Narrative:

Air carrier X at approach control request, we were maintaining best forward airspeed on final (250 KIAS) and cleared for visibility approach to runway 23. Started to slow at approximately 8 mi out. At 4 mi and slowing through 180 KIAS, on a normal 3 degree G/south, a small twin engine aircraft was observed turning final in front of and below us, approximately 1 mi ahead. We asked approach who the traffic was--no response. Asked again--no response. It was obvious we could not stay behind aircraft Y and complete the approach. Air carrier X initiated a missed approach, turned to right to avoid a near miss and then approach control issued a missed approach vector. This was followed shortly by approach to a different runway. I am sure that aircraft Y never saw us. Approach control never advised us of traffic, or the need to slow down to keep adequate spacing. No apology, no nothing! It was obvious to me that the other aircraft had been cleared for an approach, also. This incident demonstrates the need, in my mind, of TCAS. For some unknown reason, 2 aircraft were vectored into the same approximately piece of airspace and it did not trigger an alarm or get the controller's attention. Supplemental information from acn 145468: approach control requested we keep the speed up until 5 mi out. We did just that. We began slowing to normal approach speed. We noticed a smaller aircraft (small transport) turning a right base to final in front of us. We were approximately 2 mi out at the time and gaining fast on the aircraft ahead. West/O any warning from approach in regard to the traffic, we were told to contact clt tower. We did not go to tower so that we could inquire about the traffic ahead. Before we asked about traffic, however, the distance between us and the aircraft ahead was closing rapidly, so we initiated go around procedures. As we began our missed approach procedures approach came back quickly, 'are you still with me? If so, turn right heading 150 degrees.' we responded 'yes, we are. Verify right turn to 150 degrees.' 'affirmative. There's some traffic ahead I should have pointed out.' 'we see him; we were going to ask you about him.' we climbed to 3000' and were vectored for runway 18R clt. Approach control advised they were 'sorry,' and 'thanks for the help.' the captain called approach control not get anyone in trouble, but simply to find out what happened. He said the explanation was vague at best and was assured we did nothing wrong. Since we never heard the other aircraft speak with approach control, we have no idea what caused this incident. I can only guess that either the other aircraft did not comply with clrncs, or approach control made a major goof, or (more than likely) our 'keeping the speed up' was wither much faster or possibly slower than the controller anticipated. In any event, possibly an assigned airspeed with a landing sequence (including what type aircraft to follow) would have prevented the whole affair.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR X EXECUTED GO AROUND TO AVOID CONFLICT WITH ACFT Y.

Narrative: ACR X AT APCH CTL REQUEST, WE WERE MAINTAINING BEST FORWARD AIRSPD ON FINAL (250 KIAS) AND CLRED FOR VIS APCH TO RWY 23. STARTED TO SLOW AT APPROX 8 MI OUT. AT 4 MI AND SLOWING THROUGH 180 KIAS, ON A NORMAL 3 DEG G/S, A SMALL TWIN ENG ACFT WAS OBSERVED TURNING FINAL IN FRONT OF AND BELOW US, APPROX 1 MI AHEAD. WE ASKED APCH WHO THE TFC WAS--NO RESPONSE. ASKED AGAIN--NO RESPONSE. IT WAS OBVIOUS WE COULD NOT STAY BEHIND ACFT Y AND COMPLETE THE APCH. ACR X INITIATED A MISSED APCH, TURNED TO RIGHT TO AVOID A NEAR MISS AND THEN APCH CTL ISSUED A MISSED APCH VECTOR. THIS WAS FOLLOWED SHORTLY BY APCH TO A DIFFERENT RWY. I AM SURE THAT ACFT Y NEVER SAW US. APCH CTL NEVER ADVISED US OF TFC, OR THE NEED TO SLOW DOWN TO KEEP ADEQUATE SPACING. NO APOLOGY, NO NOTHING! IT WAS OBVIOUS TO ME THAT THE OTHER ACFT HAD BEEN CLRED FOR AN APCH, ALSO. THIS INCIDENT DEMONSTRATES THE NEED, IN MY MIND, OF TCAS. FOR SOME UNKNOWN REASON, 2 ACFT WERE VECTORED INTO THE SAME APPROX PIECE OF AIRSPACE AND IT DID NOT TRIGGER AN ALARM OR GET THE CTLR'S ATTN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 145468: APCH CTL REQUESTED WE KEEP THE SPD UP UNTIL 5 MI OUT. WE DID JUST THAT. WE BEGAN SLOWING TO NORMAL APCH SPD. WE NOTICED A SMALLER ACFT (SMT) TURNING A RIGHT BASE TO FINAL IN FRONT OF US. WE WERE APPROX 2 MI OUT AT THE TIME AND GAINING FAST ON THE ACFT AHEAD. W/O ANY WARNING FROM APCH IN REGARD TO THE TFC, WE WERE TOLD TO CONTACT CLT TWR. WE DID NOT GO TO TWR SO THAT WE COULD INQUIRE ABOUT THE TFC AHEAD. BEFORE WE ASKED ABOUT TFC, HOWEVER, THE DISTANCE BTWN US AND THE ACFT AHEAD WAS CLOSING RAPIDLY, SO WE INITIATED GAR PROCS. AS WE BEGAN OUR MISSED APCH PROCS APCH CAME BACK QUICKLY, 'ARE YOU STILL WITH ME? IF SO, TURN RIGHT HDG 150 DEGS.' WE RESPONDED 'YES, WE ARE. VERIFY RIGHT TURN TO 150 DEGS.' 'AFFIRMATIVE. THERE'S SOME TFC AHEAD I SHOULD HAVE POINTED OUT.' 'WE SEE HIM; WE WERE GOING TO ASK YOU ABOUT HIM.' WE CLBED TO 3000' AND WERE VECTORED FOR RWY 18R CLT. APCH CTL ADVISED THEY WERE 'SORRY,' AND 'THANKS FOR THE HELP.' THE CAPT CALLED APCH CTL NOT GET ANYONE IN TROUBLE, BUT SIMPLY TO FIND OUT WHAT HAPPENED. HE SAID THE EXPLANATION WAS VAGUE AT BEST AND WAS ASSURED WE DID NOTHING WRONG. SINCE WE NEVER HEARD THE OTHER ACFT SPEAK WITH APCH CTL, WE HAVE NO IDEA WHAT CAUSED THIS INCIDENT. I CAN ONLY GUESS THAT EITHER THE OTHER ACFT DID NOT COMPLY WITH CLRNCS, OR APCH CTL MADE A MAJOR GOOF, OR (MORE THAN LIKELY) OUR 'KEEPING THE SPD UP' WAS WITHER MUCH FASTER OR POSSIBLY SLOWER THAN THE CTLR ANTICIPATED. IN ANY EVENT, POSSIBLY AN ASSIGNED AIRSPD WITH A LNDG SEQUENCE (INCLUDING WHAT TYPE ACFT TO FOLLOW) WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE WHOLE AFFAIR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.