Narrative:

I was operating as PIC of a contract charter flight. I had departed from bfl and flown to onto via a center stored IFR flight plan. The flight proceeded normally. The landing on 26R at ont was normal and on rollout I wondered which way I was to exit the runway. I had been flying this run steadily, but I had not exited the runways in this area at night since 4/87. I secured the transponder to standby, secured the inverter for flight INS turned off the landing lights and activated the taxi lights, one in each wing leading edge. I was anticipating a right turn exit to taxiway november. I inquired from the tower which way to turn, I was instructed to turn left onto taxiway sierra and hold short of 26L at 74 for crossing to the guard ramp. As I taxied (I do not recall if I was on taxiway 42 or 52) I was looking in the darkness for taxiway sierra. At this point I should explain that in normal operations I conducted at ont I either taxi or exit on taxiway sierra east of taxiway 70, at this point the taxiway surface is white cement, west of taxiway 70 the sierra taxiway surface is black asphalt. Taxiway sierra evidently does not have blue taxiway identify lights. I taxied forward until I saw the lit white cement area and turned left. I noticed ahead he lights of a landing aircraft. As it came closer I thought it maybe a heavy jet, I was thinking, as I could see the right wing tip identify light, 'boy, those heavy jet wings sure hang over this taxiway.' I then realized I was not on the taxiway, but on 26L with an air carrier large transport Y approaching me on rollout. I went as far to the left of the runway as I could and announced on tower frequency, 'flight X is not on the taxiway, I am on the runway.' I then heard on the frequency, 'what the hell is this?' as the air carrier large transport Y passed off my right wing, about approximately 20' wing tip sep, I found a taxiway to the left, probably 62, and exited to the left to sierra, and right to 70, held short called the tower and said, 'please apologize to the large transport Y crew, I was in the wrong place.' the tower cleared me across to cross 26L and taxi to the guard ramp and to contact ground on 121.90. When I called ground control I was told to copy a phone #, and call the tower shift supervisor, for a possible report of pilot deviation. After unloading and repositioning the aircraft to the FBO for tie-down I called the phone # and spoke with the supervisor. In our conversation I related what had happened as I recalled it. She took the information for her report. She informed me that she did not want to file a report, but the large transport Y pilot had called her and was filing a report with his company. She said she had called flight standards, only received a recording, and I would be contacted. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: callback conducted to determine if runway and taxiway signage, lighting, charting or taxiway designators were contributory. Reporter noted that although taxiway south uses reflectors instead of lights (except at taxiway intxns), his own complacency was the cause. Further questioning by the analyst revealed that the reporter maintains the aircraft as well as flies it, and that his duty day (for maintenance) had started in the early am. At the time of the incident, the reporter had been working for about 12 hours, and although the reporter does not claim fatigue as a contributing factors, the analyst feels that fatigue is a major consideration. The FAA followed up on the incident, requiring what the reporter referred to as a 609 check. This was apparently a recertification procedure where the reporter was required to demonstrate his ability to safely efficiently taxi the aircraft at night at ont.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NEAR MISS (20') ON THE GND FOR ATX FRT ACFT AND ACR LGT.

