPANCY EXISTED, WE TOOK OFF. TO EXPLAIN WHY A LNDG IN ACY WAS IN THE LOG BOOK AN INFORMATIONAL NOTE WAS WRITTEN IN TO EXPLAIN THE SITUATION. IT WAS THOUGHT, PERHAPS INCORRECTLY, THAT THIS TYPE OF NOTE WOULD REQUIRE NO FURTHER ACTION. IT HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO MY ATTN THAT SINCE WE HAD TO MAKE A RETURN FOR LNDG THAT WE SHOULD HAVE MADE A WRITE UP AND HAD A MECH SIGN IT OFF. IT WAS MY VIEW THAT SINCE THE GND CREW HAD THE HEADSET SAFELY IN THEIR HANDS AND THE INTERPHONE DOOR CLOSED, NO MECHANICAL DEFECT EXISTED. HAD THE HEADSET RIPPED LOOSE THEN COMMON SENSE WOULD HAVE DICTATED THAT A DETAILED INSPECTION WAS IN ORDER TO VERIFY NO OTHER DAMAGE. I GIVE CREW TO THIS CREW FOR PREVENTING THAT OCCURRENCE AND GETTING THE ACFT ON THE GND ASAP. THIS WHOLE INCIDENT STEMS FROM THE FACT THAT A GND CREWMAN LEFT THE HEADSET PLUGGED INTO THE ACFT. WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE AND WHY THEY DID NOT COMMUNICATE WITH THE FLT CREW WHILE ENGS WERE BEING STARTED I DON'T NOW. THERE IS NO WAY WE CAN TELL IF HEADSETS ARE IN UNLESS THEY TALK TO US. HOW TO PREVENT AN OCCURRENCE SUCH AS THIS AGAIN IS BEYOND ME, GIVEN THE HIGH RATE OF EMPLOYEE TURNOVER WITH MOST GND HANDLING AGENCIES. INTERPHONE CONTACT IS ALWAYS DESIRABLE, BUT NOT ALWAYS POSSIBLE. THAT IS WHY HAND SIGNALS WERE DEVISED. TRNING AND SUPERVISION IS JUST AS IMPORTANT WITH GND CREWS AS IT IS WITH FLT CREWS. I HOPE LESSONS WERE LEARNED BY ALL INVOLVED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.