Narrative:

A high-speed rejected takeoff occurred due to a red engine fail alert. The reject was made around 145kts with a V1 speed of approximately 157kts. Planned takeoff weight was 564;000 lbs. The engine fail light flickered several times before the reject was executed with no other indications or alerts. Once clear of the runway; the captain called for the rejected takeoff QRH procedure and then coordinated our return to the gate. Soon after clearing the runway; a level 2 brake overheat occurred. The captain called for the QRH and complied with the procedure. The brake temperature peaked at approximately 599 degrees C. During the taxi back in; a vibration was felt when taxi power was applied with an engine #1 compressor evm (engine vibration monitor) amber indication of 5.0. As more power was applied; the worse the vibration was felt. The captain then decided to secure the #1 engine and continue the taxi. At block in; maintenance was briefed of the incident. They inspected the #1 engine and found the rear portion of the turbine compressor destroyed. Maintenance then coordinated a FOD check of the runway given the amount of damage. There was evidence of damage to the #5 main tire that was possibly caused by the high-speed rejected takeoff. Among the three of us; none had ever experienced a real-life engine failure this close to V1. Given the fact of not having any noticeable yaw or banging sounds; the only evidence of an engine fail was the flickering red engine fail light on the glare shield. The event proved to be quite different from the V1 cut exercise experienced in training.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD-11 flight crew reported a high speed rejected takeoff due to an engine fail alert light.

Narrative: A high-speed rejected takeoff occurred due to a red ENGINE FAIL alert. The reject was made around 145kts with a V1 speed of approximately 157kts. Planned takeoff weight was 564;000 lbs. The ENGINE FAIL light flickered several times before the reject was executed with no other indications or alerts. Once clear of the runway; the Captain called for the REJECTED TAKEOFF QRH procedure and then coordinated our return to the gate. Soon after clearing the runway; a Level 2 BRAKE OVERHEAT occurred. The Captain called for the QRH and complied with the procedure. The brake temperature peaked at approximately 599 degrees C. During the taxi back in; a vibration was felt when taxi power was applied with an engine #1 compressor EVM (Engine Vibration Monitor) amber indication of 5.0. As more power was applied; the worse the vibration was felt. The Captain then decided to secure the #1 engine and continue the taxi. At block in; maintenance was briefed of the incident. They inspected the #1 engine and found the rear portion of the turbine compressor destroyed. Maintenance then coordinated a FOD check of the runway given the amount of damage. There was evidence of damage to the #5 main tire that was possibly caused by the high-speed rejected takeoff. Among the three of us; none had ever experienced a real-life engine failure this close to V1. Given the fact of not having any noticeable yaw or banging sounds; the only evidence of an engine fail was the flickering red ENGINE FAIL light on the glare shield. The event proved to be quite different from the V1 cut exercise experienced in training.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.