Narrative: I WAS OPERATING AS PIC OF A CONTRACT CHARTER FLT. I HAD DEPARTED FROM BFL AND FLOWN TO ONTO VIA A CENTER STORED IFR FLT PLAN. THE FLT PROCEEDED NORMALLY. THE LNDG ON 26R AT ONT WAS NORMAL AND ON ROLLOUT I WONDERED WHICH WAY I WAS TO EXIT THE RWY. I HAD BEEN FLYING THIS RUN STEADILY, BUT I HAD NOT EXITED THE RWYS IN THIS AREA AT NIGHT SINCE 4/87. I SECURED THE XPONDER TO STANDBY, SECURED THE INVERTER FOR FLT INS TURNED OFF THE LNDG LIGHTS AND ACTIVATED THE TAXI LIGHTS, ONE IN EACH WING LEADING EDGE. I WAS ANTICIPATING A RIGHT TURN EXIT TO TXWY NOVEMBER. I INQUIRED FROM THE TWR WHICH WAY TO TURN, I WAS INSTRUCTED TO TURN LEFT ONTO TXWY SIERRA AND HOLD SHORT OF 26L AT 74 FOR XING TO THE GUARD RAMP. AS I TAXIED (I DO NOT RECALL IF I WAS ON TXWY 42 OR 52) I WAS LOOKING IN THE DARKNESS FOR TXWY SIERRA. AT THIS POINT I SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT IN NORMAL OPS I CONDUCTED AT ONT I EITHER TAXI OR EXIT ON TXWY SIERRA E OF TXWY 70, AT THIS POINT THE TXWY SURFACE IS WHITE CEMENT, W OF TXWY 70 THE SIERRA TXWY SURFACE IS BLACK ASPHALT. TXWY SIERRA EVIDENTLY DOES NOT HAVE BLUE TXWY IDENT LIGHTS. I TAXIED FORWARD UNTIL I SAW THE LIT WHITE CEMENT AREA AND TURNED LEFT. I NOTICED AHEAD HE LIGHTS OF A LNDG ACFT. AS IT CAME CLOSER I THOUGHT IT MAYBE A HVY JET, I WAS THINKING, AS I COULD SEE THE RIGHT WING TIP IDENT LIGHT, 'BOY, THOSE HVY JET WINGS SURE HANG OVER THIS TXWY.' I THEN REALIZED I WAS NOT ON THE TXWY, BUT ON 26L WITH AN ACR LGT Y APCHING ME ON ROLLOUT. I WENT AS FAR TO THE LEFT OF THE RWY AS I COULD AND ANNOUNCED ON TWR FREQ, 'FLT X IS NOT ON THE TXWY, I AM ON THE RWY.' I THEN HEARD ON THE FREQ, 'WHAT THE HELL IS THIS?' AS THE ACR LGT Y PASSED OFF MY RIGHT WING, ABOUT APPROX 20' WING TIP SEP, I FOUND A TXWY TO THE LEFT, PROBABLY 62, AND EXITED TO THE LEFT TO SIERRA, AND RIGHT TO 70, HELD SHORT CALLED THE TWR AND SAID, 'PLEASE APOLOGIZE TO THE LGT Y CREW, I WAS IN THE WRONG PLACE.' THE TWR CLRED ME ACROSS TO CROSS 26L AND TAXI TO THE GUARD RAMP AND TO CONTACT GND ON 121.90. WHEN I CALLED GND CTL I WAS TOLD TO COPY A PHONE #, AND CALL THE TWR SHIFT SUPVR, FOR A POSSIBLE RPT OF PLT DEVIATION. AFTER UNLOADING AND REPOSITIONING THE ACFT TO THE FBO FOR TIE-DOWN I CALLED THE PHONE # AND SPOKE WITH THE SUPVR. IN OUR CONVERSATION I RELATED WHAT HAD HAPPENED AS I RECALLED IT. SHE TOOK THE INFO FOR HER RPT. SHE INFORMED ME THAT SHE DID NOT WANT TO FILE A RPT, BUT THE LGT Y PLT HAD CALLED HER AND WAS FILING A RPT WITH HIS COMPANY. SHE SAID SHE HAD CALLED FLT STANDARDS, ONLY RECEIVED A RECORDING, AND I WOULD BE CONTACTED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: CALLBACK CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE IF RWY AND TXWY SIGNAGE, LIGHTING, CHARTING OR TXWY DESIGNATORS WERE CONTRIBUTORY. RPTR NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH TXWY S USES REFLECTORS INSTEAD OF LIGHTS (EXCEPT AT TXWY INTXNS), HIS OWN COMPLACENCY WAS THE CAUSE. FURTHER QUESTIONING BY THE ANALYST REVEALED THAT THE RPTR MAINTAINS THE ACFT AS WELL AS FLIES IT, AND THAT HIS DUTY DAY (FOR MAINT) HAD STARTED IN THE EARLY AM. AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT, THE RPTR HAD BEEN WORKING FOR ABOUT 12 HRS, AND ALTHOUGH THE RPTR DOES NOT CLAIM FATIGUE AS A CONTRIBUTING FACTORS, THE ANALYST FEELS THAT FATIGUE IS A MAJOR CONSIDERATION. THE FAA FOLLOWED UP ON THE INCIDENT, REQUIRING WHAT THE RPTR REFERRED TO AS A 609 CHK. THIS WAS APPARENTLY A RECERTIFICATION PROC WHERE THE RPTR WAS REQUIRED TO DEMONSTRATE HIS ABILITY TO SAFELY EFFICIENTLY TAXI THE ACFT AT NIGHT AT ONT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.