Narrative:

Flight from phl to msy. Center quite busy, vectoring us and others with developing rain showers in area. We were cleared direct mxe. (Note: I, the first officer, was flying; autoplt and my DME [#2] MEL'd, the captain's navigation was set to our next navigation fix,, EMI, J48 to determine pensy intersection on J48.) (also, after mxe, we were to track outbnd on the mxe 278 degree right to pensy intersection, J48, on course.) after a while center gave us a right turn to 280 degrees both the RMI and the to/from indicator on the #2 HSI indicated that mxe was still ahead to the southwest (the #2 DME MEL'd as inoperative). Uneasy about the assigned 280 degree heading, I asked the captain to tune in mxe on navigation 1. Sure enough his navigation showed mxe behind us. We cycled the #2 navigation frequency. The #2 needles showed approximately then, and worked fine the rest of the flight. I dismissed the 'nervous' needle of station passage to 'one of those things.' I never thought to look at the captain's #2 RMI needle--I don't know what it indicated. Captain was busy with radar. This wouldn't have happened if #2 DME was functioning. If the autoplt had been functioning, my mental load would have been reduced to allow more capacity for analysis, maybe would have figured it out sooner. I don't know what we could have done different. Obviously the #1 navigation had to be set up for J48. The #2 navigation indicators stuck. Had there been an accident we would have been blamed, yet we were following our navigation indicators--a possible example of the flaws of post-accident analysis.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG WITH NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT PROBLEM EXPERIENCES TRACK DEVIATION.

Narrative: FLT FROM PHL TO MSY. CENTER QUITE BUSY, VECTORING US AND OTHERS WITH DEVELOPING RAIN SHOWERS IN AREA. WE WERE CLRED DIRECT MXE. (NOTE: I, THE F/O, WAS FLYING; AUTOPLT AND MY DME [#2] MEL'D, THE CAPT'S NAV WAS SET TO OUR NEXT NAV FIX,, EMI, J48 TO DETERMINE PENSY INTXN ON J48.) (ALSO, AFTER MXE, WE WERE TO TRACK OUTBND ON THE MXE 278 DEG R TO PENSY INTXN, J48, ON COURSE.) AFTER A WHILE CENTER GAVE US A RIGHT TURN TO 280 DEGS BOTH THE RMI AND THE TO/FROM INDICATOR ON THE #2 HSI INDICATED THAT MXE WAS STILL AHEAD TO THE SW (THE #2 DME MEL'D AS INOP). UNEASY ABOUT THE ASSIGNED 280 DEG HDG, I ASKED THE CAPT TO TUNE IN MXE ON NAV 1. SURE ENOUGH HIS NAV SHOWED MXE BEHIND US. WE CYCLED THE #2 NAV FREQ. THE #2 NEEDLES SHOWED APPROX THEN, AND WORKED FINE THE REST OF THE FLT. I DISMISSED THE 'NERVOUS' NEEDLE OF STATION PASSAGE TO 'ONE OF THOSE THINGS.' I NEVER THOUGHT TO LOOK AT THE CAPT'S #2 RMI NEEDLE--I DON'T KNOW WHAT IT INDICATED. CAPT WAS BUSY WITH RADAR. THIS WOULDN'T HAVE HAPPENED IF #2 DME WAS FUNCTIONING. IF THE AUTOPLT HAD BEEN FUNCTIONING, MY MENTAL LOAD WOULD HAVE BEEN REDUCED TO ALLOW MORE CAPACITY FOR ANALYSIS, MAYBE WOULD HAVE FIGURED IT OUT SOONER. I DON'T KNOW WHAT WE COULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENT. OBVIOUSLY THE #1 NAV HAD TO BE SET UP FOR J48. THE #2 NAV INDICATORS STUCK. HAD THERE BEEN AN ACCIDENT WE WOULD HAVE BEEN BLAMED, YET WE WERE FOLLOWING OUR NAV INDICATORS--A POSSIBLE EXAMPLE OF THE FLAWS OF POST-ACCIDENT ANALYSIS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.