Narrative:

After holding at ctf due to WX between there and our destination, rdu, we proceeded to cae to refuel before continuing to rdu. ATC gave us a vector of 180 degrees and later direct cae VOR. Approach control kept us at 6000 ft and direct cae VOR until we prompted them for lower and asked if they still wanted us direct to cae VOR. They just replied to continue direct cae VOR. We then spotted the runway and knew we were high and needed 50-60 degrees right to intercept the localizer for runway 29. We requested a vector and received one. It was apparent that we would have a difficult time getting down and configured for landing in time, but seemed possible. We continued for landing, and I instructed the copilot to continue, but to be prepared for a go around. The approach supervisor offered a 360 degree turn, but continuing with a possible planned go around seemed more prudent with our changing speed and confign. Approach said to switch to tower frequency and the frequency was switched. Shortly afterward we landed and upon clearing the active the copilot called to see if we should stay with tower or switch to ground. There was no reply. It was then that we discovered the frequency which had been set was 119.52 rather than 119.50. We realized then that we must not have spoken to the tower with the quickness of events prior to landing. Upon calling the tower, tower advised they have given us a green light clearance for landing. Contributing to the incident was a long month with a copilot who I should have sat down for a serious discussion about crew coordination and first officer's duties as second in command vs captain command authority. I had not had that discussion, but my patience with his method of operation had come to an end as we departed holding and I made the decision to divert. I had strongly reminded him that I was the captain and would make the decisions and that we would discuss more on the ground. Both our minds were busy with the diversion, contacting the company to advise, flying the aircraft, etc, and on top of the mishandling by approach control, missed the improper frequency and the call for landing clearance. I should have made the frequency change, but believe that the copilot quickly made it while flying as has been his practice of flying without good crew coordination all month. I was at fault for not correcting this early in the month. The incident could have been prevented with either good approach control handling or good crew coordination.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR FLT CREW SWITCHED TO WRONG FREQ AND LANDED WITHOUT VERBAL CLRNC. A GREEN LIGHT WAS GIVEN.

Narrative: AFTER HOLDING AT CTF DUE TO WX BTWN THERE AND OUR DEST, RDU, WE PROCEEDED TO CAE TO REFUEL BEFORE CONTINUING TO RDU. ATC GAVE US A VECTOR OF 180 DEGS AND LATER DIRECT CAE VOR. APCH CTL KEPT US AT 6000 FT AND DIRECT CAE VOR UNTIL WE PROMPTED THEM FOR LOWER AND ASKED IF THEY STILL WANTED US DIRECT TO CAE VOR. THEY JUST REPLIED TO CONTINUE DIRECT CAE VOR. WE THEN SPOTTED THE RWY AND KNEW WE WERE HIGH AND NEEDED 50-60 DEGS R TO INTERCEPT THE LOC FOR RWY 29. WE REQUESTED A VECTOR AND RECEIVED ONE. IT WAS APPARENT THAT WE WOULD HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME GETTING DOWN AND CONFIGURED FOR LNDG IN TIME, BUT SEEMED POSSIBLE. WE CONTINUED FOR LNDG, AND I INSTRUCTED THE COPLT TO CONTINUE, BUT TO BE PREPARED FOR A GAR. THE APCH SUPVR OFFERED A 360 DEG TURN, BUT CONTINUING WITH A POSSIBLE PLANNED GAR SEEMED MORE PRUDENT WITH OUR CHANGING SPD AND CONFIGN. APCH SAID TO SWITCH TO TWR FREQ AND THE FREQ WAS SWITCHED. SHORTLY AFTERWARD WE LANDED AND UPON CLRING THE ACTIVE THE COPLT CALLED TO SEE IF WE SHOULD STAY WITH TWR OR SWITCH TO GND. THERE WAS NO REPLY. IT WAS THEN THAT WE DISCOVERED THE FREQ WHICH HAD BEEN SET WAS 119.52 RATHER THAN 119.50. WE REALIZED THEN THAT WE MUST NOT HAVE SPOKEN TO THE TWR WITH THE QUICKNESS OF EVENTS PRIOR TO LNDG. UPON CALLING THE TWR, TWR ADVISED THEY HAVE GIVEN US A GREEN LIGHT CLRNC FOR LNDG. CONTRIBUTING TO THE INCIDENT WAS A LONG MONTH WITH A COPLT WHO I SHOULD HAVE SAT DOWN FOR A SERIOUS DISCUSSION ABOUT CREW COORD AND FO'S DUTIES AS SECOND IN COMMAND VS CAPT COMMAND AUTHORITY. I HAD NOT HAD THAT DISCUSSION, BUT MY PATIENCE WITH HIS METHOD OF OP HAD COME TO AN END AS WE DEPARTED HOLDING AND I MADE THE DECISION TO DIVERT. I HAD STRONGLY REMINDED HIM THAT I WAS THE CAPT AND WOULD MAKE THE DECISIONS AND THAT WE WOULD DISCUSS MORE ON THE GND. BOTH OUR MINDS WERE BUSY WITH THE DIVERSION, CONTACTING THE COMPANY TO ADVISE, FLYING THE ACFT, ETC, AND ON TOP OF THE MISHANDLING BY APCH CTL, MISSED THE IMPROPER FREQ AND THE CALL FOR LNDG CLRNC. I SHOULD HAVE MADE THE FREQ CHANGE, BUT BELIEVE THAT THE COPLT QUICKLY MADE IT WHILE FLYING AS HAS BEEN HIS PRACTICE OF FLYING WITHOUT GOOD CREW COORD ALL MONTH. I WAS AT FAULT FOR NOT CORRECTING THIS EARLY IN THE MONTH. THE INCIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED WITH EITHER GOOD APCH CTL HANDLING OR GOOD CREW COORD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.