Narrative:

Air carrier X departed ord. Climb instructions were to climb on a south heading to 5000'. After crossing 4000' a climb clearance was issued for 6000' and read back. Soon after this readback, climb instructions were issued for FL220, with an expedited climb to 8000' (I believe), along with a heading. The copilot was flying and kept the nose up to maintain a good rate of climb (probably about 3000 FPM at 250 KIAS). I acknowledged the clearance and armed the new altitude. There were 1 or 2 garbled xmissions and then a transmission warning our flight of traffic ahead and to stop climb and return immediately to 6000'. The nose was pushed over to stop climb and power retarded. I reported the traffic in sight and the controller issued a maintain visibility clearance and insisted on a return to 6000'. We were more interested in a trajectory that would assure physical clearance from the other aircraft. During this maneuver, a turn right to 230 degrees was issued. I glanced at the altimeter and probably got back to around 6500' or so--between 6000 and 7000' anyway. In a few seconds, the traffic was no longer a factor and a new clearance was issued for FL220 and a south heading for eon. In an attempt to soothe the controller, I reported that it wasn't as bad as it looked, since we were watching the traffic in plenty of time. At this time the controller informed me he had issued the clearance to another flight! I replied that I wasn't aware of that. 1) to this day, I feel the clearance was issued to my flight. Since this type error is not uncommon, I may be proved wrong. 2) while the clearance to FL220 was being acknowledged, I looked right, forward and left, and immediately saw a possible westbound conflict at 10 O'clock above us. I even pointed out the traffic to the copilot and we agreed we'd watch. By this time, I could tell he was an large transport. (First sighting was at between 5-10 mi.) I even remarked, 'I wonder how this will work out?'. 3) I marked 'yes' on evasive maneuver, but it really wasn't. It was more of a prevention guarantee. Although the F/a's felt the pushover, they didn't think it was terribly unusual. 4) since we had a chance to establish our own trajectory, I feel we probably were more than 1000' apart on passing the other aircraft, probably doubly that. Observations: as in this case, trouble often comes from the issuing of problems in motion. A long readback is required. When the frequency is tied up, how can a controller say no to someone who has taken it in error? Even when the right person gets a long clearance, the frequency is tied up and the odds are all too high that some of it will have to be corrected or repeated. On the good side, see and be seen in VMC pays off again!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR X RESPONDED TO WRONG CALL SIGN. ACFT CLIMBED THROUGH ASSIGNED ALT. PLT DEVIATION.

Narrative: ACR X DEPARTED ORD. CLB INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO CLB ON A S HDG TO 5000'. AFTER XING 4000' A CLB CLRNC WAS ISSUED FOR 6000' AND READ BACK. SOON AFTER THIS READBACK, CLB INSTRUCTIONS WERE ISSUED FOR FL220, WITH AN EXPEDITED CLB TO 8000' (I BELIEVE), ALONG WITH A HDG. THE COPLT WAS FLYING AND KEPT THE NOSE UP TO MAINTAIN A GOOD RATE OF CLB (PROBABLY ABOUT 3000 FPM AT 250 KIAS). I ACKNOWLEDGED THE CLRNC AND ARMED THE NEW ALT. THERE WERE 1 OR 2 GARBLED XMISSIONS AND THEN A XMISSION WARNING OUR FLT OF TFC AHEAD AND TO STOP CLB AND RETURN IMMEDIATELY TO 6000'. THE NOSE WAS PUSHED OVER TO STOP CLB AND PWR RETARDED. I RPTED THE TFC IN SIGHT AND THE CTLR ISSUED A MAINTAIN VIS CLRNC AND INSISTED ON A RETURN TO 6000'. WE WERE MORE INTERESTED IN A TRAJECTORY THAT WOULD ASSURE PHYSICAL CLRNC FROM THE OTHER ACFT. DURING THIS MANEUVER, A TURN RIGHT TO 230 DEGS WAS ISSUED. I GLANCED AT THE ALTIMETER AND PROBABLY GOT BACK TO AROUND 6500' OR SO--BTWN 6000 AND 7000' ANYWAY. IN A FEW SECS, THE TFC WAS NO LONGER A FACTOR AND A NEW CLRNC WAS ISSUED FOR FL220 AND A S HDG FOR EON. IN AN ATTEMPT TO SOOTHE THE CTLR, I RPTED THAT IT WASN'T AS BAD AS IT LOOKED, SINCE WE WERE WATCHING THE TFC IN PLENTY OF TIME. AT THIS TIME THE CTLR INFORMED ME HE HAD ISSUED THE CLRNC TO ANOTHER FLT! I REPLIED THAT I WASN'T AWARE OF THAT. 1) TO THIS DAY, I FEEL THE CLRNC WAS ISSUED TO MY FLT. SINCE THIS TYPE ERROR IS NOT UNCOMMON, I MAY BE PROVED WRONG. 2) WHILE THE CLRNC TO FL220 WAS BEING ACKNOWLEDGED, I LOOKED RIGHT, FORWARD AND LEFT, AND IMMEDIATELY SAW A POSSIBLE WBND CONFLICT AT 10 O'CLOCK ABOVE US. I EVEN POINTED OUT THE TFC TO THE COPLT AND WE AGREED WE'D WATCH. BY THIS TIME, I COULD TELL HE WAS AN LGT. (FIRST SIGHTING WAS AT BTWN 5-10 MI.) I EVEN REMARKED, 'I WONDER HOW THIS WILL WORK OUT?'. 3) I MARKED 'YES' ON EVASIVE MANEUVER, BUT IT REALLY WASN'T. IT WAS MORE OF A PREVENTION GUARANTEE. ALTHOUGH THE F/A'S FELT THE PUSHOVER, THEY DIDN'T THINK IT WAS TERRIBLY UNUSUAL. 4) SINCE WE HAD A CHANCE TO ESTABLISH OUR OWN TRAJECTORY, I FEEL WE PROBABLY WERE MORE THAN 1000' APART ON PASSING THE OTHER ACFT, PROBABLY DOUBLY THAT. OBSERVATIONS: AS IN THIS CASE, TROUBLE OFTEN COMES FROM THE ISSUING OF PROBS IN MOTION. A LONG READBACK IS REQUIRED. WHEN THE FREQ IS TIED UP, HOW CAN A CTLR SAY NO TO SOMEONE WHO HAS TAKEN IT IN ERROR? EVEN WHEN THE RIGHT PERSON GETS A LONG CLRNC, THE FREQ IS TIED UP AND THE ODDS ARE ALL TOO HIGH THAT SOME OF IT WILL HAVE TO BE CORRECTED OR REPEATED. ON THE GOOD SIDE, SEE AND BE SEEN IN VMC PAYS OFF AGAIN!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.